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Disaster  Study   Number    13 


INDIVIDUAL  AND   GROUP  BEHAVIOR  IN  A 

COAL  MINE  DISASTER 


Editors 
H.   D.   BEACH  and   R.  A.   LUCAS 


Disaster  Research  Group 


National  Academy  of  Sciences- 


National  Research  Council 


Publication  834 


DIVISION  OF 
ANTHROPOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY 

EMILW.HAURY,  Chairman 
CARL  PFAFFMAN,  Chairman  Elect 
NEAL  E.  MILLER,  Past  Chairman 

DAVID  A.  BAERREIS,  Member 
Executive  Committee 

ROGER  W.RUSSELL  Member 
Executive  Committee 

GLEN  FINCH,  Executive  Secretary 

GEORGE  W.  BAKER,  Technical  Director 
Disaster  Research  Group 


From  the  collection  of  the 


n 


m 


Prelinger 

i     a 

JJibrary 

t         P 


San  Francisco,  California 
2006 


DISASTER  RESEARCH  GROUP 

The  Disaster  Research  Group  is  an 
activity  of  the  Division  of  Anthropology 
and  Psychology,  National  Academy  of 
Sciences  —  National  Research  Council. 
It  succeeds  and  carries  on  many  of  the 
functions  of  the  Committee  on  Disaster 
Studies,  which  met  under  the  auspices 
of  the  Division  of  Anthropology  and 
Psychology  from  1952  to  1957. 

The  Disaster  Research  Group  con- 
ducts research,  sponsors  conferences 
and  publications,  and  advises  with  offi- 
cials on  problems  of  human  behavior 
in  disaster  and  civil  defense.  It  con- 
tinues publication  of  the  Disaster  Study 
Series  initiated  by  the  Committee  on 
Disaster  Studies. 

At  present  its  activities  are  supported 
by  a  grant  from  the  National  Institute 
of  Mental  Health  of  the  Department  of 
Health,  Education,  and  Welfare,  a  con- 
tract with  the  Office  of  Civil  and  De- 
fense Mobilization,  and  a  grant  from 
the  Ford  Foundation. 


INDIVIDUAL  AND  GROUP  BEHAVIOR  IN  A 

COAL  MINE  DISASTER 


Disaster  Study  Number  J3 

Qf* v  '<*"?"**-/'   /"y*  '"y  </  rl*y-1    t—erit '\*  t~*  >'  • 

Disaster  Research  Group 

Division  of  Anthropology  and  Psychology 


INDIVIDUAL  AND   GROUP  BEHAVIOR  IN  A 

COAL  MINE  DISASTER 


Editors 

H.    D.    BEACH 

Associate  Professor  of  Psychology 

Dalhousie  University 

Nova  Scotia 

and 

R.    A.    LUCAS 

Associate  Professor  of  Sociology 

Acadia  University 

Nova  Scotia 


Publication  834 

National  Academy  of  Sciences — National  Research  Council 

Washington,  D.  C. 

1960 


N_3 


Library  of  Congress 
Catalog  Card  Number  60-60096 


Ava;/ab/e  from 

Printing  and  Publishing  Office 

National  Academy  of  Sciences — National  Research  Council 
Washington,  D.  C. 

Price  $3.00 


Copyright©  by  the  National  Academy  of  Sciences,  1960 


PROJECT  STAFF 


(Mrs.)  Nellen  Armstrong,  Assistant  in  Sociology,  Acadia  Univer- 
sity,  Wolfville,   Nova  Scotia 

H.   D.   Beach,  Associate  Professor  of  Psychology,   Dalhousie  Uni- 
versity, Halifax,   Nova  Scotia 

L.   R.   Denton,   Clinical  Psychologist,  Nova  Scotia  Department  of 
Welfare,   Truro,   Nova  Scotia 

R.  A.   Lucas,  Associate  Professor  of  Sociology,  Acadia  Univer- 
sity,  Wolfville,   Nova  Scotia 

P.  N.  Murphy,   Psychiatric  Resident,   Dalhousie  University,   Hali- 
fax,  Nova  Scotia 

R.  J.   Weil,  Assistant  Professor  of  Psychiatry,   Dalhousie  Univer- 
sity, Halifax,  Nova  Scotia 


THE  BUMPS 

If  on  the  street  you  chance  to  meet 

A  man  who'r  pale  and  thin, 

With  sticking-plaster  on  his  face 

From  forehead  to  chin, 

And  his  whole  frame  shakes  at  the  steps  he  takes, 

And  his  head  is  full  of  lumps; 

You  may  surmise,  he's  one  of  the  guys 

Who  works  down  where  she  bumps. 

When  a  man  works  in  a  place  that  "kicks" 

He  is  up  against  no  joke; 

For  he  doesn't  know  when  she  might  let  go 

(And  she  hits  a  nasty  poke). 

He  holds  his  breath,  he  is  scared  to  death; 

Every  noise  he  hears,  he  jumps; 

For  a  man's  in  dread,   fear  he'll  lose  his  head 

When  he's  in  a  place  that  bumps. 

At  night  when  he  crawls  into  his  bed, 

He  can  scarcely  sleep  a  wink; 

He'll  lie  and  fret,   for  he's  all  upset, 

And  his  nerves  are  on  the  blink. 

If  he  falls  asleep,   out  of  bed  he'll  leap, 

For  he  dreams  he's  at  the  "face"; 

It's  a  darned  hard  row,   that  a  man  must  hoe, 

When  he's  in  a  bumpy  place. 

L1  Envoi 

So  when  the  old  West  Slope  is  bumping, 

And  all  the  boxes  are  "jumping"; 

When  there's  great  big  pebbles  falling  all  around 

Can  you  blame  the  guy  that  lingers, 

With  a  smoke  between  his  fingers, 

In  a  kitchen  where  the  roof  is  good  and  sound? 

-  A  Minetown  poem  attributed  to 

Dannie  Boutilier,   "The  Miners'  Poet" 


vii 


PREFACE 

With  the  publication  of  this  report,  the  thirteenth  in  the  Dis- 
aster Study  Series ,   another  agent  has  been  added  to  the  types  of 
events  which  have  been  previously  analyzed  in  the  series:    a  mine 
disaster.     The  pre-rescue  period  of  entrapment  for  the  victims  was 
especially  prolonged  and  stressful.     This  situation  provided  a  rich 
and  challenging  opportunity  for  the  staff  that  did  the  study.     Their 
skills  included  a  satisfactory  balance  of  psychiatry,  psychology, 
and  sociology. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  there  is  at  least  one  distinct  si- 
milarity- -geographical--between  this  report  and  one  of  the  pioneer- 
ing social  science  studies  of  disasters,   Samuel  Prince's  Catastro- 
phe and  Social  Change.     Both  the  1958  mine  "bump"  as  well  as  the 
1917  ship  explosion,   which  formed  the  basis  of  Prince's  study, 
occurred  in  Nova  Scotia  and  were  analyzed  by  residents  of  that  pro- 
vince.    Of  far  greater  significance  is  the  contrast  between  1917  and 
1958  research  concepts  and  techniques.     The  present  study  also 
attests  to  the  ability  of  the  1958  research  staff  to  construct  new 
techniques  in  order   to   obtain  a  more  systematic  assessment  of 
disaster  behavior. 

When  the  Academy-Research  Council's  work  in  the  area  of 
disaster  research  was  initiated  nearly  a  decade  ago,   more  than 
10,000  different  accounts  of  disasters  were  extant.     The  vast  ma- 
jority of  these  had  been  provided  by  popular  writers  and  journalists. 
The  need  to  supplement  this  kind  of  information  with  systematic 
scientific  research  was  central  to  the  Academy-Research  Council's 
decision  to  assist  in  the  study  of  human  behavior  in  disasters. 

The  present  report  is  focused  on  a  disaster  which  had  many 
dramatic  consequences  and  which  has  been  the  subject  of  a  number 
of  journalistic  accounts.     That  there  are  unique  differences  between 
the  way  a  journalist  and  a  behavioral  scientist  examine  and  report 
the  same  phenomena  is  fairly  obvious  to  most  readers.     Without  dis- 
paraging the  approach  of  the  journalist,   the  present  report  provides 
an  opportunity  for  illustrating  some  of  the  differences  between  the 
contributions  which  flow  from  these  two  sources. 

Support  for  this  study  was  made  possible  by  the  use  of  DRG 
funds  from  its  National  Institute  of  Mental  Health  and  its  Ford 
Foundation  grants.     Publication  of  this  report  does  not  necessarily 
imply  agreement  with  every  statement  contained  herein,   either  by 
the  Disaster  Research  Group  or  by  its  sponsoring  agencies. 

George  W.   Baker 
Technical  Director 
Disaster  Research  Group 
ix 


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

We  would  like  to  take  this  opportunity  to  express  our  thanks 
to  the  many  persons  and  agencies  who  have  contributed  to  this  pub- 
lication.    The  National  Academy  of  Sciences--National  Research 
Council  made  the  project  possible  by  its  financial  contribution. 
Harry  B.  Williams  of  its  Disaster  Research  Group  initiated  the 
study  and,   along  with  Charles  E.  Fritz,   gave  the  project  staff  the 
benefit  of  his  specialized  research  experience  in  disaster.    George 
W.   Baker  expertly  guided  the  project  from  the  stage  of  preliminary 
report  to  publication. 

The  collection  of  the  data  was  made  possible  by  the  coopera- 
tion and  assistance  given  by  the  people  and  officials  of  Minetown  at 
a  time  when  they  might  well  have  been  preoccupied  with  their  own 
difficulties.     The  miners  and  families  who  were  interviewed  and 
tested  are  to  be  specially  commended  for  the  willingness  and  gra- 
ciousness  with  which  they  supplied  information.     The  doctors  as- 
sociated with  the  Minetown  Medical  Clinic  assisted  in  both  personal 
and  professional  capacities.     R.   A.   Burden  of  Minetown  contributed 
invaluable  assistance  as  special  medical  and  technical  consultant. 

In' the  analysis  of  the  data,  the  project  staff  is  indebted  for 
the  contributions  of  Hugh  Vincent,  Psychologist,  D.  V.  A.  Hospital; 
David  Doig,   Psychologist,   Victoria  General  Hospital;  Solomon 
Hirsch,  Associate  Professor  of  Psychiatry,   Dalhousie  University, 
all  of  Halifax. 

Throughout  the  study,   special  assistance  was  rendered  by 
the  Nova  Scotia  Legislative  Library,   and  the  Minetown  and  Nova 
Scotia  Mental  Health  Associations.     Dalhousie  University,  Halifax, 
provided  office  space  and  equipment. 

J.  W.  Clark  and  William  H.  James  of  the  Psychology  Depart- 
ment, Dalhousie  University,  acted  as  editorial  assistants  in  the 
preparation  of  this  report.     Their  dedicated  interest  and  efforts 
contributed  greatly  to  the  monograph.     H.  J.  O'Gorman,   Jr.  , 
Hunter  College,  New  York,   made  many  valuable  suggestions. 
Dwi'ght  W.   Chapman,   Luisa  F.   Marshall,   and  Jeannette  F.  Rayner , 
members  of  the  Disaster  Research  Group  staff,  and  John  H.   Rohrer, 
consultant  to  the  Group  provided  important  critical  comment.    Mark 
J  Nearman,  also  of  the  Disaster  Research  Group  staff,   gave  splen- 
did assistance  in  editorial  work. 

H.  D.  B. 
R.  A.  L. 


xi 


CONTENTS 

List  of  Tables.    .    . xv 

List  of  Figures xvi 

Chapter  1             Methodology 1 

Chapter  2            Background  of  the  Disaster 7 

Chapter  3            Surface  Reactions  and  Rescue 15 

Chapter  4  Behavior  of  the  Trapped  Miners: 

A  Descriptive  Account 35 

Chapter  5  Behavior  of  the  Trapped  Miners: 

A  Quantitative  Analysis 67 

Chapter  6  Psychological  Data  on  Trapped  and 

Nontrapped  Miners 83 

Chapter  7  The  Relationship  Between  Psychological 

Data  and  Initiations 99 

Chapter  8  Psychological  and  Behavioral  Analysis 

of  Selected  Individuals 109 

Chapter  9            Evaluation  and  Summary 131 

Appendix  A:        The  Disaster  Services  in  Minetown    ....  141 

Appendix  B:        Medical  Findings  on  the  Condition  of 

the  Trapped  Miners 149 

Appendix  C:        The  Sentence  Completion  Test 153 

References  Cited  .                                             . 155 


xiii 


LIST  OF  TABLES 

1.  Three  Groups  of  Wives  Having  Different  Levels 
of  Involvement:     Post-impact  Response  by  Per 

Cent  of  Group 26 

2.  Three  Groups  of  Wives  Having  Different  Levels 
of  Involvement:     Waiting  Period  Response  by 

Per  Cent  of  Group 28 

3.  Psychophysiological  Symptoms  During  Entrap- 
ment:    Group  of  Twelve 61 

4.  Psychophysiological  Symptoms  During  Entrap- 
ment:   Group  of  Six 62 

5.  Rank  Order  by  Initiation  Perception,   "I"  Initia- 
tion,  and  Group  Evaluation  Scores:    Group  of 

Six 70 

6.  Rank  Order  by  Initiation  Perception,   "I"  Initia- 
tion,  and  Group  Evaluation  Scores:    Group  of 

Twelve 71 

7.  Rank  Order  by  Group  Evaluation  Score  in  the 
Escape  Period,  the  Pinned  Miner  Episode,  and 

the  Survival  Period:     Group  of  Six 74 

8.  Rank  Order  by  "I"  Initiation  Score  in  the  Escape 
Period,   the  Pinned  Miner  Episode,   and  the  Sur- 
vival Period:    Group  of  Six 75 

9.  Rank  Order  by  Initiation  Perception  Score  in  the 
Escape  Period,  the  Pinned  Miner  Episode,  and 

the  Survival  Period:     Group  of  Six 75 

10.  Rank  Order  by  Group  Evaluation  Score  in  the 
Escape  Period  and  the  Survival  Period:    Group 

of  Twelve 76 

11.  Rank  Order  by  "I"  Initiation  Score  in  the  Escape 

Period  and  the  Survival  Period:     Group  of  Twelve    ...       77 


xv 


12.  Rank  Order  by  Initiation  Perception  Score  in 
the  Escape  Period  and  the  Survival  Period: 

Group  of  Twelve 77 

13.  Comparison  of  Mean  Intelligence  and  Per- 
sonality Test  Scores  for  Trapped  and  Non- 
trapped  miners 88 

14.  Mean  Psychological  Test  Scores  of  Younger 
and  Older  Trapped  Miners,  and  Younger  and 

Older  Nontrapped  Miners 89 

15.  Correlation  Matrix  for  Trapped  Miners  (N  =  19)   ....       92 

16.  Correlation  Matrix  for  Nontrapped  Miners 

(N  =  12) 93 

17.  Mean  Intelligence  and  Personality  Test  Scores 

of  Eight- Day  Group  and  Six-Day  Group 95 

18.  Rank  Order  Correlations  Between  Test  Scores 
and  the  Three  Measures  of  Initiation  for  the 
Escape  and  Survival  Periods  Separately  and 

Combined  (N  =  18)  .    .    . .     100 

19.  Surface  Disaster  Relief  Services 142 

20.  Distribution  by  Category  of  Physical  and  Emo- 
tional Condition  and  Treatment  of  Trapped 

Miners   . 150 

21.  The  Physical  and  Emotional  Condition  and 

Treatment  of  the  Trapped  Miners  by  Code  Category  .    .     152 

LIST  OF  FIGURES 

1.  Diagram  of  No.   2  Mine  Showing  Area  of  Bump: 

'   Vertical  Section 9 

2.  A  Typical  Mining  Area:     Cross  Section 10 

3.  Location  of  the  Group  of  Twelve   While  Trapped: 

Ground  Plan    . 36 

4.  Location  of  the  Group  of  Six,  the  Pinned  Man, 
and  the  Semi-isolated  Man  While  Trapped: 

Ground  Plan 38 

xvi 


CHAPTER  1 
METHODOLOGY 


This  monograph  examines  individual  and  group  behavior  in  a 
coal  mine  disaster  that  killed  75  miners  and  trapped  19  more  under- 
ground from  6  1/2  to  8   1/2  days.     The  emphasis  is  on  the  men  who 
were  trapped- -their  behavior  during  entrapment,  their  physical 
and  particularly  their  psychological  state  after  rescue.     More 
briefly  considered  are  the  rescue  work,   the  miners  who  were  not 
working  at  the  time  of  the  disaster,   the  wives  of  the  trapped  miners, 
and  the  general  community  setting  of  Minetown,*  where  the  disaster 
occurred.     Families  of  disaster  fatalities  were  not  interviewed. 

The  fundamental  purpose  of  this  study  was  to  carry  out  basic 
research  in  human  behavior.     Specific  social  engineering  aims 
were  not  of  major  concern  and  the  investigators  did  not  set  them- 
selves to  answer  a  definite  set  of  practical  questions.     Rather  this 
project  attempted  to  follow  the  lines  of  scientific  method  as  closely 
as  possible  under  emergency  field  conditions.     As  far  as  possible, 
standard  procedures  and  techniques  were  used.     Where  no  conven- 
tional technique  was  available  for  a  particular  condition,  an  ex- 
ploratory one  was  attempted.     A  critical  appraisal  of  these  tech- 
niques might  well  assist  future  disaster  research. 

The  Minetown  disaster  situation  presented  a  number  of  ad- 
vantages for  research,   although  the  investigators  had  little  prior 
knowledge  of  the  situation.     The  trapped  miners  obviously  presented 
an  important  focus  for  the  study- -they  had  been  in  a  real-life  situ- 
ation directly  relevant  to  a  large  body  of  small  group  theory,   labora- 
tory studies,   and  natural  group  research,   and  they  had  experienced 
an  event  having  implications  for  important  problems  in  military  and 
civilian  life.     Also,  the  situation  limited  the  number  of  operating 
variables  and  provided  groups  that  might  be  compared,   facilitating 
a  semi-experimental  approach.     Further  the  situation  permitted  the 


#This  pseudonym  was  adopted  to  protect  the  anonymity  of  .respon- 
dents . 


study,   in  an  abnormal  but  natural  setting,   of  several  problems 
(leadership  and  morale,   and  their  personality  attributes)  that  have 
long  intrigued  social  scientists. 

The  entry  of  the  research  team  into  Minetown  was  accom- 
plished through  the  auspices  of  a  voluntary  psychiatric  community- 
relief  service  which  had  been  instituted  immediately  following  the 
disaster.     Although  this  enabled  the  team  to  fulfill  simultaneously 
two  functions- -research  and  therapy--it  made  relationships  more 
complex;  interviewer- respondent  relationships  were  at  times  mixed 
with  doctor-patient  relationships.      The  clinical  functions  that, 
willy-nilly,  team  members  were  called  on  to  perform  perhaps 
slightly  vitiated  the  scientific  detachment  and  objectivity  of  the 
study  as  a  whole  (Eaton  &  Weil,    1951). 

The  data  were  gathered  within  the  general  theoretical  frame- 
work of  psychiatry,  psychology,   and  sociology.     Most  of  the  data 
were  quantified  and,  where  feasible,   analyzed  by  standard  statisti- 
cal procedures.     Although  the  samples  were  not  large,  quantifica- 
tion was  stressed  in  an  attempt  to  exert  rigid  control  on  impression- 
istic observations. 

Subjects  and  Procedures 

The  data  for  this  study  were  collected  from  six  groups  of 
subjects: 

(a)  Nineteen  trapped  miners.     Thes\e  men  were  subdi- 
vided into  three  subgroups  by  thfe  nature  of  their 
entrapment  and  its  duration:     12  men  who  were 
trapped  in  one  location  for  61/2  days;  6  men  who 
were  located  in  a  different  place  and  were  rescued 
after  81/2  days;  and  one  man  who  was  in  semi- 
isolation  for  81/2  days  some  distance  from  the 
subgroup  of  six. 

(b)  Twelve  nontrapped  miners.     These  men  were  se- 
lected from  the  miners  who  had  worked  on  the  day- 
shift  during  the  day  of  the  disaster.     They  were 
matched  with  the  19  trapped  miners  for  age,   educa- 
tion,  religion,   marital  status,  and  type  of  work  per- 
formed in  the  mine.     Eight  of  the  nontrapped  miners 
had  participated  in  rescue  operations. 

(c)  Seventeen  wives  of  the  trapped  miners. 


(d)  Eleven  wives  of  the  nontrapped  miners. 

(e)  Ten  personal  service  and  professional  personnel  re- 
presenting the  services  generally  rendered  in  a 
small  mining  community,   like  Minetown.     They 
were  a  nurse,  a  school  superintendent,  a  school 
principal,   a  minister,   a  union  official,  a  store 
proprietor,  a  bank  manager,   a  medical  doctor,   a 
government  official,   and  a  mine  manager. 

(f)  Seven  wives  of  personal  service  and  professional 
personnel. 

All  the  data  from  these  76  subjects  were  collected  by  means 
of  interviews  and  psychological  tests  carried  on  from  5  to  23  days 
after  the  miners  had  been  rescued.     The  division  of  labor  among 
the  three  members  of  the  field  research  team  was  determined  not 
only  by  the  specialized  interests  of  each  member  but  also  by  the 
need  to  collect  the  data  quickly  and  by  the  psychiatrist's  previous 
service  role  in  the  community  during  rescue  operations.     The  psy- 
chiatrist interviewed  all  miners,   trapped  and  nontrapped.     The 
sociologist  interviewed  the  professional  and  personal  service  per- 
sonnel of  the  community  and  all  wives.     The  psychologist  admin- 
istered the  psychological  tests  to  the  19  miners  who  had  been  trapped 
and  to  the  12  nontrapped  miners. 

In  the  majority  of  cases,   the  psychiatrist  interviewed  a  miner 
only  once.     This  restriction  was  imposed  by  a  benefactor's  taking 
the  trapped  miners  on  a  vacation  from  Minetown  soon  after  their 
rescue.     The  psychiatrist's  interviews  were  focused  first  on  the 
individual's  experience  and  behavior  during  the  emergency  period, 
that  is,   from  the  time  of  impact  to  the  completion  of  rescue  opera- 
tions.    For  the  trapped  group,   this  involved  the  period  of  entrap- 
ment; for  the  nontrapped  group,   it  covered  the  period  of  rescue 
operations.     The  second  part  of  each  interview  covered  the  man's 
feelings  and  behavior  since  completion  of  rescue  operations,  and 
his  view  of  the  future.     The  final  part  of  the  interview  obtained  the 
man's  life  history.     An  attempt  was  made  to  use  the  nondirective 
metnod  of  interviewing,   especially  when  obtaining  the  miner's 
account  of  experience  in  the  disaster.     Subjects  were  interviewed 
in  the  hospital  or  in  their  homes.     All  but  five  of  the  31  interviews 
were  recorded  on  tape  and  later  transcribed.     The  psychiatrist 
made  notes  while  conducting  the  five  untaped  interviews  and  dic- 
tated his  report  of  the  interview  later  the  same  day. 

The  sociologist  interviewed  the  45  wives  and  the  personal  ser- 
vice and  professional  personnel  in  their  homes  or  at  their  place  of 


work,   using  a  prepared  questionnaire  form.     The  questions  were  fo- 
cused on  indications  of  preparedness  for  disaster,   first  reactions  to 
disaster,  and  activity  during  the  emergency  and  waiting  periods.    The 
interviews  were  conducted  in  a  somewhat  directive  manner,  with 
the  respondents  being  allowed  to  elaborate  when  they  wished.     Their 
verbatim  responses  were  written  on  the  questionnaire. 

The  purpose  of  psychological  tests  in  this  investigation  was 
to  measure  some  of  those  functions  that  might  be  affected  by  entrap- 
ment underground,   such  as  immediate  memory,  attention  and  con- 
centration, visual- motor  coordination,  analytic  thinking,  handling 
of  unstructured  material,  and  attitude.     The  objectives ,  together 
with  consideration  of  time  limitations  and  the  makeshift  research 
conditions,   decided  the  selection  of  the  following  tests: 

(a)  The  Vocabulary,   Digit  Span,  and  Block  Design  sub- 
tests  of  the  Wechsler  Adult  Intelligence  Scale 
(Wechsler,    1955). 

(b)  Counting  backwards  from  20  to  1,  and  counting 
backwards  from  100  by  7's. 

(c)  Bender-Gestalt  drawing  test  (Bender,    1938). 

(d)  Rorschach  ink  blot  test  (Rorschach,    1942). 

(e)  Sentence  Completion  test  (Appendix  C). 

The  Sentence  Completion  test  was  constructed  for  the  study 
expressly  to  elicit  information  about  the  subject's  fears  and  anxi- 
eties; expressed  needs;  evaluation  and  expectation  of  self  and  others; 
and  attitudes  toward  mining,  bosses,   leaders,   religion,  and  the  fu- 
ture. 

j 
The  exigencies  of  the  research  situation,  particularly  the 

limitations  of  time  and  the  miners'  susceptibility  to  fatigue,   made 
it  necessary  to  implement  modifications  of  the  test  battery  in  the 
field.     The  Vocabulary  subtest  was  given  to  only  17  trapped  miners 
andv3  nontrapped  miners.     The  memory  part  of  the  Bender-Gestalt 
test  was  omitted  after  the  first  few  subjects  expressed  considerable 
anxiety  and  took  an  undue  amount  of  time  trying  to  recall  the  figures. 
On  the  Rorschach,  the  inquiry,   that  is,  the  follow-up  questions  after 
the  initial  response,   disturbed  the  first  subjects,   took  a  long  time, 
and  gave  virtually  no  more  information  than  was  elicited  by  one  or 
two  general  questions  .     For  these  reasons  it  was  limited  thereafter 
to  two  questions:    (a)  "How  much  of  the  blot  looks  like.  .  .  ?"  and  (b) 


"What  about  the  blot  makes  it  look  like.  .  .  ?"     The  final  modification 
was  to  give  only  five  of  the  Rorschach  cards,   namely,   I,   III,   VI, 
VIII,   and  X.     This  change  may  raise  objections  from  clinicians,   but 
the  observance  of  the  standard  test  method  was  precluded  here  be- 
cause many  of  the  miners  were  too  tired  to  tackle  all  the  Rorschach 
cards.     Methodologically,   this  decision  is  justifiable  in  terms  of 
reliability  studies  of  ink  blot  cards  (Dbrken,    1950;  Frank,    1939; 
Hertz,    1934).     Moreover,   in  this  study  a  control  group  was  used  for 
comparative  purposes. 

Treatment  of  Data 


The  interview  responses  of  the  wives  and  nontrapped  miners 
that  were  relevant  to  particular  questions  were  coded  and  counted. 
The  section  dealing  with  their  experiences  and  behavior  also  makes 
use  of  descriptive  quotes  and  anecdotes  (Chapter  3).     Those  parts 
of  the  trapped  miners'  interviews  that  were  about  their  experience 
and  behavior  underground  and  that  were  essentially  nondirective 
were  subjected  to  a  content  analysis  in  terms  of  "initiations."   This 
made  it  possible  to  discuss  the  group  interaction  of  the  trapped 
miners  on  a  comparative  basis  (Chapter  5).     The  psychological  test 
data  were  all  quantified.     As  an  additional  means  of  quantifying  each 
miner's  personality  assets,   two  psychiatrists  analyzed  each  inter- 
view for  several  personality  attributes.     These  attributes  were 
rated  and  the  sum   of  the  ratings  was  taken  as  the  man's  psychiatric 
ego  strength  spore.     Psychiatric  ego  strength  and  psychological  test 
data  were  then  analyzed  within  and  between  groups  by  means  of 
statistical  techniques  (Chapter  6).     In  appraising  the  individual 
trapped  miners  in  terms  of  predisaster  history,  psychological  make- 
up,  and  role  behaviors  while  trapped,  quantitative  information  con- 
stituted the  primary  basis  for  inferences. 


CHAPTER  2 
BACKGROUND  OF  THE  DISASTER 


At  8:05  p.m.   on  October  23,    1958,   an  underground  upheaval 
devastated  No.   2  mine  in  Minetown.     Of  the  174  men  who  were  in 
the  mine  at  the  time,   74  were  fatally  injured,    100  were  rescued, 
and  one  of  these  died  of  injuries  two  weeks  later.     The  day  after 
the  last  body  was  removed  from  the  mine,   the  company  announced 
that  it  would  not  reopen  the  mine,   and  so  brought  ninety  years  of 
mining  operations  to  an  end  in  this  coal  mining  town.     This  study 
is  focused  on  the  subjects'  behavior  during  the  emergency  period.* 

The  Community 

At  the  time  of  the  disaster  Minetown  had  a  population  of  7,  138 
(Dominion  Bureau  of  Statistics,    1953).     The  majority  were   Protes- 
tants of  Anglo-Saxon  background,  with  a  fair-sized  Roman  Catholic 
minority.     There  were  also  a  few  Negroes.     Minetown  has  always 
been  a  town  of  families,  with  no  tradition  of  transient  immigrant 
labor  or  dormitory  coal  camps  such  as  Luntz  (1958)  observed  in 
Coaltown.     Eighty  per  cent  of  the  town's  families  were  home  owners 
Although  Minetowners  thought  of  themselves  as  belonging  to  a  stable 
community  with  a  high  degree  of  occupational  inheritance,   35  per 
cent  of  the  population  had  moved  into  Minetown  within  the  current 
generation.     For  the  most  part  they  came  from  the  immediate  ag- 
ricultural hinterland.     About  19  per  cent  had  been  in  Minetown  for 
three  generations. 

The  town  is  connected  to  the  main  railway  line  by  a  four- mile 
spur  line.    It  is  also  at  the  junction  of  two  highways.    The  surround- 
ing, mixed  agricultural  land  and  rocky,  wooded  terrain  provide  excel- 
lent hunting  and  fishing.     The  nearest  larger  town  is  55  miles  away. 

Minetown  has  been  a  one-industry  town:  the  economy  has  been 
almost  exclusively  dependent  on  coal  mining.     At  one  time  there  had 


#The  long-term  implications  of  the  disaster  for  individuals,   groups, 
and  the  community  as  a  whole  form  a  separate  study.     It  has  been 
conducted  by  largely  the  same  staff  that  conducted  this  study  in  1958 


been  several  mines,  but  at  the  time  of  the  1958  disaster  only  No. 
2  mine  WLIS  still,  working,  all  the  others  having  closed  for  reasons 
of  safety  and  economy.     Number  2  mine  employed  one  thousand  men. 
Only  twenty  people  were  employed  in  other  primary  production  in- 
dustries.    All  other  employed  community  members  were  engaged 
in  providing  personal  goods  and  services  to  mining  personnel  and 
their  families. 

The  Mine 


Number  2  mine  is  one  of  the  deepest  coal  mines  in  the  world. 
Figure   1  is  a  diagram  of  it.     The  mine  shaft  entered  the  earth  at  a 
slope  of  approximately  30  degrees.     At  a  distance  of  11,400  feet 
(called  the  11 ,400  foot  level),   and  a  vertical  depth  of  4,348  feet, 
the  slope  levelled  out  to  about  12  degrees.     The  main  slope  extended 
to  the  7,800  foot  level  and  was  joined  by  tunnels  to  the  back  slope. 

The  coal  was  bituminous,   lying  in  seams  8  1/2  to  9  feet  high. 
The  coal  was  raised  and  the  men  carried  in  and  out  of  the  mine  by 
means  of  an  outside  electric  hoist  that  lowered  one  "rake,"  or  group 
of  boxes  and  trollies,  while  another  was  being  hoisted.     At  the  top 
of  the  back  slope  a  second  electric  hoist  lowered  and  hoisted  rakes 
from  the  four  working  levels  on  the  east  side  of  the  mine:  the  12,600, 
13,000,    13,400,  and  13,800  foot  levels.     A  short  level  at  14,200  feet 
was  maintained  for  circulating  the  air  for  ventilating  the  mine. 

Air  pipes  conducted  compressed  air  to  the  machines  that  were 
used  on  the  coal  faces,   or  walls.     The  circuit  for  ventilation  was 
down  the  back  slope  to  the  14,200  foot  level  and  out  the  12,600  foot 
level.     The  temperature  in  the  mine  rarely  fell  below  80°  Fahren- 
heit and  rose  only  slightly  higher  in  some  locations. 

The  coal  was  mined  toward  the  slope  by  the  retreating  long- 
wall  method.     This  means  that  as  the  coal  was  removed  from  the 
walls  a  new  row  of  "packs,"  i.e.  ,   roof  supports,  was  built  behind 
the  worker  in  the  recently  evacuated  area  and  the  last  row  removed 
so  that  the  roof  was  allowed  to  fall  in  behind  the  new  working  area. 
This  unsupported  roof  area  was  called  in  Minetown  the  "waste," 
and  in  some  mining  communities  the  "gob."    As  the  miner  cut  coal 
out  of  the  wall,  behind  him,   in  order,  were  the  pan  line,  an  area 
with  a  roof  supported  by  packs,  and  the  waste  without  roof  support, 
sometimes  fallen  in,   sometimes  still  holding  (see  Figure  2).     The 
men  moved  up  and  down  the  travelling  road  between  the  rows  of 
packs  parallel  to  the  wall. 


—-"—"^^Z  ENGINE 
•£  HOIST 


AREA  INVOLVED  IN  BU 


/,'/  •< 


CONNECTING 
BETWEEN 


Figure   1.     Diagram  of  No.   Z  Mine  Showing  Area  of  Bump: 
Vertical  Section 


DROPOUT 
TRAVELING  ROAD 


Figure  2.     A  Typical  Mining  Area:     Cross  Section 


10 


When  taking  coal  out  of  the  wall,  the  miner  was  higher  than 
the  level  (see  Figure  2)  so  that  the  coal  ran  down  onto  a  pan  line, 
or  metal  trough.     This  trough  was  shaken  longitudinally  by  the  pan 
engine  to  slide  the  coal  down  onto  conveyors  which  moved  it  out  to 
the  loader  and  into  coal  boxes  at  the  end  of  the  level.     These  coal 
boxes  were  then  pulled  along  the  levels  on  tracks  by  stationary 
engines  and  cables  and  finally  up  the  slopes  to  the  surface  by  the 
hoisting  engines. 

The  men  worked  on  three  nonrotating  shifts.     Two  hundred 
worked  on  the  surface.     Eight  hundred  worked  underground,   each 
man  carrying  his  lunch  pail  and  a  large  can  of  fresh  water  of  greater 
quantity  than  would  usually  be  required  for  one  shift.     There  was  a 
wide  division  of  labor.     Of  the  men  underground,   270  were  "contract" 
miners,  those  who  actually  dug  the  coal  from  the  walls.    Before  be- 
coming miners,  they  had  to  be  physically  fit  and  have  experience  in 
the  mine,   special  training,  and  certification.     They  dug  coal  in 
groups  of  about  30  on  a  group  contract  basis  and  were  paid  accord- 
ing to  the  amount  of  coal  reaching  the  surface  from  their  walls. 
These  contract  miners  were  usually  in  the  mine  for  a  ten-hour  shift. 
This  permitted  them  to  work  an  eight-hour  day  at  the  coal  face. 
They  were  not  paid  for  travelling  the  long  distance  from  mine  portal 
to  coal  wall.     Total  earnings  were  divided  among  the  members  of 
the  group.     Contract  miners  earned  higher  pay  than  the  other  work- 
ers, particularly  if  they  belonged  to  a  high-producing,   cooperative 
group . 

The  remaining  530  underground  men  were  "datal"  laborers. 
They  worked  for  an  eight-hour  day,  portal  to  portal,   for  a  fixed 
day's  pay.     The  datal  laborers  supported  the  contract  miners  with 
many  different  services,   including  building  packs  to  support  the 
roof,   operating  hoists  and  machines,  and  cleaning  up  rubble.     A 
small  group,   called  "shift  men,"  cleared  the  mine  of  any  rubble 
and  maintained  and  checked  the  machinery  on  the  night  shift  when 
coal  was  not  mined.     The  datal  laborers,  usually  working  in  pairs, 
were  much  more  mobile  in  the  mine  than  the  contract  workers. 
Their  skills,  like  all  skills  in  the  mine,   required  few  formal  edu- 
cational qualifications.     They  were  learned  on  the  job  and  were  not 
readily  transferable  to  jobs  outside  a  coal  mine. 

Mining  Dangers 

Safety  precautions  were  necessary  because  coal  mining  is  a 
dangerous  occupation.     Minetown  miners  had  to  work  with  danger 
of  three  types.     First,  there  were  humanly  preventable  mine  ex- 
plosions,  which  brought  death  on  a  mass  scale:    two  major  mine  ex- 
plosions,  one  in  1891  and  one  in  1956,  had  killed  164  Minetown  miners 

11 


The  second  type  of  danger  the  miners  faced  continuously  was 
the  threat  of  individual  injuries  or  death.     Individual  accidents  in 
the  mines  had  killed  176  men,  an  average  of  two  deaths  per  year. 
Of  these,   96  were  attributable  to  human  error;  80  were  due  to  un- 
controllable and  unpredictable  forces  of  nature.*    There  had  been 
only  13  years  free  of  fatal  accidents  in  the  history  of  Minetown. 
Seven  of  these  were  prior  to  1900.     These  figures  do  not  take  ac- 
count of  deaths  caused  by  occupational  disease  due  to  methane, 
carbon  monoxide,   dust  particles,   etc.  ,   or  by  the  many  serious  in- 
juries. 

Individual  accidents  and  explosions  are  present  in  all  mines, 
but  a  third  threat,  the  "bump,"  is  found  only  in  certain  mining  areas. 
A  bump  may  be  described  as  a  sudden  bursting  of  the  coal  or  of 
the  strata  immediately  in  contact  with  it.     It  is  usually  accompanied 
by  a  loud  report  and  by  ground  tremors ,  which  are  sometimes  felt 
at  great  distances  from  the  point  of  origin.     The  primary  cause  of 
a  bump  in  a  coal  mine  is  believed  to  be  due  to  pressure  that  is 
exerted  on  the  coal  seam  and  its  underlying  strata  by  the  weight  of 
the  overlying  mass.     This  may  result  from  mining  operations,  par- 
ticularly when  mining  is  at  great  depths.     (Report.  .  .  ,    1959).     Bumps 
are  uncontrollable  and  completely  unpredictable,  and  in  Minetown 
they  occurred  frequently.     In  No.   2  mine,  they  had  been  a  major 
concern  to  workers,  the  company,  the  government,  and  geologists 
alike. 

Bumps  have  buried  or  killed  whole  groups  of  men  and  dislodged 
stones  that  have  required  the  combined  efforts  of  five  or  six  men  to 
move.     Other  bumps  have  shattered  the  coal  wall,  and  the  coal  has 
"run"  in  tons,   injuring  or  burying  workers  as  they  dug  to  reach 
buried  comrades.     Bigger  bumps  have  resulted  in  major  shifts  of 
the  strata  with  underground  roadways  being  heaved  against  the  roof. 
Trollies  of  several  tons  weight  have  been  crumpled  and  driven  into 
the  rock  and  coal. 

Preventive  measures  suggested  by  world  experts,  as  well  as 
by  local  folklore,  have  had  little  effect.     The  first  recorded  bump  in 
Minetown  occurred  in  1917  at  the  4,700  foot  level.    Subsequently, 
small  bumps  have  occurred  frequently,   and  periodically  there  have 
been  large  or  "district"  bumps.    Attempts  to  counteract  the  danger 


^Figures  especially  compiled  by  the  Legislative  Librarian  for  this 
study  from  the  annual  reports  of  the  Department  of  Mines  from 
1876-1956. 


12 


led  first  to  a  modification  of  "room  and  pillar  extraction,"  then,   in 
1925,   to  the  adoption  of  "retreating  longwall  mining."    Later,  the 
levels  were  widened,  additional  stonefilled  packs  built,  and  many 
other  modifications  made.     Some  deeper  levels  were  abandoned  be- 
cause of  severe  bumping.     None  of  the  modifications  have  eliminated 
the  occurrence  of  bumps.     In  all,    some  500  bumps  have  been  re- 
corded in  No.  2  mine.     Between  March  and  October,    1958,  under- 
ground personnel  recorded  17  bumps.     Although  these  17  were  all 
small  bumps,   50  men  had  been  injured,   one  fatally  (Report.  .  .  , 
1959). 

Safety  and  Rescue  Procedures 

Each  group  of  contract  miners  had  an  "official,"  who  was  a 
fellow  contract  worker  designated  by  the  company  to  look  after  the 
safety  of  the  group.     Checking  for  gas  was  one  of  his  responsibilities. 
Regulations  required  the  official  to  evacuate  the  area  if  the  methane 
content  reached  2.5  per  cent. 

A  few  contract  miners  with  long  experience  and  familiarity 
with  the  mine  became  "dreagermen.  "    Dreagermen  were  specially 
trained  in  rescue  work  and  were  the  first  to  enter  the  mine  in  the 
event  of  a  mishap.     They  wore  masks  with  a  two-hour  oxygen  supply, 
and  carried  38  pounds  of  special  equipment  that  allowed  them  to  work 
in  gas -filled  places.     This  job  provided  high  prestige,   but  no  extra 
pay.     In  all  levels  of  the  mine  for  each  shift,  the  company  had  desig- 
nated miners  to  be  responsible  for  directing  rescue  work  and  clean- 
ing up  when  an  accident  occurred. 

All  underground  workers,  at  the  start  of  their  shift,   changed 
into  their  pit  clothes  in  the  wash  house.    At  the  lamp  cabin  they  re- 
ceived their  lamps  in  exchange  for  a  metal  disc.     The  lamps  fitted 
on  their  hats  and  were  powered  with  wet-cell  batteries.     They  gave 
light  for  about  twelve  hours  without  recharge  and  could  be  turned 
off  and  on  by  the  miners  to  help  preserve  the  life  of  the  battery. 
These  were  the  only  lights  in  the  mine,   so  the  men  wore  them  con- 
tinuously.    The  lamps  were  numbered  with  the  men's  check  numbers, 
as  were  their  lamp  discs,   so  that  in  an  emergency  a  tally  of  per- 
sonnel in  the  mine  could  be  made  rapidly  by  counting  the  discs  on 
the  board  at  the  lamp  cabin.     A  badly  crushed  body  could  be  identi- 
fied by  the  number  stamped  on  the  lamp  battery  strapped  to  his  belt. 

An  "official"  in  the  mine  placed  each  man  in  a  particular  loca- 
tion and  noted  in  his  record  book  where  the  man  was  supposed  to  be. 
This  was  not  always  accurate  as  some  jobs  required  a  man  to  cir- 
culate considerably  in  the  mine.     The  official's  record  book,  how- 
ever,  did  provide  another  check  on  the  location  of  a  miner. 

13 


The  1956  Explosion 

The  last  major  disaster  in  Minetown  prior  to  the  1958  bump 
had  taken  place  two  years  before,  when  an  underground  coal  dust 
explosion  and  fire  trapped  127  men  in  No.   4  mine.     Two  dreagermen 
lost  their  lives  in  the  early  part  of  the  rescue.     Within  four  days, 
88  men  were  rescued  and  the  remaining  39  men,  who  were  known 
to  be  dead,  were  sealed  inside  the  mine  in  order  to  control  the  fire 
and  their  bodies  were  recovered  later.     Number  4  was  not  used 
again,   leaving  No.   2  mine  as  the  only  working  mine. 

Immediately  after  the  1956  explosion  occurred,  the  disaster 
organization  of  the  mine  was  put  into  action.     Dreagermen  entered 
the  mine  and  operated  in  smoke  and  carbon  monoxide.     Additional 
dreagermen  came  to  Minetown  from  other  mining  centers.     "Bare- 
faced" miners,  without  masks  or  oxygen,   carried  out  underground 
rescue  work  in  unpolluted  areas.     On  the  surface,  the  hospital  was 
prepared  for  emergency  service.     Relief  organizations  entered  the 
town  bringing  supplies  and  special  skills,   set  up  and  staffed  can- 
teens, auxiliary  hospitals ,  first  aid  centers  (one  of  which  was 
staffed  by  a  psychiatric  team),   and  other  services.     Townspeople 
manned  local  organizations.     Newsmen  and  commentators  covered 
the  story  from  the  pit  head.     All  available  space  was  taken  up  in 
the  community. 

Although  the  1958  bump  created  a  different  type  of  mine  dis- 
aster,  many  of  the  same  miners,   dreagermen,   and  rescuers  were 
involved.     It  affected  the  same  town  and  directly  reached  into  many 
of  the  same  homes.     Many  of  the  same  relief  organizations  with  the 
same  personnel  rushed  to  the  scene  and  took  up  the  same  locations 
and  duties.     The  1956  explosion  provided  many  patterns  that  were 
followed  in  1958.     Although  each  disaster  has  unique  aspects ,  and r 
consequently,  not  all  behavior  was  affected  by  the  earlier  prece- 
dent, the  fact  that  so  many  people  had  been  involved  so  recently  in 
large-scale  emergency  action  affected  many  facets  of  the  1958 
operations . 


14 


CHAPTER  3 
SURFACE  REACTIONS  AND  RESCUE 


The  bump  of  October  23,    1958,  was  the  most  severe  in  the 
history  of  Minetown.     The  shock  was  registered  on  a  seismograph 
800  miles  away.     The  bump  was  felt  as  a  distinct  tremor  in  com- 
munities 15  to  20  miles  away.     In  Minetown,   almost  everyone  felt 
the  ground  tremor. 

A  miner  who  had  been  on  the  day  shift  was  walking  down 
Minetown 's  Linden  Street  at  the  moment  of  impact.     He  reported: 

I  thought  some  kids  put  a  bomb  under  Jim  Brown's 
house.     I  said,   "What  in  the  hell's  that?"  and  he  said, 
"I  don't  know!"    And  then  a  neighbor  came  out  and  she 
hollered,   "What  was  that?"  and  I  said,   "I  don't  know." 
So  I  ran  home,   and  I  said,   "Mary,   did  you  feel  that 
bump?"  And  she  said,    "It  knocked  me  off  the  couch." 
And  I  said,   "Lord  God!   it's  the  whole  three  walls 
must  have  went!  "  and  I  ran  to  the  pit. 

Four  thousand  feet  underground,   one  of  the  174  miners  work- 
ing in  the  mine  had  just  stepped  over  the  seat  of  the  trip  car  when 
the  bump  rocked  the  mine: 

I  can't  recall  how  long  I  was  out;  it  might  have 
been  a  day  or  an  hour  or  it  could  have  been  five 
minutes.     I  really  don't  know.     When  I  came  to,   every- 
thing was  right  to  the  roof;  the  rails  and  the  unit  that 
I  was  operating  was  just  a  mass  of  steel.     It  was  all 
smashed  and  drove  right  into  the  pack.     Nearly  every- 
thing was  right  to  the  roof.     I  don't  know  how  I  got  out 
myself;  there  was  a  space  there  about  six  or  eight 
inches  in  height.     I  must  have  got  through  it,  but  I 
don't  remember  coming  through  it  myself. 

In  one  of  the  homes  in  Minetown,  the  wife  of  a  miner  who  was 
at  work  in  the  mine  was  sitting  alone  in  her  dining  room  watching 
television: 


15 


I  knew  exactly  what  happened.     It  is  hard  to  ex- 
plain, but  it  just  felt  like  the  whole  world  hit  the  house; 
it  was  terrific.     I  knew  it  was  a  bump  and  I  thought  of 
my  husband  in  the  mine.     I  said  right  out  loud,    "My 
God  above,   it  happened!"    My  husband  had  always  said, 
"If  anything  ever  goes  wrong  at  the  pit,   don't  go  near 
the  mine."    So  I  immediately  went  to  my  sister's  next 
door.     When  we  heard  it  over  the  radio  I  was  worried 
about  my  daughter  who  is  a  stenographer  in  Yorktown. 
She  would  hear  the  radio  and  be  very  worried  about 
her  father.     At  that  time,   I  expected  word  about  the 
men  by  midnight,  and  I  wanted  my  two  daughters  home 
then. 

Several  streets  away,  a  nurse  felt  the  impact  and  after  check- 
ing everything  in  the  house  decided  that  it  must  be  a  bump.     She 
was  terrified  at  the  thought  of  the  seriousness  of  the  impact.     She 
cried.     She  went  to  her  neighbors  to  confirm  her  conclusion.     From 
there  she  went  to  the  pit  head,  heard  a  report  that  the  men  were 
all  right,   and  returned  to  her  home.     Later  she  went  to  bed,   only 
to  get  up  again,   dress,   recheck  the  seriousness  of  the  bump,  and 
subsequently  report  to  the  hospital. 

Although  the  main  focus  of  this  study  is  on  the  miners  trapped 
in  the  mine,  brief  consideration  will  be  given  to  the  rescuers,   res- 
cue operations,   and  the  waiting  miners'  wives.     First,   the  off- 
shift  miners  who  were  in  the  town  on  the  evening  of  the  bump  will 
be  discussed. 

Off -shift  Miners 


It  has  been  noted  in  many  disaster  studies  that  if  persons  or 
groups  have  no  forewarning  or  expectation  of  the  impact  of  a  disaster, 
they  initially  tend  to  define  or  interpret  the  event  in  terms  of  cues 
that  are  familiar  to  them  (Committee  on  Disaster  Studies,    1955). 
This  tendency  to  assimilate  disaster  cues  to  normal  or  usual  expec- 
tations has  been  reported  in  virtually  every  disaster  study  (Fritz  &c 
Rayner,    1955;  Marks  &  Fritz,    1954;  Spiegel,    1957;  Young,    1953). 
Minetown  serves  as  an  unusual  situation  in  which  to  observe  the 
reaction  to  first  impact  because  the  citizens  and  particularly  the 
miners  themselves,  were  skilled  in  mine  lore  and  the  signs  and  sig- 
nals of  tragedy.     A  bump  of  such  great  intensity,  however,  was  a 
unique  experience  for  identification  and  interpretation  against  these 
well-known  cues. 


16 


Twelve  miners  who  were  off  shift  at  the  time  of  the  bump  were 
interviewed.     None  was  alone  when  the  bump  occurred.     Six  of  the 
12  said  they  immediately  recognized  the  tremor  as  a  bump.     Al- 
though they  thus  judged  correctly,   they  talked  to  the  interviewer  in 
similes  that  they  thought  the  interviewer  would  understand:     "It  felt 
like  a  big  truck  hit  the  house,"  or,   "It  felt  like  the  house  had  fallen 
off  its  foundation." 

Five  thought  the  impact  was  something  other  than  a  bump:    a 
bomb,   a  fallen  stool,   children  upstairs,   or  a  truck  hitting  the  house. 
The  other  miner  from  the  12  interviewed  was  driving  his  car  at  the 
time  and  was  unaware  that  the  impact  had  taken  place. 

Clearly,   although  all  Minetowners  were  at  least  knowledgeable 
in  mining  matters,   it  was  primarily  those  that  had  relatives  in  the 
mine  at  the  time  of  impact  who  immediately  interpreted  the  impact 
as  a  bump.     Five  of  the  6  miners  that  immediately  interpreted  the 
impact  as  a  bump  had  relatives  in  the  mine  at  the  time;   15  of  the  17 
wives  that  had  husbands  in  the  mine  at  the  time  did  likewise.     On 
the  other  hand,   of  the  6  off -shift  miners  that  did  not  have  relatives 
in  the  mine  at  the  time,   all  interpreted  the  impact  as  something  other 
than  a  bump,   as  did  half  of  the   18  wives  whose  husbands  were  not 
in  the  mine  at  the  time.     This  direct  personal  involvement  rather 
than  a  general  background  and  orientation  seems  largely  to  account 
for  the  difference.     However,   an  important  question  remains  un- 
answered:   why  did  none  of  the  non-personally  involved  miners,   all 
of  whom  were  experienced  with  bumps,  not  identify  the  event  cor- 
rectly? 

The  degree  of  general  background  and  orientation  may  be  a 
factor  in  the  apparent  accuracy  of  interpretation  of  a  disaster  event. 
Whereas  62  per  cent  of  all  subjects  in  this  study  made  a  specific 
and  correct  interpretation,   only  10  per  cent  in  Killian's  (1956) 
sample  made  a  comparable  interpretation. 

Virtually  every  disaster  account  makes  reference  to  the  jam- 
ming of  telephone  facilities  when  a  slightly  increased  percentage  of 
the  population  attempts  to  use  the  system  simultaneously  (Fritz  & 
Mathewson,    1957).     Minetown  was  no  exception.     A  number  of  people 
reported  that  they  were  unable  to  complete  telephone  calls  success- 
fully.    But  while  all  the  off- shift  miners  confirmed  or  redefined  their 
original  conclusions  about  the  nature  of  the  tremor  within  a  few 
minutes,    only  one  reported  using  the  telephone.     The  majority 
carried  out  their  social  confirmation  in  the  group  in  which  they  found 
themselves  at  the  time  of  impact.     In  addition,  about  half  of  the 
sample  of  miners  confirmed  their  first  impressions  with  a  larger 
group  on  the  street  or  with  neighbors. 

17 


Rumors  are  present  in  virtually  every  disaster  situation 
(Prasad,    1935).     The  situation  in  the  first  few  minutes  after  the 
impact  was  particularly  susceptible  to  rumor,   for  rumor  increases 
with  the  importance  of  the  subject  to  the  individuals  concerned  and 
with  the  ambiguity  of  evidence  pertaining  to  the  topic  at  issue  (All- 
port  &  Postman,    1947).     One  of  the  off-shift  miners  had  his  parti- 
cular interpretation  of  the  bump  verified  in  informal  discussion: 

In  the  street  they  told  me  that  the  bump  had  been  in 
the  waste,  and  no  one  was  hurt.     If  it  was  in  the  waste, 
that's  happened  so  often  it  just  doesn't  mean  anything. 

This  was  accepted  by  this  experienced  miner  long  before  any  accu- 
rate information  could  possibly  be  available.     Things  people  ex- 
pected to  happen  were  reported  as  having  happened  (cf .  ,   Larson, 
1954). 

All  but  one  of  the  miners  interviewed  went  to  the  mine  within 
a  few  minutes  of  the  impact.     This  particular  case  of  convergence 
at  a  disaster  site  illustrates  a  number  of  separate  categories  of 
convergence  as  specified  by  Fritz  and  Mathewson  (1957).     The  off- 
shift  miners  converged  upon  the  mine,  not  only  for  information  and 
evaluation  of  the  bump,  but  also  as  helpers  responding  to  the  infor- 
mal social  code  of  miners  that  they  assist  in  rescue  operations  as 
soon  as  a  disaster  occurs.     They  were  helpers  on  an  informal 
voluntary  system  and  were  simultaneously  integrated  into  the  exist- 
ing formal  structure  of  rescue  operations.     In  addition,   each  was 
anxious  about  relatives  or  friends. 

Miners  who  volunteered  for  rescue  work  were  the  supporters 
of  families,  and  in  volunteering  they  were  risking  their  families' 
support  as  well  as  their  lives.     Yet  nowhere  in  the  inverviews  was 
there  any  suggestion  of  the  conflicting  loyalties  reported  in  other 
disaster  rescue  studies  (Killian,    1952).     Rescue  work  was  regarded 
as  a  duty  to  friends,  co-workers,  and  the  occupation;  it  was  part  of 
the  discipline  of  their  work.     Some  had  relatives  in  the  mine.     Others 
had  themselves  been  saved  in  previous  mine  disasters.     The  majori- 
ty had  a  general  identification  with  their  fellow  miners  by  virtue  of 
their  common  occupation  and  the  knowledge  that  they  themselves 
might  face  a  similar  situation  in  the  future  (cf.  ,  Marks  &  Fritz, 
1954). 

If  the  loyalties  to  these  various  groups  and  ideals  had  been 
weighed  against  loyalty  to  the  family,   it  would  be  expected  that  the 
multiple  loyalties  symbolized  by  entering  the  mine  would  have  far 
outweighed  the  responsibility  to  the  family.     There  was  no  evidence, 

18 


however,   that  the  issues  were  weighed,  apparently  because  the 
family  itself  had  loyalty  to  the  miners'  norms.     The  wives  had  rel- 
atives,  friends,   and  husbands  of  friends  trapped  in  the  mine,  and 
the  wives  had  to  live  in  a  community  in  which  behavior  was  judged 
in  part  by  the  males'  conformity  to  the  code.     In  no  interview  could 
any  reservation  concerning  a  husband's  decision  on  the  part  of  the 
miners'  wives  be  found.     Rather  than  conflicting  group  norms, 
Minetown  rescue  behavior  illustrates  the  reinforcement  of  common 
values  shared  by  multiple  groups. 

In  the  sample  of  12  off-shift  miners,   8  took  part  in  rescue 
operations,   and  of  these  8,    5  suggested  that  it  was  the  "natural" 
thing  to  do  —  implying  the  informal  code:     "My  idea  was  to  get  down 
and  see  what  I  could  do  below."    One  miner  also  spoke  specifically 
of  relatives:     "I  worked  till  it  was  done,   till  it  was  over  —  I  brought 
up  my  brother."    On  the  other  hand,   three  were  officially  ap- 
proached and  specifically  assigned:     "We  was  asked  to  be  there-- 
we've  always  been  on  what  they  call  the  wrecking  crew."    But  the 
informal  social  code  of  rescue,   social  pressures,   and  knowledge 
of  appropriate  role  did  not  mean  that  a  rescuer  was  able  to  fulfill 
it.     One  of  the  men  had  a  physical  disability  that  precluded  rescue 
work;  one  was  unable  to  participate  because  of  "nervous"  reasons; 
and  one  gave  no  explanation.     The  fourth  stayed  within  the  code; 
he  volunteered  but  was  not  accepted: 

I  heard  they  wanted  volunteers  to  go  down,   so  about 
fifteen  minutes  after,   I  went  over.     And  he  said,   "Well, 
the  amount  of  men  we  wanted  we  just  got."    So  I  said, 
"There's  no  need  of  my  services"  and  went  back  and 
never  bothered  them  no  more. 

The  miner  who  could  not  face  the  task  because  of  nervous- 
ness discussed  the  breaking  of  his  own  expectations  and  the  group 
code  in  this  way: 

I  tried  to  go  down,   but  I  couldn't--!  was  in  rescue 
work  before,   and  I  don't  know  if  I  lost  my  nerve  or 
what,   but  I  just  couldn't.     I  couldn't  make  it,   and  that's 
all.     What  I  thought  about  was  if  I  went  down  there  and 
went  all  to  pieces  I  would  have  to  have  two  men  bring 
me  up,   and  where  those  two  men  could  continue  on  and 
do  something  valuable.     That's  the  way  I  figured  it. 

One  of  the  men  who  was  assigned  reported  reluctance  when 
he  was  telephoned: 


19 


When  they  did  call  on  me,   it  came  as  quite  a  shock 
because  I  figured  they  had  lots  of  men  and  they  wouldn't 
need  me.     And  when  they  did,   it  left  kind  of  a  hollow 
feeling  in  my  stomach.     I  wouldn't  want  to  have  that  ex- 
perience again,  not  even  going  down  as  a  rescuer.     I 
don't  think  I'd  volunteer  again  really. 

The  miners,  however,  were  not  all  forced  to  make  a  public 
decision  if  they  did  not  wish  to  do  rescue  work.     Few  were  formally 
recruited  or  telephoned  personally  by  those  responsible  for  mine 
rescue  crews.     Many  more  than  the  60  or  70  rescuers  needed  on 
each  shift  were  available;  therefore,   it  is  impossible  to  determine 
just  how  many  did  not  report  or  volunteer  on  their  respective  shifts 
as  a  personal  choice. 

Rescue  Operations 

The  Royal  Commission  (Report.  .  .  ,    1959)>    stated  that  it  is  a 
matter  of  commendation  that  within  minutes  of  the  knowledge  of  the 
bump  rescue  operations  were  set  in  motion.     Immediately  after  the 
mine  manager  felt  the  bump  at  8:05  p.m.  ,  he  telephoned  the  chain 
runner  stationed  on  the  7,800  foot  level.     He  was  informed  that 
everything  was  in  order  on  the  main  slope;  however,  no  communica- 
tion was  available  with  the  sections  below  the  7,800  foot  level.     Ar- 
rangements were  made  to  hoist  the  coal  cars  on  the  slopes  to  clear 
the  way  so  that  "man  rakes"  could  be  lowered  with  rescue  personnel. 
Fans  were  checked  and  found  in  good  running  order,   but  power  was 
not  available  in  large  sections  of  the  mine. 

Mine  exploration  and  rescue  of  this  type  is  a  specialized  and 
highly  intricate  operation.     Unlike  other  similar  Situations  in  which 
outside  direction  was  needed  (Gordon  &  Raymond,    1952),   the  entire 
operation  was  meticulously  carried  out  by  the  Minetown  company 
and  its  employees .     No  direction  from  outside  the  community  was 
required. 

The  surface  plant  was  placed  on  the  disaster  organization  plan. 
The  rescue  station  was  opened,  and  the  gas -analyzing  apparatus  pre- 
pared to  run  complete  determinations.  Senior  officials  were  notified 
and,  after  consultation  with  the  rescue  superintendent,  arrangements 
were  made  for  additional  dreagermen  and  equipment  from  other  coal 
communities  . 

The  dreagermen  arrived  at  the  mine,   and  many  miners  who 
had  come  to  the  pit  head  volunteered  for  rescue  work  as  "barefaced 
miners."     Barefaced  miners  work  in  gas-free  areas  on  an  eight- 
hour  shift  and,   unencumbered  by  masks  and  oxygen  equipment,   they 
can  work  harder  and  in  more  difficult  positions  than  the  dreagermen. 

20 


At  8:40  p.m.  ,  the  mine  manager  entered  the  mine  with  13 
men  including  representatives  of  the  Union  and  the  Department  of 
Mines.     First,   communication  was  restored  to  the  13,400  foot  level. 
It  was  reported  that  the  inside  end  of  the  13,000,    13,400,  and  13,800 
foot  levels  was  closed  off  outside  the  walls  and  no  word  had  been  re- 
ceived from  any  of  the  men  on  the  wall  faces. 

About  9:30  p.m.  ,  the  rescue  party  reached  the  13,400  foot 
level  where  it  found  the  level  blocked  by  methane  gas.     The  party 
then  made  its  way  to  the  13,800  foot  level.     One  badly  injured  man 
was  found.     Thirty  additional  men,   including  a  doctor,   were  called 
down  to  aid  other  possible  injured.     At  11:30  p.m.  ,    12  live  men  and 
a  fatally  injured  man  were  found.     The  live  men  were  sent  to  the 
surface  immediately.     At  about  1:30  a.m.  ,  the  bottom  of  the  13,400 
foot  level  wall  was  reached  and  11  men  were  rescued  and  sent  to  the 
surface. 

Of  the  174  men  in  the  mine,   81  were  rescued  or  escaped  with- 
in 24  hours.     Nineteen  of  these  were  injured,   some  severely.     This 
bump  was  unique  in  that  it  occurred  at  the  coal  face,  or  wall,  and 
not  in  the  levels  where  bumps  usually  struck.     As  a  consequence, 
most  of  the  81  men  who  came  out  alive  had  been  in  the  levels  and 
slopes  at  the  time  of  the  shock.     However,   some  of  them  had  been 
in  areas  on  the  wall  where  destruction  was  not  complete.     It  was 
not  known  whether  anyone  had  survived  at  the  top  of  the    13,400  foot 
level  wall  and  along  the  13,000  foot  level  wall,   since  all  entrances 
to  these  areas  were  blocked  by  solid  falls  of  stone,   coal,   and  debris. 

Rescue  work  proceeded  without  pause,   directed  by  the  mine 
manager.     After  the  first  24  hours,  between  150  and  200  miners, 
divided  into  their  regular  shifts,  worked  at  rescue.     They  operated 
in  teams,   each  team  with  a  complete  range  of  skills.     The  four 
local  dreagermen  teams  were  reinforced  by  48  dreagermen  from 
other  coal  mining  towns.     Three  doctors  entered  the  mine  from 
time  to  time  when  necessary. 

This  underground  rescue  operation  was  supported  at  the  pit 
head  by  a  multiplicity  of  special  services  that  had  converged  upon 
Minetown  from  a  radius  of  150  miles.     At  the  time  of  the  bump,  it 
was  not  known  how  many  injured  men  would  have  to  be  cared  for. 
Emergency  and  relief  agencies  dispatched  teams  and  equipment  to 
the  town;  army  and  civil  defense  units  moved  in;  first  aid  stations 
were  set  up  at  the  pit  head;  mobile  kitchens  were  opened;  supplies 
of  oxygen  were  rushed  in;  a  community  psychiatric  service  was 
staffed  around  the  clock.     The  majority  of  these  services  and  per- 
sonnel had  rushed  to  Minetown  for  the  1956  explosion,   and  this 

21 


previous  experience  patterned  their  spatial  location  and  the  division 
of  labor  during  the   1958  bump  with  a  minimum  of  confusion.     The 
list  of  the  main  services  and  an  appraisal  of  their  effectiveness  is 
found  in  Appendix  A. 

The  Royal  Commission  (Report.  .  .  ,    1959)    reports  that  rescue 
operations  were  carried  out  under  almost  impossible  conditions  and 
the  rescue  of  a  large  number  of  men  was  brought  about  by  the  con- 
tinued and  persistent  efforts  on  the  part  of  those  engaged  in  the  res- 
cue work.     Under  normal  operations  there  was  a  height  of  over  eight 
feet  along  the  wall  faces  and  levels,  but  the  violent  upthrust  of  the 
floor  reduced  the  height  to  about  three  feet  and,  at  intervals,   to 
much  less.     Coal  ribs  had  burst  and  pushed  into  the  level  approaches, 
completely  closing  them.     In  addition  to  this,  the  ventilation  was 
disrupted.     Roads  and  equipment  we  re  thrust  against  the  roof  creat- 
ing additional  obstacles  that  retarded  and  handicapped  the  rescue 
operations. 

Dreagermen  continued  to  work  at  the  restoration  of  ventilation 
for  the   12,600,    13,000  and  13,400  foot  levels.     The  barefaced  miners 
had  to  exercise  great  care  in  their  work,   as  it  was  feared  that  the 
removal  of  any  coal  under  stress  could  result  in  another  bump.     The 
men  engaged  in  rescue  work  were  in  constant  danger.     They  were 
aware  of  this  danger,  but  did  not  acknowledge  it  to  one  another: 

We  done  all  the  hollering  and  talking  and  chewing- - 
everything  we  could  think  of  to  one  another --to  keep  our 
minds  off  the  bumps.     We  knew  what  we  was  under,  we 
knew  what  we  had  to  go  through.     See?     We  knew  that. 

To  accomplish  entry  in  levels  and  along  wall  faces,   debris 
had  to  be  removed  by  makeshift  methods.     Only  one  man  at  a  time 
could  dig  at  the  "face"  of  the  tunnel,   and  even  then,  the  handle  of 
the  pick  had  to  be  cut  off.     As  he  dug,   another  man  scraped  the  coal 
back  with  his  hands,   and  a  third,  using  a  shovel  without  a  handle, 
put  coal  in  water  buckets.     The  buckets  were  passed  back  by  a  bucket 
brigade  from  man  to  man  in  the  narrow  tunnel: 

If  it  hadda  been  one  man  there  alone- -working 
there- -he  couldn'ta  done  nothing.     But  four  of  us 
spelled  one  another  off.     And  like  that,   I'd  go  in 
there  first  on  my  stomach  and  dig  and  plow- -maybe 
for  two  minutes,   maybe  for  five,   maybe  ten- -no 
longer  than  ten  at  any  time.    There  wasn't  the  right 
air  for  you- -anyway  to  begin  with.     And  then  it  was 
so  dusty.    The  minute  you  stuck  a  pick  in  it  you  got 

22 


that  dust,   and  sometimes  you  could  hardly  see.     I'd 
come  out  and  the  other  fellow'd  crawl  in  over  my  back 
and  go  in  and  dig.    And  I'd  sit  there  on  the  high  side 
and  rest.    But  the  four  of  us  kept  going  around  in  a 
circle  like  that. 

Despite  the  danger  and  discomfort,   most  rescuers  reported 
that  their  greatest  difficulties  arose  from  handling  crushed  and  de- 
composing bodies: 

You  had  to  dig  each  body  out- -maybe  strike  a  boot 
toe  first,   maybe  strike  a  cap  first.     You  can  imagine-- 
down here  in  a  hole--that  high- -sometimes  lower  than 
that,   digging,  pulling  them  out.     My  buddy  took  so  sick 
he  had  to  go  home.     I  think  maybe  my  stomach  is  just  a 
little  stronger  than  his --could  take  a  little  more.     The 
smell  was  awful;  we  had  that  spray  stuff  which  did  help 
a  lot  but  didn't  kill  it  all.     We  had  rubber  gloves  on, 
but  even  so  we  had  to  handle  every  body.     I  used  to  just 
take  sick  and  throw  up  and  go  back  at  it  again- -there 
were  four  or  five  of  us  in  that  crew.     Well,  the  rest  of 
them  were  real  good  men.     Some  fellows  just  to  look 
at  them  would  turn  sick,  and  some  fellows  couldn't  eat. 

There  was  great  admiration  expressed  for  miners  who  did  not 
react  physiologically  or  psychologically  to  the  work  and  the  odor. 

Many  rescuers  made  a  distinction  among  an  unidentified  body, 
the  body  of  a  friend,  and  the  body  of  a  relative.     One  respondent 
noted  that  if  he  did  not  see  the  body  of  a  relative,  the  next  of  kin 
could  not  ask  him  about  it.     Another  expressed  the  difference  be- 
tween friends  and  relatives  in  this  way: 

I  was  just  as  glad  that  somebody  else  got  my  cousin 
(the  dead  body)  because  those  were  all  my  friends,   every- 
body down  there  was  friends.     Well,   it's  bad  enough  to 
run  into  them  when  you're  digging,  but  when  you  run  in- 
to £n^_oj^our__own,    it  hurts  worse,  don't  it? 

Nevertheless,   the  men  worked  regular  eight-hour  shifts,   and 
within  each  shift  the  pick  never  stopped,  a  new  man  taking  the  pick 
from  the  exhausted  man's  hand.     Minor  coal  bumps  occurred  as  the 
rescuers  dug  their  way  forward.     Gas  forming  from  the  coal  was  re- 
moved and  ventilation  to  the  tunnel  was  provided  by  a  suction  fan  in 
the  end  of  a  pipe  the  length  of  the  tunnel. 


23 


From  Friday,   October  24,   until  Wednesday,   October  29,  the 
rescuers  worked  without  finding  any  men  alive.     Bodies  were  re- 
covered one  or  two  at  a  time  and  brought  to  the  surface  with  the 
change  of  shifts.     On  Monday,  the  manager  issued  a  press  release 
in  which  he  stated  that  there  was  very  little  hope  that  more  men 
would  be  found  alive.     He  did  make  one  reservation:  there  was  a 
possibility  of  life  at  the  13,000  foot  level  wall,  which  had  not  yet 
been  reached  by  the  rescuers. 

Work  was  started  on  this  wall,   and  it  was  found  that  the  inside 
of  the  13,000  foot  level  was  completely  closed.     Opening  it  involved 
burrowing  with  the  bucket  brigade  a  distance  of  401  feet.     The 
wreckage  and  rubble  were  so  great  that  it  took  over  48  hours  of  con- 
tinuous work  in  relays  to  advance  328  feet.     At  2:30  p.m.  ,   Wednes- 
day,  October  29,   they  reached  the  six- inch  air  line  in  the  level  and 
found  that  it  was  parted.     While  an  air  sample  was  being  taken  in 
the  pipe,   the  voices  of  12  men  trapped  at  the  bottom  of  the  13,000 
foot  level  wall  were  heard.     The  remaining  distance  of  73  feet  was 
gouged  out  in  12  hours.     During  this  period,  a  copper  tube  one-half 
inch  in  diameter  was  pushed  through  the  air  line.     Under  a  doctor's 
supervision,   liquids  were  pumped  through  the  tube  to  the  trapped 
men. 

When  the  men  were  reached  at  2:30  a.m.  ,    Thursday,   October 
30,  they  were  found  to  be  in  reasonably  good  condition.     One  of  the 
men  had  a  broken  leg  and  another  was  suffering  from  an  internal  in- 
jury.    The  last  of  the  12  men  rescued  at  this  location  reached  the 
surface  at  5:12  a.m.,   Thursday,   October  30,   after  6  1/2  days  of 
entrapment. 

Immediately  after  the  12  men  had  been  taken  to  the  surface, 
the  13,000  foot  level  wall  was  explored  uphill  for  a  distance  of  160 
feet.     At  this  point,  the  wall  was  blocked  by  rock  and  coal  and  an 
opening  had  to  be  made  through  the  midwalls  and  the  waste  toward 
the  top  of  the  wall.     This  work  continued  until  Saturday,   November 
1,  when,   at  4:42  a.m.  ,   the  rescuers  found  a  lone  man.     This  man 
was  trapped  in  a  small  hole  and  was  in  such  a  weakened  condition 
that  he  could  give  no  information.     In  the  words  of  a  rescuer, 

He  was  in  a  little  wee  cubbyhole  not  higher  than  the 
arm  of  a  chair.     He  was  down,  laying  by  the  pans,  and 
all  this  waste  hanging  up  behind  him.     If  it  had  fell,   it 
would  have  buried  him  up. 

A  small  opening  out  of  the  isolated  man's  cubicle  was  enlarged, 
and  after  crawling  forward  a  few  hundred  feet  the  rescuers  found  six 

24 


more  men  alive.     The  six  men  were  first  given  water  and  tnen  hot 
soup  and  coffee  after  suitable  intervals.     The  trapped  men  crawled 
down  the  wall,  where  they  were  placed  on  stretchers.     These  men 
arrived  at  the  surface  at  9:15  a.m.  ,  Saturday,   November  1,  after 
81/2  days  in  the  mine. 

The  exploration  continued  until  8:25  p.m.  ,   Thursday,   Novem- 
ber 6,   exactly  two  weeks  after  the  bump.     By  that  time  the  last  of 
the  74  dead  bodies  had  been  discovered  and  taken  to  the  surface. 

Behavior  of  Wives  in  the  Community 

The  17  wives  of  the  trapped  miners  were  interviewed  about 
their  behavior  during  the  period  of  impact  and  the  long,   subsequent 
waiting  period.     To  check  if  this  behavior  was  typical  of  all  wives 
in  the  community  rather  than  specific  to  wives  of  trapped  miners, 
two  small  samples  of  less  personally  involved  wives  were  inter- 
viewed:    a  group  of  1 1  wives  whose  husbands  were  off-shift  miners 
(many  were  rescuers);  and  a  group  of  7  wives  of  professional  and 
personal  service  personnel  who  were  least  involved. 

The  Night  of  the  Bump 

The  distribution  and  frequencies  of  a  number  of  early  reactions 
to  the  bump  by  the  three  samples  of  wives  are  shown  in  Table  1. 
All  but  2  of  the  17  wives  of  trapped  miners  said  they  knew  immediate- 
ly that  the  "shaking  of  the  house"  was  a  bump.     The  two  exceptions 
were  a  woman  who  was  driving  a  car  and  another  who  thought  that 
"it  was  just  the  TV  aerial  falling  down  again." 

Even  though  most  of  them  knew  immediately  that  there  had 
been  a  serious  mine  disaster  when  they  felt  the  tremor,  all  wives 
reported  some  kind  of  rapid  social  confirmation  of  the  event.     A 
half  confirmed  the  bump  through  neighbors  and  a  half  through 
relatives  . 

Other  studies  have  found  that  individuals  under  stress  tend  to 
form  groups  spontaneously.     It  has  been  suggested  that  catastrophe 
produces  strong  feelings  of  dependency  (Tyhurst,    1954a),   and  that 
groups  seem  to  have  the  function  of  explaining  and  redefining  an 
ambiguous  but  threatening  situation  (Larson,    1954).     While  all  of 
the  wives  of  trapped  miners  joined  groups,   fewer  than  30  per  cent 
of  the  wives  less  directly  involved  did  so.     Certainly  many  of  the 
less  involved  wives  had  their  husbands  nearby  to  supply  both  in- 
formation and  support. 


25 


TABLE  1 


Three  Groups  of  Wives  Having  Different  Levels  of  Involvement: 
Post- impact  Response  by  Per  Cent  of  Group 


Wives  of 

Wives  of 

Wives  of 

professional 

trapped 

off-  shift 

and  service          All 

miners 

miners 

personnel          wives 

Response 

(N  =  17) 

(N=  11) 

(N  =  7)          (N  =  35) 

Interpreted  impact  as 

bump  88 

Had  someone  in  family 
go  to  pit  head  41 

Received  confirmation 
from  neighbors, 
friends,  or  relatives    100 

Did  not  go  to  bed  on 

first  night  94 

Tried  to  use  telephone       41 

Left  home  to  visit  some- 
one during  first  night     59 


Had  visitors  on  first 
night 


65 


55 
73 

27 

73 

55 

64 
73 


43 
85 

29 

13 
13 

71 
57 


69 
60 

63 

71 
40 

63 
66 


The  attainment  of  both  information  and  social  management  of 
the  situation  was  accomplished  by  face-to-face  contacts,   rather  than 
by  telephone.     Fewer  than  half  the  wives  attempted  to  use  the  tele- 
phone on  the  first  night,  and  of  those  who  did,   several  reported  that 
they  could  not  reach  anyone  by  telephone,  as  the  lines  were  jammed. 
Ten  of  the  17  wives  of  trapped  miners  did  not  go  near  the  pit  head 
on  the  first  evening.     This  is  in  marked  contrast  to  the  less  involved 
wives.     The  great  majority  of  wives  of  both  off-shift  miners  and  per- 
sonal service  personnel  went  to  the  pit  head.     In  the  Minetown  dis- 
aster,  personal  convergence  (cf .  ,   Fritz  &  Mathewson,    1957)  varied 
inversely  with  the  degree  of  personal  involvement  in  the  disaster. 
Most  of  the  people  who  went  to  the  pit  head  acted  as  helpers . 


26 


All  the  trapped  men  were  working  at  roughly  the  same  place 
in  the  mine.     Their  wives  knew  this;  yet  on  the  first  evening  their 
estimates  of  when  they  might  expect  news  of  their  husbands  varied 
considerably.     Eleven  wives  of  trapped  miners  expected  news  of 
their  husbands  immediately;  4  expected  news  within  five  hours;  2 
wives  did  not  expect  word  for  days.     The  four  wives  who  had  hus- 
bands in  the  1956  explosion  had  the  least  immediate  expectations. 
Those  women,  then,  who  had  been  directly  involved  in  an  earlier 
disaster  had  a  different  set  of  expectations  from  those  who  had  not 
had  this  experience. 

During  the  first  evening,   most  of  the  wives  in  the  three  samples 
visited  the  homes  of  friends  or  relatives,   or  had  visitors  call.     The 
implications  of  the  disaster  were  community-wide,   and  there  was  a 
great  deal  of  visiting  going  on  all  over  Minetown.    Almost  all  the 
wives  of  trapped  miners  stayed  up  all  night,   most  of  them  with  rel- 
atives.   Despite  the  general  indication  in  social  science  research  of 
the  declining  importance  of  the  extended  family,  the  extended  family 
in  Minetown  played  an  important  role  during  the  crisis  and  in  the 
later  recovery  from  disaster.     The  importance  of  satisfying  the  need 
to  be  with  others  and  of  maintaining  a  stable,   supporting,   interper- 
sonal environment  stressed  by  Fritz  and  Rayner  (1958)  is  well  illus- 
trated by  the  behavior  of  wives  during  the  night  of  the  bump. 

The  Waiting  Period 

Table  2  shows  the  frequencies  of  a  number  of  behaviors  in  the 
three  samples  of  wives  during  the  waiting  period.     During  the  long 
period  of  uncertainty  while  waiting  for  news  of  their  husbands,  the 
wives  were  living  within  a  relatively  stable,   intact,   social  structure. 
Three  wives  moved  into  the  homes  of  relatives.     Fourteen  of  the  17 
had  relatives  staying  with  them  night  and  day,  and  they  kept  their 
houses  operating  very  much  as  usual,  preparing  meals  and  accom- 
plishing the  daily  routine  with  the  active  assistance  of  relatives. 
This  routine  extended  to  laundry  and  baking.     Only  3  wives  stayed 
alone  any  night. 

Unlike  many  disaster  situations,  there  was  no  major  wide- 
spread devastation  or  reconstruction.     This  made  it  possible  to 
maintain  social  groupings,   especially  family  life  with  a  routine  but 
meaningful  activity  linking  it  with  ongoing  society  (cf.  ,  Tyhurst, 
1954a).     The  routine  was  retained,  assisting  the  period  of  waiting, 
but  most  wives  did  not  have  sole  responsibility  for  maintaining  it. 

Whenever  a  district  bump  occurred,   it  was  taken  for  granted 
that  there  was  no  school  the  next  day  for  children  whose  fathers 

27 


TABLE  2 

Three  Groups  of  Wives  Having  Different  Levels  of  Involvement: 
Waiting  Period  Response  by  Per  Cent  of  Group 

Wives  of 

Wives  of       Wives  of      professional 
trapped          off- shift      and  service       All 
miners  miners  personnel       wives 

Response  (N  =  17)  (N=ll)  (N  =  7)         (N  =  35) 


Stayed  at  others1  homes       27 

Had  others  to  stay  with 

them  83 


27 


Prepared  usual  meals  in 
own  home 

Received  help  in  meal- 


83 


91 


100 


22 


43 


89 


making 

83 

0 

0 

40 

Did  laundry 

71 

64 

71 

69 

Did  baking 

59 

73 

57 

63 

Kept  children  home  from 
school  till  twelfth  daya 

83b 

13C 

Od 

52e 

Went  visiting 

53 

73 

71 

63 

aAppropriate  only  for  wives  with  school-age  children. 
t>N  =  12. 
CN  =  7. 
dN  =  2. 

eN  =  21. 

were  involved.     Two  wives  sent  their  children  back  to  school  before 
word  was  received  of  the  fate  of  their  husbands.     Ten  wives  with 
school-age  children  waited  until  the  rescue  before  returning  their 
children  to  the  school  routine,   thus  keeping  the  family  intact  during 
the  waiting  period. 


28 


It  has  been  found  that  adequate  and  authoritative  information, 
widely  disseminated  to  the  public,   will  discourage  the  speed  of  dis- 
ruptive rumors  and  combat  reactions  of  either  unwarranted  de- 
featism or  unwarranted  optimism  (National  Opinion  Research  Cen- 
ter,   1950).     Press,   radio,   and  television  coverage  was  extensive, 
and  originated  from  a  building  at  the  pit  head.     Periodic  announce- 
ments of  progress  were    given.     The  majority  of  wives  continually 
listened  to  the  broadcasts  of  a  nearby  radio  station  which  for  the 
first  few  days  played  only  recorded  music  between  news  flashes  and 
commentary  on  the  disaster.     Nearly  half  the  wives  read  all  the  news- 
papers they  could  obtain,   "mostly  for  interest  only,"  rather  than 
for  factual  information.     The  radio  seemed  to  be  their  most  reliable 
source  of  news,  as  it  was  in  the  West  Frankfurt  mine  disaster  (Con- 
ference. .  .  ,    1953).    Some  wives  even  watched  their  rescued  husbands 
removed  from  the  mine  over  television  and  then  drove  to  meet  them 
at  the  hospital. 

Despite  adequate  information,   rumors  develop  in  disaster 
(Caplow,    1947).     Six  wives  said  that  they  did  not  hear  any  rumors, 
and  5  said  that  they  heard  rumors,  but  did  not  believe  them.     Se- 
veral wives  maintained  their  private  source  of  news,  which  for  them 
was  dependable:    they  relied  on  "official  information  from  my  fami- 
ly doctor"  or  "firsthand  information  from  my  brother  who  was  a 
dreagerman. " 

On  the  fifth  day,  a  high  ranking  official  made  the  public  an- 
nouncement that  the  company  held  little  hope  that  any  man  remained 
alive.     Although  an  official  announcement,   it  was  rejected  as  untrue 
by  over  half  the  waiting  wives.     The  majority  had  more  faith  in  their 
own  or  others'  experiences  (and  hopes)  in  these  matters  than  they 
did  in  the  official  report:     "My  brother-in-law  is  a  dreagerman  and 
he  told  me  they  could  still  be  alive."    Of  the  total,    11  said  they  "had 
hope  for  the  whole  period  and  never  gave  up."    For  the  other  6, 
however,   this  was  a  turning  point  from  hope  to  hopelessness:     "I 
lost  hope.     It  was  an  official  announcement,  not  just  a  rumor,"  or, 
"I  believed  it.     I  went  out  and  bought  a  black  dress  and  hat  and  told 
the  children." 

Two  wives  were  erroneously  advised  of  the  death  of  their  hus- 
bands by  telephone  without  notification  by  their  clergyman.     Although 
the  official  role  of  the  clergyman  as  the  official  bearer  of  death  noti- 
fication could  and  did  remove  much  error  and  neutralize  rumor  and 
false  reports,   as  well  as  giving  specialized  support  at  this  time  of 
crisis,   it  restricted  the  clergyman's  other  activities.     Two  wives 
who  were  visited  by  their  clergy  in  their  role  as  clergy,   rather  than 
as  official  notifier,   admitted  being  frightened  by  the  visit.     Several 

29 


churches  organized  visiting  committees  of  church  members  rather 
than  bring  additional  stress  to  the  waiting  wives.     Nevertheless, 
over  half  of  the  waiting  wives  were  visited  by  their  clergyman  on  the 
fifth  day,   the  day  of  the  official  public  announcement  that  little  hope 
was  held  for  any  of  the  men. 

When  asked  what  was  the  worst  thing  about  the  whole  waiting 
period,   9  wives  discussed  the  inactivity  and  sense  of  insecurity  of 
waiting  for  days  "without  knowing  what  to  do."     Most  reported  that 
they  felt  helpless  and  had  depended  completely  on  radio  and  televi- 
sion.    Only  a  few  had  any  difficulty  in  sorting  out  the  days  in  retro- 
spect.    Most  of  the  wives  said  that  they  had  not  slept  much  for  the 
whole  waiting  period. 

Two  wives  felt  that  the  visit  of  the  clergy  distressed  them, 
especially  those  whose  prayers  "took  it  for  granted  that  my  husband 
was  dead."     Two  complained  that  the  radio  station  continually  played 
inappropriate  music  between  announcements,   especially  Good  Night, 
Sweetheart.       Two  complained  bitterly  about  the  official  company 
announcement  on  the  fifth  day  that  caused  so  many  of  them  to  sink 
into  a  mood  of  hopelessness .     The  two  wives  who  had  been  adverse- 
ly affected  by  rumor  said  that  this  had  been  the  worst  part  of  it. 
One  wife  had  a  daughter  that  became  hysterical,  and  another  found 
that  when  she  cried  "the  baby  also  cried,"  so  after  the  first  day  she 
was  determined  not  to  cry. 

Several  family  patterns  indirectly  aided  the  wives  to  maintain 
themselves  and  their  household  during  the  waiting  period.     Thirteen 
handled  the  family  budget,  and  10  had  a  weekly  grocery  account. 
Directly  applicable  to  the  disaster  was  the  fact  that  13  of  the  17 
wives  had  discussed  with  their  husbands  what  to  do  in  their  day- to- 
day living  in  the  -event  of  an  accident.     Only  one  was  unable  to  carry 
out  the  proposed  plan,  as  she  had  just  given  birth.     Most  wives 
stated  that  their  husbands  had  warned,   "don't  go  near  the  mine." 

Some  wives  were  better  prepared  for  disaster  than  others  in 
that  they  had  credit  accounts  or  in  that  they  customarily  handled  the 
family  money.     Some  families  were  better  prepared  in  that  they  had 
discussed  plans  for  day-to-day  living.     By  these  indices,   6  of  the 
wives  were  fully  prepared.     One  was  totally  unprepared  and  10  were 
prepared  to  some  extent.     Three  of  the  fully  prepared  wives  had  had 
husbands  trapped  in  the  1956  explosion. 


30 


Conclusions 

The  consideration  of  the  rescue  operations,  the  surface  re- 
lief support,   and  the  waiting  wives  leads  to  three  conclusions. 

First,  the  rescue  operations  could  have  continued  in  the  way 
they  did  only  with  the  support  of  a  large,   stable,   social  structure 
behind  them.     All  services  in  the  community  and  area  remained  in- 
tact during  the  crisis. 

Second,  the  community  itself  and  many  formal  organizations 
were  prepared  to  cope  with  this  type  of  disaster  by  virtue  of  pre- 
vious disaster  experience.     Not  only  relief  agencies  but  the  miners 
and  citizens  themselves  had  been  through  a  major  disaster  two  years 
before.     Many  of  the  same  patterns  were  followed. 

Third,  the  social  structure  and  institutions  of  the  town  were 
able  to  meet  this  particular  type  of  emergency.    ,The  evidence  at 
hand  does  not  bear  out  findings  of  other  studies:  that  the  disaster 
had  little  direct  impact  on  the  lives  of  the  inhabitants  (Gordon  & 
Raymond,    1952),   or  that  the  people  were  complacent,  apathetic 
(Gordon  &:  Raymond,    1952),  or  fatalistic  (Luntz,    1958;  Marks  & 
Fritz,    1954).     Minetown  was  not  similar  to  Goaltown,  which  was 
characterized  by  impersonality,   resignation,   cynicism,  and  sus- 
picion (Luntz,    1958).     Rather,   over  many  years,  living  from  day 
to  day  with  dangers,  the  population  acquired  appropriate  values,  be- 
liefs, and  social  organizations.     These  social  developments,  although 
differing  greatly  from  those  in  communities  that  do  not  face  ever- 
present  danger,  were  similar  to  those  of  other  mining  communities. 

As  in  many  coal  communities,  workers  entered  mining  be- 
cause,  from  their  perspective,   mining  was  the  best  of  the  few  al- 
ternatives they  saw  available.     In  Minetown,   it  was  the  highest  paid 
industry  in  the  area.     Once  an  experienced  miner,  a  man  had  pro- 
fitable but  nontransferable  skills  and  a  fierce  pride  in  craft;  at  this 
point,   mining  was  spoken  of  as  "in  the  blood." 

In  the  face  of  a  constant  and  uncontrollable  danger,  the  miner, 
like  countless  generations  before  him,   controlled  his  relationship 
to  danger  through  shared  myths  and  beliefs  (cf.  ,  Malinowski,    1925). 
In  Minetown,  these  included  unlucky  days --Thursday  was  the  current 
one,  although  Friday  had  been  the  previous  choice.     Absenteeism 
was  a  way  that  the  miners  coped  with  the  danger  involved  in  their 
work  situation.     While  at  work,  however,  the  joke  was  paramount, 
not  the  discussion  of  danger. 


31 


Besides  shared  myths,    many  miners  worked  out  their  own  in- 
tuitive signs  as  a  guide  to  impending  danger,   which  allowed  them 
to  continue  working  in  the  mine.     These  private  guides  to  danger  in- 
cluded the  action  of  rats,    sounds  heard  in  the  mine,   or  tensions  felt. 
"I  heard  the  props  and  stringers  cracking,"  "the  pavement  would  get 
hard,"  or  "I  feared  her  when  she  was  quiet." 

In  common  with  many  mining  communities,   the  norms  shared 
by  all  individuals  guaranteed  mutual  help.     The  miners'  code  of 
rescue  meant  that  each  trapped  miner  had  the  knowledge  that  he 
would  never  be  buried  alive  if  it  were  humanly  possible  for  his 
friends  to  reach  him.     This  code  was  so  widely  understood  and  so 
unconsciously  accepted  that  no  miner-rescuer  was  faced  with  serious 
role  conflict.     At  the  same  time,  the  code  was  not  rigid  enough  to 
ostracize  those  who  could  not  face  the  rescue  role. 

These  common  expectations,  norms,   and  social  arrangements 
extended  to  the  families  of  the  miners.     No  family  in  the  community 
was  untouched  by  the  disaster;  differences  existed  merely  in  degree 
of  involvement.     The  majority  of  families  had  plans  for  an  emer- 
gency.    Their  financial  arrangements  permitted  a  wife  to  look  after 
her  family  during  a  period  of  waiting  and  immediate  crisis.     Those 
directly  involved  or  bereaved  were  assisted  by  the  extended  family 
as  well  as  by  those  less  directly  involved. 

This  level  of  preparedness,  which  characterized  the  social 
structure  of  the  town,   extended  to  the  growth  of  particular  institu- 
tions,   as  well  as  modifications  of  traditional  institutions.     A  dis- 
aster fund  had  been  in  continuous  existence  from  1886.     Besides 
the  union  fees  and  employees1  relief  fund  check-off  by  the  pay- 
master of  the  company,  there  was  also  a  doctor's  check-off  and  a 
church  contribution  check-off.     The  clergy  traditionally  bore  news 
of  a  fatal  accident  to  the  family  on  behalf  of  the  company. 

Unlike  communities  infrequently  and  unexpectedly  visited  by 
disaster,   Minetown  was  constantly  prepared  for  this  anticipated 
eventuality.     Quite  unconsciously,  through  constant  dealing  with 
danger  and  death,  patterns  of  behavior  became  established  and, 
through  time,   so  widely  used  that  they  can  be  considered  norms, 
codes,   popular  myths,   and  institutional  arrangements.     This  ap- 
propriate social  structure  allowed  for,  and  cushioned,   many  social 
effects  of  disaster. 

A  mine  disaster  or  emergency  occurring  within  such  social 
arrangements  is  not  likely  to  arouse  either  apathy  or  blame  and 
indignation.     To  the  outside  observer  there  may  even  be  an  air  of 

32 


normality.     This  normality  could  well  have  been  anticipated,   for 
Minetowners  knew  what  to  do;  their  behavior  had  been  patterned 
over  many  years. 


33 


CHAPTER  4 

BEHAVIOR  OF  THE  TRAPPED  MINERS: 
A  DESCRIPTIVE  ACCOUNT 

When  the  bump  occurred  on  the  evening  of  October  23,    174 
men  were  underground  in  No.   2  mine.     Within  24  hours,   81  were 
rescued,   one  of  whom  subsequently  died  in  a  hospital.     Of  the  93 
others,   74  died  in  the  mine  and  their  bodies  were  eventually  re- 
covered.    The  remaining   19  were  trapped  and  rescued  alive:     12 
in  one  group,    6  in  another  group,   and  one  in  semi-isolation.     The 
group  of  twelve  was  rescued  after  61/2  days  and  the  group  of  six 
together  with  the  semi-isolated  miner  after  81/2  days.     This 
chapter  describes  the  behavior  and  experiences  of  these  19  men. 

Situational  Factors 
The  Group  of  Twelve 

The  miners  in  this  group  ranged  from  22  to  58  years  in  age, 
with  an  average  of  38.8  years.     They  had  attained  an  average  edu- 
cational level  of  grade  6.9,   with  a  range  from  grade  2  to  grade  11. 
Only  one  miner  had  gone  to  high  school.     All  of  the  miners  were 
married  and  living  with  their  wives,   except  one  man  who  had  been 
separated  from  his  wife  for  a  considerable  number  of  years.     They 
had  an  average  of  2.2  children.     Six  of  the  men  were  contract 
miners  and  6  were  datal  workers.     The  members  of  the  group  had 
spent  from  3  1/2  to  31  years  in  the  mine;  their  average  was   18.6 
years.     The  fathers  of  9  of  the  12  had  also  worked  in  the  mine. 

The  area  occupied  by  the  trapped  group  of  twelve  was  at  the 
bottom  of  the  13,000  foot  level  wall.     Ten  of  the  twelve  remained 
together  in  a  cavity  measuring  approximately  12  by  30  feet  (see 
Figure  3).     The  two  miners  who  were  immobile  with  severe  injuries 
were  in  an  adjoining  cavity  of  about  the  same  over-all  dimensions. 
The  roof  in  the  second  cavity  was  more  dangerous,   and  there  was 
less  clear  floor  space.     There  was  a  third,   small  cavity  about  8 
feet  from  the  location  of  the  ten  miners;  it  was  entered  by  a  hole 
"large  enough  for  a  man  to  crawl  through."    The  miners  were  vague 
about  its  dimensions,  but  it  was  established  as  being  approximately 
2  by  10  feet  with  height  ranging  from  3  to  4  feet.     The  ceiling  was 
described  as  ragged  and  dangerous.     This  was  the  cavity  that 

35 


'-.  STONE  PACK 


STONE  PACK 


PACKH 
U=U 
PAN  LINE 


:|:|:  1 3  400  FT.  WA LL  ;:•:•::::::::::::: 


|*v?T  COAL  FACE  :::::::::::j::::::::: 
$:•   13,000  FT.  WALL  HiSS 


!)  NEW  RESCUE  TUNNEL  TO 


73  FT.  .^^^^^§^®g 
::::::::::!:  COAL  ;:;:;:;:!:;:;:;:;xS:S 


wxw:  COAL 


END  OF  PIPE 


®     INDICATES  APPROXIMATE  POSITION   OF  MINERS,    i-XvXW^ 

WITH   THREE  IDENTIFIED   BY  NUMBER  '^§l^^M^^^^!§^: 


Figure  3.     Location  of  the  Group  of  Twelve  While  Trapped: 
Ground  Plan 


36 


contained  the  air  pipe  through  which  contact  was  made  with  the 
rescuers.     It  is  notable  that  the  trapped  miners  gave  the  dimensions 
of  the  cavity  where  the  ten  were  located  as  about  10  by  11  feet,   one- 
third  of  what  it  actually  measured. 

The  main  tunnel  used  in  the  escape  operations  was  described 
as  very  narrow  in  parts,    "only  big  enough  to  crawl  along  on  hands 
and  knees."     It  was  about  150  to  ZOO  feet  long,   and  its  width  and 
height  varied.     There  were  many  obstructions  in  it:  packs,  broken 
pipes,   and  dismembered  dead  bodies.     A  few  shallow  cul-de-sacs 
led  off  this  tunnel,   all  of  which  were  explored  by  members  of  the 
group. 

The  Group  of  Six  and  the  Semi-isolated  Man 

The  ages  of  this  group  ranged  from  29  to  49  years,   with  an 
average  of  39  years.     The  average  educational  level  was  grade  6.6, 
ranging  from  grade  4  to  grade  11.     Only  one  had  attended  high  school, 
But  for  one  bachelor,   all  were  married  and  living  with  their  wives. 
They  had  an  average  of  3.5  children—one  of  this  group  had  12  chil- 
dren.    Four  of  the  men  were  contract  miners  and  3  were  datal  work- 
ers.    Their  average  length  of  time  in  the  mine  was   15.8  years, 
ranging  from  9  to  32  years.     The  fathers  of  5  of  the  men  had  also 
been  miners . 

The  group  of  six  was  trapped  at  the  top  of  the  13,000  foot  level 
wall  (see  Figure  4).     The  dimensions  of  the  main  cavity  were  30  to 
40  feet  long,   about  10  feet  wide,   and,   due  to  a  sloping  floor,   from 
4  to  6  feet  high.     The  usable  space  was  cut  down  by  two  packs  and  a 
broken  engine.     There  were  also  pans  and  an  air  pipe  which  ran 
through  the  cavity  at  ceiling  level.     The  ceiling  of  the  cavity  was 
ragged  and  dangerous  in  places. 

The  man  in  semi-isolation  (X6)*  was  located  in  a  small  cavity 
about  75  feet  away  from  the  group  of  six.     This  smaller  cavity  was 
about  4  feet  wide  by  4  to  5  feet  long  and  5  to  6  feet  in  height.     A 
small  hole  about  2  to  3  feet  in  diameter  led  into  this  cavity  from  the 
main  tunnel  that  was  subsequently  used  in  escape  attempts.     This 
opening  allowed  air  to  enter  the  cavity,   permitting  the  survival  of 
X6. 

The  75-foot  tunnel  used  in  escape  operations  was  very  narrow 
and  was  described  as  hardly  big  enough  in  parts  "for  a  man  to  crawl 


*Each  member  was  given  a  code  name:  the  letter  identifies  the  in- 
dividual while  the  number  identifies  the  group  to  which  he  belonged 

37 


^  RESCUE  TUNNEL 

izjii— *#jo<^yM>!A  \\\ 


X      ®     INDICATES  APPROXIMATE   POSITION  OF  MINERS 
¥     X6      SEMI -ISOLATED   MAN 
S        P      PINNED  MINER 


i 


Figure  4.     Location  of  the  Group  of  Six,   the  Pinned  Man,    and 
the  Semi-isolated  Man  While  Trapped:    Ground  Plan 


38 


through  on  his  hands  and  knees."     The  roof  was  dangerous  and 
there  were  shallow  cul-de-sacs  leading  into  the  waste. 

Physical  Dangers 

The  temperature  in  the  cavities  containing  the  two  groups  was 
approximately  80°  Fahrenheit,   and  the  air  was  stagnant.     The  air 
flowing  from  the  depths  of  the  mine  to  the  surface  in  the  days  fol- 
lowing the  bump  had  a  high  concentration  (about  70  per  cent)  of  me- 
thane and  carbon  dioxide.     There  are  no  exact  figures  available  on 
the  gas  concentration  in  the  cavities  occupied  by  the  trapped  miners. 

Regulations  required  the  mine  to  be  evacuated  when  the  me- 
thane content  had  reached  2.5  per  cent.     During  the  last  day  of  res- 
cue,  a  calculated  risk  was  taken  in  sending  barefaced  miners  into 
the  return  airway  of  the  12,600  foot  level  in  a  concentration  of  about 
6  per  cent  methane.     Several  of  the  trapped  men  said  they  found 
breathing  heavy  at  times.     One  said,   "I  had  an  awful  hard  time  to 
breathe.     I  think  it  was  right  after  the  bump  and  I  think  there  was 
quite  a  bit  of  percentage  of  gas."    Another  said  the  gas  only  bothered 
them  for  about  ten  minutes  after  the  bump;  after  that,  the  air  was 
quite  good  and  his  breathing  was  normal.     But  there  were  pockets 
of  gas  at  high  concentration  trapped  in   some  of  the  passages  through 
which  the  men  attempted  to  escape,   and  a  few  men  lost  conscious- 
ness and  had  to  be  pulled  away  by  their  companions. 

The  anaesthetizing  threshold  of  carbon  dioxide  is  considerably 
lower  than  that  of  methane,   and  the  prolonged  unconsciousness  of 
the  semi- isolated  man  in  a  restricted  space  may  have  been  due  to  a 
high  carbon  dioxide  concentration.     His  survival  without  food  or 
water  with  apparently  few  mental  or  physical  effects  resembles  the 
state  of  "hibernation"  induced  by  an  11  to  17  per  cent  carbon  dioxide 
concentration  in  experimental  animals  (Seevers ,    1944). 

The  narcotic  effects  of  carbon  dioxide  at  a  concentration  as 
low  as  5  per  cent  may  have  had  something  to  do  with  the  relative 
freedom  from  overt  anxiety  and  panic  of  all  the  trapped  men  and 
the  freedom  from  pain  of  those  who  were  slightly  injured  (cf .  ,  Me- 
duna,    1950;  Stokes,   Chapman,   &  Smith,    1948;  Wolpe,    1958).     The 
carbon  dioxide  may  also  have  contributed  to  the  hallucinations  which 
most  of  the  trapped  men  reported  (cf.  ,  Meduna,    1950). 

The  members  of  both  groups  were  aware  of  the  hazards  of 
gas.     In  both  groups  there  were  men  who  had  been  in  the  1956  ex- 
plosion and  who  warned  the  others  immediately  after  the  bump  to 
keep  their  heads  near  the  ground  as  a  precautionary  measure. 


39 


Once  the  impact  period  was  over,  however,   fear  of  gas  did  not 
cause  undue  anxiety  except  when  they  explored  new  passageways. 

The  danger  of  another  bump  was  always  present,  but  none  of 
the  trapped  men  spoke  about  it  while  underground.     They  did  worry, 
however,  about  the  possibility  of  the  collapse  of  the  ragged  roofs 
of  the  tunnels  and  cavities,  particularly  when  they  were  making  es- 
cape attempts. 

Psychological  Dangers 

The  fear  of  not  being  rescued  was  uppermost  in  the  minds  of 
the  trapped  miners.     The  sounds  of  the  rescue  operations  were  in- 
terpreted by  some  as  the  sealing  off  of  the  mine.     This  fear  was 
dealt  with  by  denial  and  by  their  companions1  more  hopeful,   rea- 
soned explanation.  v 

In  some  miners,  fear  changed  to  resignation  during  the  last 
few  days  when  the  sounds  of  rescue  occasionally  stopped  for  an  hour 
or  two  at  a  time  as  the  rescuers  in  the  long,  narrow  tunnels  changed 
shifts.     These  were  the  periods  when  most  anxiety  and  pessimism 
were  expressed.     In  the  group  of  six,  underground  for  two  days  more 
than  the  group  of  twelve  and  without  contact  with  the  rescuers  until 
the  final  breakthrough  on  the  ninth  day,  there  was  more  ambivalence 
about  the  interpretation  of  the  noises  of  rescue. 

The  group  of  six  had  two  additional  problems:  the  pinned 
miner  and  the  semi-isolated  miner.     The  presence  of  a  pinned  and 
dying  miner  whom  they  were  powerless  to  help  was  a  serious  threat 
to  the  morale  of  this  group,  particularly  because  this  man  lived 
5  1/2  days.     When  the  bump  occurred,  he  had  been  working  close 
to  a  pack.     One  of  his  arms  was  caught  between  two  of  the  crushed 
timbers  of  the  pack.     His  whole  arm  was  pinned  down  and  crushed 
below  the  shoulder  joint. 

D6  described  the  situation  surrounding  this  injured  man  as 
follows: 

One  fellow  was  caught.     He  said  he  couldn't  get  his 
arm  out. .  .Well,  we  looked  around  to  see  what  we  could 
do,  and  we  had  no  saw  and  no  tools  at  that  time.     And 
we  thought  about  trying  to  comfort  this  man  as  best  we 
could.  .  .We  gave  this  man  some  aspirins.  .  .We  shared 
our  bit  of  water  with  him.  .  .He  had  his  arm  crushed 
right  down  solid.     The  whole  packs,  in  between.     Yes, 
that  was  squeezed  in  about  half  an  inch,   down  solid. 


40 


In  the  21/2  days  during  which  the  pinned  man  remained 
conscious,  he  moaned  a  great  deal  and  pleaded  with  the  other 
trapped  men  to  remove  his  arm.     One  miner  reported  that  the 
pinned  miner  said  to  him,   "Oh  dear,   oh  dear,   E6,   I  would  help 
you  if  you  was  caught."    However,  they  decided  not  to  remove  his 
arm.     D6  explained  it  this  way: 

If  we  could  have  released  his  arm  it  would  have 
been  a  terrible  painful  pressure  to  have  released  his 
arm.  .  .the  way  the  man  was,  would  have  become 
violent  and  could  have  died*  .  .and  the  pack  was  not  too 
stable  anyway.     We  would  have  had  to  have  climbed  on 
the  tops  and  sides.     I  suppose  we  could  have  got  the 
man  out  with  much,   much, --it  would  have  been  a  ter- 
rible struggle  trying  to  get  him  out  without  hurting  him 
...  I  knew  that  once  his  arm  was  off  and  the  flow  of 
blood  started.  .  .we  would  have  to  put  a  tourniquet  on 
.  .  .  and.  .  .  release  it  so  often,  and  when  we  released  it 
we  would  have  weakened  that  man  at  the  same  time. 
What  I  mean  you  have  to  let  a  certain  amount  of  blood 
come,   and  that  man  will  probably  become  violent.  .  . 
And  we  thought  the  men  would  probably  be  within  two 
or  three  days  up  to  rescue  us.  .  .The  boys  all  agreed 
with  me. 

E6  put  the  problem  in  these  terms: 

(The  pinned  man)  wanted  us  to  cut,  to  cut  his  arm 
off.     Well,  we  couldn't  very  well  get  a  saw  in  there; 
well,  we  tried  with  a  pack  chisel  but  it  was  too  dan- 
gerous for  the  whole  bunch  of  us  .  .  .we  thought  we 
would  start  the  blood  and  then  we  would  have  trouble   \ 
with  him,   maybe  go  out  of  his  mind,   see,   and  then  if 
anything  did  happen,  well,  the  way  I  looked  at  it,   I 
thought  if  anything  did  happen  and  we  cut  his  arm  off 
and  then  he  died  that  way,   they'd  kind  of  blame  it  on 
us. 

During  the  last  three  days  of  this  man's  life  he  was  delirious 
While  in  this  state,  he  continued  to  plead  with  the  group  to  ampu- 
tate his  arm  and  raved  about  water  much  of  the  time.     He  died 
quietly  on  the  fifth  day. 

Guilt  and  ambivalence  were  also  noted  in  relation  to  X6,  the 
man  in  isolation.  When  first  contacted  on  the  second  day,  X6  was 
thought  to  be  "pretty  near  gone."  On  the  second  contact  with  X6 

41 


on  the  fourth  or  fifth  day,  they  discovered  he  was  still  alive  and 
had  moved;  however,  they  were  very  tired,  weak,  and  without  light, 
so  they  decided  not  to  move  him  up  with  them. 

Impulsive  and  irrational  behavior  was  occasionally  a  threat 
to  the  trapped  miners.     In  the  group  of  six,  F6  was  near  the  break- 
ing point  at  times.     He  was  inactive,  pessimistic,  and  extremely 
irritable.     On  one  of  the  last  days  he  said,   "If  I  had  a  knife  I  would 
put  it  through  me  now."    He  was  more  bothered  by  the  pleading  of 
the  pinned  man  and  once  had  to  be  restrained  by  C6  from  impulsive- 
ly severing  the  pinned  man's  arm  with  an  axe.     In  the  group  of 
twelve,  M12  had  an  outburst   of  hostility  and  on  the  seventh  day  be- 
came very  "riled  up"  when  he  thought  the  rescuers  were  digging  in 
the  wrong  direction.     J12  was  inactive  and  tearful.     The  two  injured 
men  expressed  resentment  and  suspicion  about  the  rationing  of 
water.     Such  situations  were  handled  by  the  other  miners  by  direct 
action  or  reason  and  reassurance. 

The  presence  of  dead  and  decomposing  bodies  was  a  source  of 
stress  for  both  groups.     112  said, 

It  really  shook  me  when  I  looked  around  that  pack 
and  saw  a  man  thrown  to  the  roof,  and  said,   "My  God! 
look  in  there,  "  but  it  is  best  not  look  at  all.  .  .Seeing 
his  head,  the  way  it  was  battered,   it  took  the  life  out 
of  me  for  a  while. 

C6  said  about  the  smell  of  the  decomposing  bodies, 

Oh,  it  was  terrible  the  last  two  days.     It  wasn't 
too  bad  until- -see,  the  place  was  so  small- -we  didn't 
--we  had  to  stay  in  the  air  to  live  ourselves.     We  had 
to  stay  in  the  air  because  if  we  had  got  in  the  waste  a 
little  bit  she  was  dirty,   gassy.     So  we  had  to  stay  right 
in  the  air .  .  .  And  this  fellow  that  died  at  the  engine 
started  to  smell.     We  turned  him  over.     We  couldn't 
move  him  all  together.     But  we  turned  him  over  and 
got  an  old  piece  of  canvas  and  laid  on  him  to  try  to 
get  the  air  to  go  up  by  us  that  way.     Oh,   it  was  terrible 
the  last  couple  of  days.     The  smell,  that  is  what  I  was 
scared  of.     The  stuff  might  poison  us,  you  know.     The 
fume  of  that.     I  was  scared  of  that  too.     Of  course,  you 
can't  tell  yet  what  it  might  do  to  us. 

Few  of  the  men  spontaneously  mentioned  the  dead  bodies,  and 
some  claimed  that  they  were  unaffected. 

42 


Behavior  While  Trapped 
M12  described  the  bump  to  the  interviewer: 

This  young  fellow.  .  .he  come  down;  shifted  from 
his  place  above  to  down  below.     He  came  down  to  me 
and  just  made  a  wisecrack  like  we  do  all  the  time.     We 
are  all  the  time  saying  things.     "Are  you  going  to  load 
the  pans  or  dig  some  more?"     I  walked  over  to  him  and 
I  said,    "Boy,   I'm  not  going  to  take  that  stuff  off  of  you!  " 
And  I  started  over  towards  him.     And  he  was  setting  on 
the  pans.     And  I  said,   "Oh,  by  the  way,   did  you  feel 
that  bump  a  while  ago?"    And  just  as  I  said  "bump," 
that  is  when  the  big  one  come.     It  just  seemed  like  the 
word  bump  was  the  trigger.     Immediately  I  said  that, 
why,  he  flew.     I  seen  him  going.     I  seen  his  feet,   that 
was  all.     I  thought  at  that  time—I  thought  that  the  roof 
had  come  in  on  us,   that  we  were  up  to  the  roof,   right 
up,   and  it  seemed  like  it  expanded  the  way  I  went.     I 
remember  going  right  to  the  roof  and  I  thought  I  was 
killed.     Immediately  after  that  it  seemed  just  a  matter 
of  seconds,   it  happened  so  fast  and  expanded.     But  I 
could  see  it  all,  the  way  I  looked  at  it,  just  like  a 
bullet  shot  out  of  a  gun.     And  then  I  could  hear  the  boys 
moaning  and  groaning. 

There  was  just  one  fellow  that  was  caught  bad,  and 
one  of  the  young  fellows  was  working  on  him,   and  that 
is  all  the  room  he  had--just  for  one  fellow.     It  didnft 
take  him  very  long,   and  he  got  him  out.     Well,  then  we 
started  looking  around  for  each  fellow,   to  hear  and  see 
how  he  was.     Well,   after  a  while  we  got  all  together  and 
we  found  out  there  was  none  of  us  seriously  hurt.     We 
weren't  seriously  hurt  but  we  heard  another  fellow  down 
below  us,  hollering.     So  we  went  down  to  him,  and  it 
was  this  P12.     By  just  looking  at  him  I  knew  his  leg 
was  broke  and  he  was  in  a  bad  way.     So  we  told  him.  .  . 
"You  are  safe  as  long  as  you  are  setting  where  you 
are."     We  didn't  think  at  that  time  that  the  roof  would 
come  in  on  us.     So  we  came  back  up  to  this  little  place 
where  we  were  all  setting  there.     We  were  there  for 
six  days. 

Of  the  twelve  men  working  at  the  bottom  of  the  13,000  foot 
level  who  survived  the  bump,  two  were  seriously  injured.     O12 
suffered  from  an  inferior  dislocation  of  his  left  shoulder  with 


43 


damage  to  the  brachial  plexus.     He  also  had  several  fractured  ribs 
on  the  left  side.     Both  were  very  painful  conditions  that  prevented 
much  movement.     PIZ's  injury  at  the  time  of  the  bump  resulted  in 
a  comminuted  fracture  of  his  right  femur.     He  also  had  multiple 
contusions  of  both  legs.     These  injuries  rendered  P12  practically 
helpless. 

None  of  the  group  of  six  was  seriously  injured  by  the  bump. 
F6  was  buried  to  the  waist  in  coal  and  extracted  by  E6.     His  hips 
were  very  painful  for  two  days  and  he  did  not  take  an  active  part  in 
any  of  the  group  activities.     Immediately  following  the  bump,  the 
group  clustered  around  C6  who  had  been  trapped  for  four  days  in 
1956.     He  advised  them  "to  stay  together"  and  to  "keep  their  heads 
down"  because  of  the  danger  of  gas.     They  remained  thus  for  a  few 
minutes  and  then  B6  and  D6  went  to  the  assistance  of  the  miner 
whose  arm  was  crushed.     Then  they  all  sat  down  and  talked  about 
what  they  could  do. 

The  Escape  Period:  The  Group  of  Twelve 

M12  gave  this  account  of  the  escape  attempts: 

We  went  back  up  there  (after  pulling  men  from  the 
rubble)  and  sat  down  and  started  talking  about  it  amongst 
ourselves.     And  right  at  that  time,   I  being  the  oldest 
miner  and  more  experienced  than  any,   I  told  them  I 
never  seen  a  bump  yet  that  there  wasn't  one  way  out. 
There  was  always  one  way,  and  we  figured  this  out 
amongst  ourselves  and  we  were  all  going  to  get  together 
and  work.  .  .One  of  the  other  miners  and  myself,  we 
talked  it  over  and  we  said,   "Now  the  air  is  coming  to 
us  very  good,    so  let's  try  and  work  our  way  up.    As 
long  as  we  can  work  our  way  up,  the  air  ought  to  blow 
the  gases  away  from  us."    So  we  started  to  work  our 
way  up  the  wall,  the  13,000  (foot  level)  wall.     Well, 
we  worked  our  way  up  there  and  we  got  up  three  stone 
walls.     We  dug  through  three  stone  walls  and  we  come 
to  the  next  part  of  the  waste  where  the  stone  wall  was 
above  a  bit  and  we  seen  that  the  only  way  we  could  pos- 
sibly do  it  was  to  go  right  up  over  the  top  of  the  waste. 
There  was  not  too  much  space  between  there  but  we 
knew  that  that  was  our  way.     So  we  started  up   through 
there  and  just  as  I  landed  at  the  top  of  the  waste  I  run 
right  into  gas.     Just  the  minute  I  hit  it--I  had  more 
experience--!  knew  what  I  was  into  and  I  immediately 
wheeled  around  and  threw  myself  back  so  I  could  get 


44 


out  of  it.     I  knew  I  was  into  it,  but  I  got  back  out  again 
and  afterwards  I  sat  there  and  I  said  to  myself,   "Now, 
did  I  really  run  into  gas  or  was  I  scared?"     I  had  a 
young  fellow  with  me.     I  wouldn't  say  that  I  didn't  have 
any  faith  in  him,  but  I  would  say  I  would  have  had  more 
faith  had  I  another  experienced  miner.     So  I  set  there 
and  I  thought  to  myself:  was  I  scared  or  did  I  really 
run  into  it?     So  I  thought  there  for  a  while.     I  had  to 
really  convince  myself.  .  .So  I  said,   "Boys,  keep  right 
close."    And  I  called  one  of  the  other  boys  up  and  I 
said,   "I  want  you  next  to  me;  I  am  going  to  try  it  again." 
.  .  .1  guess  I  wasn't  scared  because  it  knocked  me  down 
again.     I  figured  that  was  enough  right  there. 

So  we  decided  then  we  was  going  to  try  down  (the 
wall).     So  we  started  down  and  this  P12  (a  man  with  a 
broken  leg)  said,  "Don't  leave  me  here.     Get  me  up 
somewhere  where  I  feel  safer."    So  O12  was  laying  up 
there  with  a  dislocated  shoulder  so  I  told  two  of  the 
boys,  I  said,   "Now  the  two  of  youse  go  up  to  where  O12 
is.     We  will  go  down  and  start  working  on  down  below." 
So  they  took  hold  of  him  (P12)  and  took  him  up.    They 
must  have  took  him  fifty  feet,  for  all  he  had  a  broken 
leg  and  everything  he  never  said  a  word  though;  he 
stuck  right  with  them.     Well,  we  went  down  and  started 
to  dig  through  the  stone  wall  there.     We  got  down  through 
the  first  one  and  we  got  to  the  waste  from  the  first  one 
.  .  .and  it  was  so  ragged  and  so  bad  it  disturbed  the  boys 
and  they  decided  they  didn't  like  to  take  a  chance  on  it. 
So  we  all  talked  it  over  there  and  decided  to  go  back. 
So  we  went  up  again  and  sat  there  and  talked. 

After  about  three  days  of  exploring  every  possible  escape 
route,   the  eight  active  members  of  the  group  of  twelve   were  ex- 
hausted.    Their  lamp  batteries  were  almost  dead  and  the  water 
supply  was  depleted.     They  decided  that  escape  was  impossible  and 
returned  to  the  cavity  where  they  were  found  on  rescue. 

The  two  injured  men  lay  in  their  cavity  alone  during  the  es- 
cape attempts.     They  had  known  each  other  previously.     They  de- 
cided to  conserve  their  energy  and  put  all  their  hopes  on  rescue. 
O12  strapped  the  arm  of  his  dislocated  shoulder  to  his  side.     He 
did  get  up  and  make  one  unsuccessful  search  for  water. 

There  was  not  a  major  morale  problem  during  the  first  three 
days  in  either  group  as  the  active  members  occupied  themselves 


45 


most  of  the  time  with  exploring  possible  escape  routes  and  search- 
ing for  water.     "The  first  three  days  went  by  just  like- -well,   I 
didn't  realize  it  was  Monday."    They  were  tired  following  these 
efforts,  which  at  times  involved  hacking  their  way  through  stone 
barriers.     During  rest  periods,  the  conversation  centered  mainly 
around  chances  of  escape  or  rescue,  and  occasional  discussions 
about  the  welfare  of  their  families. 

The  Escape  Period:     The  Group  of  Six 

After  describing  the  confusion  of  the  impact,   E6  said, 

Then  I  see  what  happened.     Well,   I  thought,  it's  just 
a  miracle  it  didn't  happen  here.     And  I  said,   "Maybe 
down  below  it's  pretty  good,   if  we  can  get  down  to  it." 
Well,  the  shortest  way,  we  thought,   it  was  to  get  out 
the  upper  way.     We  thought  we'd  go  up  the  pack  and 
get  out.     Well,  we  tried  and  couldn't.     We  came  back 
and  we  tried.  .  .over  the  waste.     We  went  down  and 
looked  around  there.     We  had  lights  then.     And  we  looked 
around  and  we  seen  X6  (the  semi-isolated  man)  on  the 
left  side.     Well,  we  thought  he  was  gone,  pretty  near 
gone.  .  .Well,  he  was  unconscious,  you  know.     Just 
wasn't  himself.     We  seen  where  he  was  trying  to  get  a 
little  air  through  so  we  opened  it  all  up  and  we  got  air 
through. 

C6  discussed  later  escape  attempts: 

Well,  the  first  24  hours  after  we  got  first  settled 
down  there,  we  found  an  old  saw  and  we  tried  to  escape. 
Well,  the  escape  was  only  about  that  high  I  guess,  about 
five  inches.     Well,  we  dug  a  hole  out  through  the  waste 
and  out  through  the  top  of  the  escape,  and  we  sawed 
two  booms  out--two  old  wooden  booms--we  sawed  them 
out.     The  old  saw  wasn't  much  good  though.     The  handle 
was  broke  off  of  it.     Well,  then  we  seen  we  couldn't  get 
out  there,  and  we  cut  up  through  the  high  side.  .  .Then 
we  come  to  the  stone  right  up  like  that.     I  said  to  the 
boys,   "If  we  start  that  stone  now,  we've  got  no  lights." 
The  lights  started  going  dim,   see.     We  were  only 
using  one  light  between  us  at  the  time.     We  went  out 
three  different  times  to  try  to  get  up  the  high  side,  that 
is,  the  escape  of  the  13,600  (foot  level).     And  we  seen 
we  couldn't  do  that.     I  said,   "Boys,  the  best  thing  we 


46 


can  do--our  lights  is  gone  out--  is  to  go  back  to  the 
wall  and  lay  down  and  stay  there.     Our  only  chance 
is  if  the  men  gets  to  us  in  time." 

The  Survival  Period:     The  Group  of  Twelve 

On  about  the  third  day  after  the  bump,  the  group  of  twelve, 
without  water,   food,   or  light,   terminated  their  escape  attemps. 
M1Z  said, 

I  just  laid  back  and  I  said  to  myself,  well,   I  guess 
it  is  up  to  a  higher  power  than  us  to  get  us  out  of  here. 
I  said  the  only  thing  I  could  do,   I  figured,  was  to  lay 
back  and  just  try  to  keep  our  minds  occupied  with  every- 
thing else  but  what  was  going  to  happen. 

They  had  had  a  few  sandwiches,  a  doughnut,  and  a  few  pieces 
of  chewing  gum  among  them,  but  no  attempt  was  made  to  ration  this 
small  quantity  of  food.     A  few  men  were  able  to  find  unsmashed 
water  flasks,   either  their  own  or  those  of  dead  men.     They  did  not 
begin  to  ration  water  until  about  two  days  after  the  bump,  when 
much  of  it  had  already  been  drunk.     What  remained  lasted  only  un- 
til the  morning  of  the  third  day.     Another  gallon  of  water  was  found 
on  one  of  the  last  escape  attempts  (probably  on  the  third  day),  but 
it  too  was  soon  gone. 

M12  said, 

We  never  thought  about  the  water  until  it  was  too 
late.     We  never  thought  about  water  or  grub.     We 
missed  out  on  that,   see.     We  missed  the  boat  there.  .  . 
We  could  have  rationed  that  water  (sooner)  and  that 
grub.     We  could  have  had  water,  with  the  water  we 
did  have  at  first.     If  we  had  done  what  we  done  after 
the  third  day,  we  would  have  had  water.     Not  lots  of 
it,  but  we  would  have  had  enough  to  do  us  through 
them  six  days.     But  we  never  thought  about  it. 

Q12  told  the  interviewer. 

The  lights  were  done;  no  water  or  nothing.     So 
.  .  .K12  said,   "Let's  drink  our  own  urine."    So  he 
tried  it.     It  was  right  salty.     Oh,  you  could  hardly 
drink  it.     So  I  said,   "Boys,  we  have  to  survive. 
That  is  what  we  will  have  to  do:  drink  it  if  it  makes 
us  sick  or  not." 


47 


Seven  of  the  group  of  twelve  succeeded  in  drinking  urine. 
As  in  the  group  of  six,  they  adapted  themselves  to  it  by  stages. 
They  first  wet  their  lips,  then  rinsed  out  their  mouths,  and  then 
drank.     The  time  required  for  the  adaptation  varied  from  an  hour 
to  two  days  . 

Five  of  the  group  of  twelve  did  not  drink  urine.  Three  did 
not  try.  One  reported:  "I  wasn't  thirsty.  I  would  have  if  it  had 
gone  down  to  the  worst."  Two  tried  and  failed:  "I  tried  to  drink 
it  but  vomited  it  up,  and  I  didn't  try  again." 

Coal  and  bark  were  put  in  the  urine  to  try  to  improve  the 
taste.     Some  chewed  bark  to  try  to  extract  moisture  from  it. 

Some  of  the  men  who  had  been  active  during  escape  lost  hope 
when  escape  proved  impossible.     M12  told  the  interviewer, 

I  really  gave  up.     I  thought  to  myself- -after  what 
we  had  tried,  the  conditions  I  had  seen,  all  the  walls 
in- -I  can't  get  out  and  I  am  just  as  good  an  experienced 
man,  how  are  they  going  to  get  in?     So  I  just  told  my- 
self it  was  all  over.  .  .1  thought  that  if  those  fellows 
outside  that  was  trying  to  get  in  to  us ,   I  figured  they 
would  say  there  was  nobody  alive;  there  just  can't  be. 
So  instead  of  digging  a  hole  to  get  in  to  us ,  that  they 
would  timber  the  place  all  up,   getting  ready  to  bring 
bodies  out.     And  I  figured  they  would  never  get  to  us 
that  way.     It  would  be  weeks  and  weeks  and  I  said  I 
know  that  we  can't  survive  that. 

We  could  hear  the  boys  when  they  were  digging  and 
pounding  for  us.     We  could  hear  them  way  off.     Oh,  it 
sounded  like  an  awful  long  way  off.  .  .1  was  listening  to 
the  different  sounds  they  were  making  and  it  seemed 
to  me  like  I  could  hear  them  sawing  off  props  and  it 
seemed  like  I  could  hear  them  pounding  props  and  I 
knew.     I  was  just  piecing  the  thing  together  and  I  was 
trying  to  picture  what  they  were  doing  and  that  was 
the  only  thing  in  my  mind- -that  they  were  putting  a 
boom  up  and  sawing  off  these  props  and  pounding  them 
in,   getting  them  in,   see,  by  doing  that,   that  was  the 
whole  level,   so  they  could  get  big  boxes  in  and  out. 
And  that  was  what  was  going  through  my  mind.     Never 
dreamt  in  the  world  they  were  digging  a  small  hole.  .  . 
I  couldn't  picture  them  doing  that. 


48 


At  one  stage,   M12  threatened  to  "put  his  fist  through"  a  man 
who  made  a  noise  while  they  were  listening  for  the  .sound  of  res- 
cuers.    MIZ's  despondency  and  irritability  were  shared  by  others. 
J12  was  pessimistic  most  of  the  time  and  contributed  little  to  the 
group.     H12  retired  behind  a  "schizoid  screen"  and  had  little  hope 
of  rescue.     The  two  injured  men  remained  emotionally  isolated 
from  the  others.     According  to  O12, 

The  last  day  (before  contacting  the  rescuers)  we 
were  all  saying  good-bye  to  one  another  as  we  thought 
we  were  dying,  we  would  not  see  one  another  again. 

But  others  did  not  give  up  hope.     Q12  said  to  the  interviewer. 

Then  we  could  hear  them  working  for  a  while  out- 
side.    But  all  the  time  this  was  going  on  we  could  hear 
pounding  on  both  sides  of  us.     We  thought  it  was  up  the 
wall;  we  thought  it  was  down  the  level  or  in  the  other 
wall;  and  then  it  sounded  like  it  was  at  our  level.     It 
sounded  like  miles  away.     And  we  pounded  on  pipes  and 
we  pounded  on  the  pans.     So  then  we  crawled  up  the  hole 
where  the  air  line  was.     It  had  a  big  shut-off  on  the 
valve.     It  was  reduced,  I  think,   from  five  inch  to  a 
three,   and  where  the  three  came  on  to  the  five  it  was 
broke  off.  .  .So  I  felt  around  and  I  found  this  pack  wedge. 
And  I  crawled  out  in  the  hole,   working  in  the  dark, 
started  chiselling  at  this  here  nut  on  the  shut-off  valve. 
I  got  it  off.     And  I  tried  to  turn  the  couple  around.  .  .1 
got  one  loose  and  I  turned  it  around  and  tried  to  get  it 
off  but  I  couldn't.     I  hollered  at  K12.     I  said,   "I  can't 
stay  here  much  longer;  somebody  had  better  come  in." 
So  I  went  in  back  of  the  hole.  .  .At  last  he  got  it  pulled 
off.     Well,  then  that  gave  us  a  full  six- inch  air  line, 
you  see.     So  we  listened  there  and  listened  there.     We 
heard  a  motor  running  out  there.  .  .and  it  was  running 
fast.     We  knew  they  was  working  hard.     You  could  teU 
they  were  getting  further  in  because  it  was  running 
longer  each  trip.     So  we  waited,  waited,  and  waited. 

Six  other  men  took  turns  listening  and  shouting  through  the 
pipe,  but  K12  and  Q12  played  the  major  role.  Q12's  description 
continued: 

We  laid  there  side  by  side.     My  face  was  on  the 
bottom  and  his  face  was  on  top  of  mine  with  our  noses 
stuck  in  the  pipe,   listening.     We  listened  there  for 

49 


pretty  near  a  whole  day.  .  .So  all  at  once  K12  heard 
somebody's  voice  speak  out  there.     Well,  he  hollered. 
Then  he  got  an  answer  back. 

The  first  contact  of  the  group  of  twelve  with  the  rescuers  was 
made  late  on  the  sixth  day  of  entrapment.     The  rescuers  were  se- 
parated by  73  feet  of  solid  rock.     Through  the  pipe  K12  yelled  the 
names  of  the  twelve  trapped  men,  that  two  of  them  were  seriously 
injured,   and  that  they  required  water  urgently.     The  rescuers  broke 
through  twelve  hours  later,  having  previously  supplied  them  with 
water,   tea,  and  soup  through  a  smaller  pipe  which  was  passed  down 
the  main  air  pipe.     On  realizing  that  they  were  safe  most  of  the  men 
wept  for  a  few  minutes.     A  doctor  accompanied  the  rescuers  into 
the  cavity  and  remained  until  the  last  man  went  to  the  surface. 

The  Survival  Period:     The  Group  of  Six 

Late  on  the  second  day  of  their  entrapment,  the  group  of  six 
heard  sounds  of  rescuers.     D6  said, 

So  we  figured  they  had  cleaned  up  our  level  there , 
and  you  could  hear  the  rumbling,   something  like  the 
boxes  rumbling.     Sometimes  you  could  hear  them  and 
sometimes  you  would  never  hear  nothing  for  four  or 
five  hours.  .  .1  said,   "The  thing  is  we  have  got  to  get 
out  messages,   got  to  let  those  fellows  know  we  are 
alive." 

Shifts  were  organized  to  beat  against  the  pans  and  pipes  in 
the  hope  that  the  rescuers  would  hear  them. 

D6  continued: 

The  worst  thing  I  found  was  these  rescuers.     There 
were  times,  there  were  times  I  said  to  the  boys,    "We'll 
wait  when  they  are  changing  shifts  and  then  we  will 
start  banging  and  pounding."    And  we  used  to  holler-- 
for  help,  you  know,  all  the  voices.     I  said  all  our  voices 
would  carry  better  over  the  rubble  and  stuff.     I  figured, 
well,  we  can  hang  on  for  a  few  days  at  least.  .  .And 
Saturday  came  along  and  I  said,   "Well  there  is  one 
thing,  boys.     I  want  to  be  up  now.     You  never  can  tell, 
they  may  not  work  over  the  weekend,  you  know.  .  .We 
want  to  pound  on  those  pans  every  hour  on  the  hour, 
right  off  the  bat." 


50 


Although  the  group  rationed  their  water  at  D6's  suggestion, 
when  their  hope  of  immediate  escape  or  rescue  had  faded,   the 
water  was  finished  by  the  second  or  third  day.     E6  told  the  inter- 
viewer,    "Our  water  was  all  gone,    so  I  said,    'Well,  boys,  we're 
going  to  have  to  drink  pure  pee.  '    And  they  kind  of  laughed." 

They  began  to  consider  E6's  suggestion  seriously  within  a 
short  time,   and,   after  some  gagging  and  vomiting,   all  drank  urine. 
"One  fellow  was  drinking  it  all  the  time.     I  thought  he  was  drinking 
beer."     A  single  chocolate  bar  was  found  by  the  group  of  six  and 
they  broke  it  into  six  pieces  and  ate  it.     This  made  some  of  them 
more  thirsty. 

A6  said,   "At  one  time  I  thought  about  cutting  my  leg  and 
getting  some  blood  to  drink."    F6  annoyed  his  companions  con- 
siderably by  talking  about  "pop"  during  the  last  five  or  six  days. 
He  said, 

I  thought  a  lot  about  dying.     I  thought  dying  of  thirst 
would  be  a  horrible  way  to  go.     My  tongue  was  so  thick, 
my  throat  so  dry,   I  couldn't  swallow  and  could  hardly 
talk.     It  wasn't  pain.     It  was  a  terrible  despair  for 
water.     If  someone  had  come  up  to  me  with  a  gallon  of 
it  and  said,   "Drink  this  and  die  in  ten  minutes,"  I'd 
have  drained  it  down  and  wouldn't  have  cared. 

E6  described  his  faith  in  rescue  when  the  escape  attempts 
had  failed: 

So  we  set  down  and  pounded  on  the  pans  and  won- 
dered what  we'd  do  and  kind  of  slept  like.     And  then 
all  at  once,   oh.  .  .  F6  said.  .  .  "You  still  got  hopes  ?" 
And  I  said,   "Yes  I've  got  hopes.  .  .1  got  good  hopes 
and  I  will  until  I  draw  my  last  breath." 

D6  expressed  similar  faith  in  rescue: 

I  couldn't  understand  us  living  through  and  living 
that  long  (unless  rescue  was  to  come).     We  were  in 
fairly  good  condition.     Nobody  went  haywire.     We  were 
all  talking  sensible,   ordinary  conversations.     And  I 
figured  if  we  were  left  that  long,  in  fairly  good  shape, 
we  might  have  been  a  little  on  the  weak  side  but  no  one 
was  delirious  or  unconscious,  we  were  allowed  to  keep 
good. 


51 


Not  all  of  the  group  of  six  claimed  to  have  this  faith  in  res- 
cue.    C6  said  to  the  interviewer, 

I  sat  there  and  thought,   "Now  I  wonder  how  long?" 
Of  course,  I  just  said  to  myself,   "Well,   I'll  likely 
not  know  much  about  it  because  I'll  keep  getting 
weaker  all  the  time."     The  way  I  figured  it  we  would 
just  keep  getting  weaker  all  the  time,  and  I  didn't 
think  we  was  going  to  get  out  because  I  didn't  think 
they  were  going  to  get  to  us .     I  figured  we  would  just 
lay  there  when  we  got  that  weak.     Well,   in  fact,  the 
last  day  we  couldn't  hardly  stand  up. 

C6  had  been  active  immediately  after  the  bump,  but  during 
the  survival  period  he  cooperated  only  in  a  passive  manner.     A6 
was  pessimistic  and  helped  only  when  asked  to  do  so  by  D6.     F6 
became  irritable,   depressed,  and  uncooperative. 

D6  described  their  rescue  on  the  ninth  day: 

I  had  just  finished  pounding,   and  one  of  our  boys-- 
that  was  their  turn- -they  got  up  and  started  pounding 
on  it.     And  I  laid  back  and  kind  of  dozed  off.     And  then 
we  heard,   "How  many  is  there?"    We  never  heard 
those  fellows  until  they  come  right  up  to  us.     We  never 
heard  anything.  .  .1  woke.     And  one  of  the  boys  grabbed 
me  and  kissed  me.     And  we  said,   "Thank  God  you  are 
here"  or  something  like  that,  you  know.     And  then  the 
rescuers,  he  and  I,  joked  back  and  forth  and  carried 
on.     And  the  first  thing  we  hollered  for  was  water. 

The  Survival  Period:     The  Semi-isolated  Man 

X6  was  trapped  for  8  1/2  days  about  75  feet  away  from  the 
group  of  six.     He  was  without  food  and  water  during  the  entire 
period.     He  was  contacted  three  times,   several  days  apart,  by 
members  of  the  group  of  six.     X6  had  only  vague  memories  of  the 
trapped  period.     He  said,   "It  all  seems  like  a  dream."    He  is  con- 
sidered in  more  detail  in  Chapter  8. 

Leadership 

In  this  section,  the  term  leadership  is  applied  to  those  miners 
who  played  a  directive  role  with  reference  to  critical  problems  or 
events.     The  evidence  for  such  a  role  was  taken  from  the  man's 
own  interview  if  his  statements  were  confirmed  or  at  least  not 

52 


contradicted  by  another  miner's  account.     The  critical  issues  for 
the  trapped  miners  included 

(a)  being  partially  buried  and  in  danger  from  gas  (the  im- 
mediate post-impact  situation), 

(b)  escape, 

(c)  rationing  of  water, 

(d)  drinking  urine, 

(e)  maintaining  group  morale, 

(f)  getting  a  message  to  the  rescuers. 

The  group  of  six  faced  one  other  distinct  critical  problem: 
what  to  do  about  the  pinned  man.     Problems  (a)  and  (b)  were  con- 
centrated in  the  escape  period,  while  the  others  applied  mainly  to 
the  survival  period. 

The  following  accounts  for  the  two  groups  focus  on  the  miners 
in  each  group  who  played  central  leadership  roles.     A  comparative 
and  quantitative  analysis  of  leadership  is  presented  in  Chapter  5, 
and  the  personal  qualities  of  leaders  and  their  roles  are  discussed 
in  Chapters  7  and  8. 

The  group  of  twelve.       A  senior  miner,   G12  behaved  most 
adequately  right  after  the  bump.     While  others  were  dazed  and  con- 
fused,  this  man  helped  those  who  had  been  partially  buried.     K12 
said,   "In  the  meantime,   G12  has  come  up  to  where  N12  and  me  was 
and  uncovered  him  (N12).  .  .and  of  course  G12  went  by  me  to  help 
the  other  boys  out."    G12's  behavior  on  impact  was  direct  and  appro 
priate,   and  the  other  members  of  the  group  seemed  to  expect  this 
of  him.     During  the  escape  activities  he  participated  with  the  others 
but  did  not  take  a  leading  role.     Nevertheless,  the  group  seemed  to 
expect  him  to  take  responsibility  throughout  the  period  of  entrap- 
ment.    He  played  a  part  in  rationing  the  water;  J12  said,   "That  was 
a  good  thing  because  if  you  passed  the  can  around,    some  of  them 
couldn't  resist  taking  a  good  big  swig."     On  the  seventh  day,   aft-r 
they  had  contacted  the  rescuers  and  received  coffee,  water,   and 
soup,   M12  became  very  disturbed,  thinking  the  rescuers  were 
digging  in  the  wrong  direction.     K12  told  the  interviewer: 

I  said,   "Now  look,    M]  2  ,   I'm  not  a  miner,  but  I 
could  tell  why  they  were  close.".  .  .I'm  what  they  call 

53 


a  shiftman.     So  I  said,   "We'll  get  G12,"  This  M12 
was  the  chap  that  said  this  to  me,   "G12's  an  old 
miner."    I  said,   "G12,  you  crawl  in  there  and  give 
them  directions.".  .  ,G12  had  been  a  miner  and  he 
was  a  good  one. 

G12,  however,  apparently  did  not  contribute  much  to  the 
general  morale  of  the  group,  though  he  was  looked  to  on  several 
occasions.     He  had  received  psychiatric  treatment  for  a  depressive 
reaction  two  years  earlier. 

One  of  the  most  active  miners  in  escape  attempts  in  the  group 
of  twelve  was  M12.     Although  he  got  angry  the  first  night  and  was 
one  of  the  most  pessimistic  during  the  survival  period,  he  was  fore- 
most in  promoting  escape.     K12  said,   "He'd  drive  us  after  he  was 
down  on  his  back.  .  .to  do  some  job  to  try  to  get  out." 

K12  was  clearly  the  leader  in  the  survival  period,  although 
he  acknowledged  the  seniority  and  authority  of  G12.     He  suggested 
termination  of  escape  attempts  and  return  to  a  safer  cavity;  he  led 
N12  and  Q12  on  a  final  search  for  water,   found  a  gallon,  and  ra- 
tioned it;  he  suggested  drinking  urine  and  tried  it  first;  he  supported 
and  encouraged  those  in  despair;  he  stayed  by  the  air  pipe,  heard 
the  rescuers  working,  and  organized  shouting  through  the  pipe  until 
they  were  heard;  and  he  demanded  and  got  water,   coffee,  and  soup 
piped  in.     He  gave  the  following  account  of  this: 

I  told  them  that  we  needed  water  and  they  said, 
"You  can't  have  water.     Just  lay  down  and  take  it  easy." 
I  said,   "Look,  we  got  to  have  water,   if  we  don't  get 
water  you  might  as  well  quit  digging."     They  said, 
"The  doctor  said  you  can't  have  it."    And  I  said,    "What 
doctor?     You  put  the  doctor  on  the  end  of  that  pipe  till 
I  talk  to  him."    I  told  him,   "You  had  better  get  a  small 
pipe  through  here  and  give  us  some  water  because  we 
have  a  couple  of  fellows  who  are  hurt  and  they  need 
water  and  we  need  water  too.     We  just  have  to  have  it." 
I  told  him  what  we  were  doing,   and  I  said,   "We  can't 
take  much  of  that."    So  he  said,   "all  right,"  they 
would  put  a  pipe  through.  .  .So  finally  they  did  get  it 
through.  .  .Then  he  told  me,   "You  tell  them  to  take  a 
mouthful  and  count  five  hundred'.  "    So  when  I  got  in 
there  and  told  them  that,   I  said,   "Here's  the  water 
go  ahead  and  make  a  pig  of  yourself  if  you  want  to." 
Apparently  nobody  did  because  nobody  was  sick.     Well, 
I  knew  myself,   I  didn't  do  no  counting  when  I  got  a  hold 

54 


of  it.     I  got  a  mouthful  and  kind  of  rinsed  it  around  a 
bit  and  then  I  took  a  good  slug  of  it.     I  figured  then  I 
just  laid  back  and  let  that  trickle  down.  .  .1  had  taken 
the  small  line  in  and  over  top  of  the  pans.  .  .and  I'd 
held  the  pipe  over  there  so  whatever  was  spilled  went 
in  the  pan.     I  told  them,   I  told  the  boys  that  if  we  got 
stuck,   if  something  happened  out  there  and  they  couldn't 
get  in,  we'd  have  lots  of  moisture  right  there  in  the  pan. 
We  could  dive  into  that . 

The  group  of  six.     Three  different  miners  played  a  leader's 
role  on  different  occasions  in  the  group  of  six.     Immediately  after 
the  bump,   other  miners  looked  to  C6  because  of  the  danger  of  gas. 
C6  was  a  senior  miner,  had  been  trapped  in  the  1956  explosion,  and 
had  been  trained  as  a  dreagerman.     A6  said, 

C6  was  a  dreagerman  and  I  figured  I  would  stay 
close  to  him- -I  figured  I  was  safe  when  I  was  close  to 
him.     He  told  us  to  stay  put  and  we  stayed  put  for  a 
while. 

C6  did  not  maintain  the  role  that  was  initially  defined  for  him;  how- 
ever,  later  on  he  did  restrain  F6  from  impulsively  severing  the 
pinned  miner's  arm  with  an  axe.     He  also  noticed  the  pinned  miner's 
death  and  checked  his  pulse. 

E6  seemed  to  take  the  initiative  after  impact  and  through  the 
escape  period.     Immediately  after  the  bump,  he  dug  out  the  par- 
tially buried  F6,  assessed  the  danger  of  gas  and  the  plight  of  the 
pinned  man,  and  sent  for  an  "official,"  presumably  acting  on  the 
basis  of  training  and  experience.     He  led  several  escape  attempts 
down  the  wall,   exploring  every  possible  way  through.     On  several 
of  these,  he  and  his  friend  B6  went  together,  and  it  was  they  who 
found  the  isolated  man,   X6.     As  late  as  the  sixth  day,   E6  took  his 
friend  and,   in  spite  of  darkness  and  exhaustion,  tried  again.     E6 
suggested  that  they  drink  their  urine  and  that  they  try  eating  coal. 
However,   though  his  hopes  remained  quite  good  through  the  survival 
period  and  he  was  a  willing  helper  in  beating  the  pans,  he  was  not 
active  in  maintaining  group  morale. 

During  the  survival  period,   D6  clearly  emerged  as  the  leader 
of  the  group  of  six.     Immediately  following  the  bump,   D6  went  to 
the  miner  whose  arm  was  crushed  and  pinned  by  a  pack.     He  minis- 
tered to  this  man's  needs  as  far  as  possible  and  influenced  the  group 
not  to  remove  the  man's  arm.     He  took  little  part  in  the  escape  ac- 
tivities, however.     D6  suggested  and  supervised  the  rationing  of 

55 


the  water.     He  decided  about  the  second  or  third  day  to  beat  on  the 
pans  and  air  pipe  every  hour  on  the  hour  in  order  to  announce  their 
presence  to  the  rescuers.     He  had  the  help  of  the  more  capable 
members  of  the  group  in  this  operation.     He  watched  the  weaker 
members  of  the  group  and  when  they  could  not  take  their  turns  at 
"beating  the  pans"  he  filled  in.     In  order  to  dispel  despondency,  he 
told  jokes  and  recalled  amusing  incidents  concerning  his  own  life 
and  family.     He  sang  songs  and  led  the  group  in  singing  the  Old 
Rugged  Cross.      He  was  conscious  at  all  times  of  the  "shaky"  man 
(F6)  and  encouraged  him  with  positive  support:     "Always  laughing, 
I  would  say,    'You  will  last  for  another  day.1"    D6's  will  to  live  and 
his  belief  in  "deliverance  by  God"  seemed  to  seep  into  the  group 
during  the  long  survival  period.     D6  confirmed  the  death  of  the 
pinned  miner  on  the  sixth  day. 

D6  appeared  to  make  full  use  of  his  personality  assets  to  pro- 
mote a  type  of  inspirational  group  therapy  which  proved  most  effec- 
tive during  the  extremely  stressful  and  prolonged  survival  period. 

Sociopsychological  and  Physiological  Effects 
Hope  and  Despair 

While  despair  and  apathy  were  common  during  the  later  days 
of  entrapment,  there  were  few  if  any  times  when  at  least  one  miner 
was  not  expressing  hope  of  rescue.     It  may  be  a  characteristic  ten- 
dency of  groups  under  stress  that  not  all  members  despair  simul- 
taneously. * 

The  miners1  interviews  suggest  that  the  expression  of  despair 
had  a  positive  and  necessary  function  in  the  circumstances.     If  most 
members  of  the  group  expressed  despair,   one  member  seemed  to 
be  forced  to  take  the  role  of  the  optimist: 

I  said,   "We  might  as  well  make  up  our  mind  we 
are  here  to  stay  and  we  are  going  to  go.     We  will  all 
go  together."    And  he  said,    "The  good  Lord  didn't 
keep  us  here  this  long  to  let  us  go  now." 


#A  similar  phenomenon  has  been  noted  by  Perry,   Silber,   and  Bloch 
(1956).     They  concluded  that  a  family  under  stress  permits  only 
some  of  its  members  to  be  seen  as  disturbed,   although  other  mem- 
bers are  equally  upset. 


56 


In  another  instance,  a  miner  explained  to  the  interviewer:  "I  said, 
'They  will  get  us  out.  '  I  never  thought  they  would.  I  was  just  tell- 
ing him  that." 

The  ability  to  shift  roles,   from  voicing  despair  to  hope,   is 
well  illustrated  in  the  following  conversation: 

I  said,   "Well,   boy,   I  don't  know.    It  don't  look  good." 
I  said,   "I  don't  believe  we'll  make  it."    I  said,   "The 
sound  is  not  getting  any  handier."    And  he  said,    "No." 
And.  .  .he  started  to  cry.     And  I  said,   "Boy"--I  had 
tears  in  my  eyes—but  I  said,   "Don't  cry;  we  need  all 
our  strength."    That's  what  I  said.     "It's  only  three  or 
four  days  we  been  here  now,   five  or  six  days,"    I  said. 
And  I  said,   "I  think  I  got  strength  enough  yet  for  a 
couple  more  days  and  maybe  more."    So  he  said,   "All 
right.  .  .I'll  stop."    And  we  talked  there  quite  a  while. 

Much  of  the  period  of  waiting  was  filled  with  conversation 
about  neutral,  nonevocative  subjects.     "I  didn't  talk  much  about 
my  family,  although  I  thought  about  them."    No  one  talked  of  fellow 
workers  who  had  been  killed. 

The  interviewer  asked  the  miners  what  they  thought  about 
while  trapped.     For  the  most  part,  their  replies  were  about  fairly 
trivial  recent  events,  bits  of  finished  and  unfinished  business  ("I 
got  a  couple  of  pieces  of  hose  to  put  on  the  heater  of  the  car.  .  .It 
was  $1 .40,   and  I  didn't  pay  them,   and  I  didn't  leave  no  note  for  my 
wife  to  see  that  I  owed  them  this  $1.40,  and  I  worried  about  them 
not  getting  their  pay."),  about  hunting  and  plans  for  hunting  trips. 
Many  recognized  these  thoughts  as  cover  thoughts  for  their  real 
preoccupations:    their  families  and  the  possibility  of  rescue.    These 
latter  thoughts  evoked  despair  and  the  men  attempted  to  suppress 
them: 

I  was  thinking  of  hunting,  and  anything  like  that, 
you  know.     Anything  at  all  to  take  my  thoughts  away 
from  my  family.     I  sure  found  that  that  works.     You 
think  of  your  family  and  then  you  start  filling  up  (cry- 
ing). 

I  thought  about  a  little  bit  of  everything.     Mostly 
thought  of  my  family.     But  I  found  I  was  going  to  fill 
up  a  little  bit,   so  I  put  it  out. 


57 


.  .  .1  tried  to  keep  too  many  thoughts  from  coming 
into  my  mind,  because  I  knew  if  I  let  myself  think 
what  I  could  have  thought,   I  probably  would  have  got 
hysterical.  .  .  If  I  had  let  myself  go,   I  suppose  I  could 
have  broken  down  any  time.     That  is  one  reason  why 
I  didn't  let  myself  think  too  much  about  getting  out. 

There  was  a  taboo  against  crying: 

So  he  had  a  little  breakdown.     I  told  him,   I  said, 
"Don't  you  start  that  stuff  here.     You  just  forget  about 
that  stuff."    Because  I  figured  if  it  started,   it  would 
spread  around. 

Nevertheless,   most  of  the  men  had  a  soundless,  private  cry.     "I  had 
a  couple  of  little  sniffs.  .  .and  I  think  nearly  all  the  other  chaps  had  a 
couple."    "At  times,   tears  used  to  come  into  my  eyes --well  up  in 
my  eyes.     But  I  never  broke  down,   I  never  cried." 

Expectations  and  Behavior 

The  miners  were  trapped  in  an  environment  with  which  they 
were  familiar.     Special  skills  and  knowledge  had  been  gained  through 
their  daily  working  experience  in  the  mine  over  many  years.     It 
might  be  expected  that  this  knowledge  would  permit  the  miner  to  an- 
ticipate the  problems  he  would  face  in  a  mine  disaster  and  to  deal 
with  them  efficiently,   in  contrast,  for  instance,   to  people  suddenly 
hit  by  a  hurricane. 

To  some  extent  this  was  so.     All  the  miners  expected  gas  fol- 
lowing the  bump  and  took  the  proper  precautions  against  it.     "We 
was  afraid  of  gas  and  kept  our  heads  down."    When  nontrapped 
miners  were  asked  what  they  would  have  done  had  they  been  trapped, 
they  also  talked  of  precautions  against  gas: 

The  worst  thing  I  could  see  there  would  be  the  gas; 
to  try  to  protect  yourself  because  you  can't  smell  it, 
you  can't  see  it.     And  you  would  just  have  to  go  until 
you  felt  yourself  getting  weaker,  because  if  the  gas  gets 
you,  you  gradually  get  weaker. 

Other  precautions  were  not  taken.     The  trapped  men  gave 
little  thought  to  the  preservation  of  the  vital  water  supply  during 
their  preoccupation  with  escape.     Much  more  care  was  given  to  the 
preservation  of  the  limited  supply  of  light. 


58 


•    The  interviews,   moreover,   made  frequent  reference  to  ex- 
pectations that  were  not  fulfilled.     Some  of  these  expectations  were 
very  real  and  disturbing  to  the  trapped  men: 

Oh,   it  was  terrible.  .  .The    smell  (of  the  dead 
bodies),  that  is  what  I  was  scared  of.     The  stuff 
might  poison  us,  you  know.     The  fumes  of  that.     I 
was  scared  of  that  too.     Of  course,  you  can't  tell 
yet  what  it  might  do  to  us . 

Despite  the  miners'  knowledge  of  the  social  code  that  the  res- 
cuers work  continuously  until  the  last  man  is  out,  they  still  feared 
that  their  rescuers  would  leave  them  in  the  mine: 

Different  times  we  heard  a  picking  noise  like 
someone  scratching.     And  everytime  it  would  stop, 
we  would  think,   "Now  they're  done." 

Theyfll  take  the  weekend  off,   or  give  up. 

The  miners1  expert  knowledge  created  difficulties  when  that 
knowledge  was  unreliable  under  the  new  critical  conditions.     Al- 
though all  trapped  miners  paid  close  attention  to  all  sounds,  they 
misread  the  significance  of  these  because  they  used  as  their  point 
of  reference  the  mine  as  it  normally  operated.     The  bump  had 
broken  pipes,  blocked  passages,  and  disrupted  other  conductors  of 
sound.     Hence,   sounds  of  rescue  produced  such  definitions  as 

I  said,   "Now,  boys,   they  are  working  away  on  the 
level.     The  condition  of  this  wall  means  they  will  be  a 
month  getting  us  out  of  here.  "    And  that  is  why  I  gave 
up  hope. 

I  am  an  experienced  miner,   and  I  was  trying  to  work 
it  out  from  the  sounds.     I  had  been  on  rescue  work  in 
different  places  and  I  knew  just  what  they  should  be  doing. 
And  I  was  wrong.     I  was  100  per  cent  wrong. 

The  trapped  miners  had  been  unsure  of  their  ability  to  play 
their  role  adequately  in  the  critical  situation.     "I've  often  said  to 
my  wife  before  I  went  to  work,   'If  something  happened  and  I  was 
trapped  in  the  mine,  I  would  go  stark  raving  mad. '"    In  their  in- 
terviews,  many  expressed  astonishment  and  pride  that  they  had 
managed  to  remain  under  control. 


59 


This  expectation  that  a  trapped  man  would  be  unable  to  carry 
out  his  role  was  widespread.     Nontrapped  miners,   interviewed  after 
the  trapped  miners  had  been  rescued  and  their  experiences  made 
known,   expressed  the  same  anticipation  of  loss  of  control  had  they 
been  trapped.     Even  with  knowledge  that  the  trapped  men  had  re- 
mained under  control,    60  per  cent  of  the  nontrapped  miners  men- 
tioned fear  of  losing  sanity:     "I'd  just  go  crazy,  that's  all." 

Forty  per  cent  of  the  nontrapped  miners  did  not  know  how 
they  would  have  behaved  had  they  been  trapped: 

It's  a  hard  question.     I  don't  know.     To  be  trapped 
there,   I  think  it  would  be  impossible  for  anyone  to  say 
what  they  would  do.     I  couldn't  picture  what  I  would  do. 
No,   I  absolutely  couldn't.     I  never  had  any  experience 
that  way  at  all. 

These  expectations  of  how  a  man  would  behave  when  trapped 
were  in  marked  contrast  to  the  planned  behavior  of  the  wives  dur- 
ing the  crisis.     The  wives'  expectations  and  definitions  of  the  emer- 
gency situation  prepared  them  for  the  role  they  were  to  play  (Chap- 
ter 3). 

The  role  of  a  trapped  miner's  wife  was  a  public,   structured, 
and  active  role,  played  in  conjunction  with  less  involved  people. 
The  role  of  a  trapped  miner  was  incompletely  structured,   lacking 
in  support  from  less  involved  people,  and  it  contained  many  un- 
known qualities.     This  suggests  definite  limitations  to  "which  some 
disaster  roles  can  be  anticipated,   and,   as  a  consequence,  a  limit 
on  the  amount  of  effective  preparation  that  an  individual  can  make 
for  a  crisis,   even  one  for  which  he  has  considerable  experience 
and  training. 

Physical  Symptoms 

Tables  3  and  4  show  the  categories  of  symptoms  reported  by 
the  group  of  twelve  and  the  group  of  six  during  their  entrapment. 
Descriptive  examples  of  symptoms  used  under  each  heading  in  the 
tables  are 

(a)  Respiratory  symptoms:  episodes  of  hyper  ventilation; 
dyspnea  on  exertion  or  at  rest, 

(b)  Gastrointestinal  symptoms:  "butterflies  in  the  stomach"; 
nausea;  gagging;  vomiting;  diarrhea;  cramping  pain  in 
the  abdomen, 


60 


(c)  Cardiovascular  symptoms:  palpitations;  consciousness 
of  heart, 

(d)  Genitourinary  symptoms:  frequent  micturition;  "scalding"; 
dysuria, 

(e)  Skin  symptoms:  "goose  pimples,"  paraesthesia  or  "numb- 
ness," "pins  and  needles,"  "skin  felt  like  that  of  a  corpse, 

(f)  Musculoskeletal  symptoms:  cramping  in  the  muscles  of 
the  legs  and  arms  or  trunk, 

(g)  Headaches:  mostly  described  as  frontal  headaches. 

TABLE  3 

Psychophysiological  Symptoms  During  Entrapment: 
Group  of  Twelve 

Gastro- 

Respir-       intes-          Cardio-      Genito-  Musculo- 

atory  tinal          vascular       urinary  skeletal      Head- 


G12 
H12 
112 

P 

- 

P 

P 

P 
P 

P 

P 

J12 

P 

P 

- 

- 

- 

- 

K12 

P 

P 

- 

P              P 

P 

- 

L12 

- 

- 

P 

P 

- 

P 

M12 

_ 

. 

P 

P 

P 

P 

N12 

P 

'   « 

P 

-               P 

- 

P 

012 

- 

- 

- 

. 

- 

- 

P12 

- 

P 

- 

- 

P 

- 

Q12 

P 

P 

- 

- 

- 

P 

R12 

P 

— 

P 

P              P 

P 

P 

Note:       P  =  presence  of  symptom  reported;  -  =  presence  of 
symptom  not  reported. 

Each  trapped  miner  reported  a  number  of  symptoms.     It  is 
difficult  to  assess  the  origin  of  the  symptoms.     All  of  the  men  were 
subjected  to  starvation,   dehydration,   disturbance  of  electrolytic 
balance,   sensory  deprivation,  noxious  gases,   and,   of  course, 
severe  stress.     Several  were  seriously  injured  in  the  bump;  all 


61 


were  bruised.     Pre-existing  illnesses  and  infection  must  also  be 
taken  into  account.     No  doubt  many  symptoms  were  signs  of 
anxiety . 

TABLE  4 

Psychophysiological  Symptoms  During  Entrapment: 
Group  of  Six 

Gastro- 

Respir-      intes-         Cardio-  Genito-  Musculo- 
atory          tinal         vascular  urinary  skeletal      Head- 
Miner     system      system        system  system  Skin      system      ache 


A6                  -                  P 

P 

.  «• 

B6 

P 

- 

- 

- 

C6 

- 

P 

P 

- 

D6 

.- 

P 

P 

- 

E6                 -                 P 

P 

P 

- 

P 

F6 

- 

- 

— 

- 

Note:       P  =  presence  of  symptom  reported;  -  =  presence  of 
symptom  not  reported. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  there  were  fewer  symptoms  reported  by 
the  group  of  six  than  by  the  group  of  twelve.     The  group  of  six  were 
trapped  Z  1/2  days  longer  and  they  were  exposed  for  51/2  days  to 
a  dying  man  who  was  sometimes  delirious  and  whom  they  were 
powerless  to  help.     This  manfs  cries  for  water  and  his  pleas  for 
them  to  amputate  his  arm  were  very  stressful  to  the  group  of  six. 
This  unusual  stress  may  have  diverted  their  attention  away  from 
their  own  complaints.     On  the  other  hand,  the  stronger  social  con- 
trols in  this  small  group  (see  Chapter  5)  may  have  exerted  a  re- 
pressive effect  on  awareness  of  complaints. 

Ten  of  the  18  trapped  men  did  not  have  a  bowel  movement 
during  the  entire  period. 

The  men  seem  to  have  slept  for  short,   irregular  periods  of 
an  hour  or  two,  with  equally  long  periods  of  full  or  half  conscious- 
ness: 

I  would  lay  back  and  I  would  pray  and  I  would  fall 
asleep.  I  would  sleep  for  an  hour.  Then  you  would 
wake  up  and  start  worrying  what  was  going  on  again. 


62 


The  first  few  days  I  couldn't  sleep  at  all.     The 
only  time  I  did  sleep  was  after  we  had  got  the  water 
and  soup  into  us  . 

Nobody  slept  all  at  once.     I  don't  think  they  did, 
because  any  time  I  woke  up  I  would  always  say,   "Is 
there  anybody  awake?"    Generally  one  or  two  of  the 
boys  would  say,   "Yeah,  we  are." 

The  results  of  the  physical  examination  that  the  trapped  miners 
received  on  rescue  are  reported  in  Appendix  B. 

Deprivation  of  Sensory  Stimulation 

Both  groups  of  trapped  men  spent  the  greater  period  of  their 
entrapment  in  total  darkness:    the  group  of  twelve  for  3  1/2  days 
and  the  group  of  six  for  51/2  days.     Experimental  visual  depriva- 
tion has  produced  hallucinations  (Heron,   Doane,   &:  Scott,    1956; 
Solomon,   Leiderman,   Mendelson,   &:  Wexler,    1957),   and  almost  all 
the  trapped  miners  reported  hallucinations,  though  they  were  des- 
cribed in  different  terms.     The  following  six  are  typical  descrip- 
tions: 

(a)  Like  neon  lights  and  everything.     More  or  less 
the  nerves  of  our  eyes.     You  could  imagine  you 
could  see  dust  and  couldn't  see  nothing.     It 
occurred  pretty  well  towards  the  last  of  it. 

(b)  I  have  seen  more  lights  and  there  were  times 
that  my  eyes  were  shining  like  headlights  in  a 
car.     Just  come  right  up  like  that.     The  first 
time  I  experienced  it--seen  these  lights,   yellow 
and  blue- -I  called  them  headlights  and  I  would 
say,   "Boys,    my  headlights  are  shining."     I 
would  almost  take  my  oath  I  could  see  it;  see 
them  packs  and  the  stone  wall.     I  would  open 
my  eyes  for  a  while  and  they  would  go  away. 
But  after  a  little  while  they  would  come  again. 

I  just  thought,   well,  that's  because  it's  so  dark; 
that's  what  is  making  them  go. 

(c)  I  began  to  see  a  red--a  yellow  glow.     I  don't 
know  what  it  was  but  perhaps  it  was  the  fact 
that  we  wanted  to  see  light.     We  were  so  long 
in  the  dark,  we  persuaded  ourselves  we  could 
see  a  yellow  light. 


63 


(d)  Well,   it  was  just  like  lights  flickering  in  your 
eyes.     Your  eyes  would  open  and  still  it  was 
flickering  in  your  eyes.     I  was  laying  with  my 
eyes  closed  and  I  would  swear  somebody  had 

a  light  on  where  we  were.     It  just  seemed  like 
everything  was  lit  up.     Imagination  I  figured 
it  was  .     But  we  had  a  lot  of  troubles  at  the 
last.     We  had  a  lot  of  it  like  that.     Everybody 
was  saying  they  had  that  trouble. 

(e)  When  we  lay  down,  we  would  see  like  little 
spots,   like  little  fellows  running  away.     And 
different  times,   it  looked  as  if  there  were 
neon  signs  flashing  on  and  off  in  the  dark.     As 
soon  as  you  would  close  your  eyelids  you  would 
see  these  little  lights  and  things  dancing  in 
front  of  your  eyes. 

(f)  I  could  see  lights  in  front  of  my  eyes.     I'll 
tell  you  what  they  reminded  me  of- -these 
kaleidoscopes,   I  think  they  call  them,  with  all 
the  little  cut  glass  in.     It  was  like  one  of  these 
going  all  the  time . 

One  man  reported  a  body  illusion.  He  had  a  fracture  of  the 
lower  third  of  the  right  femur,  which  caused  his  leg  to  be  painful 
and  swollen.  He  said, 

I  began  to  think  of  my  leg  as  if  it  wasn't  part  of 
me,   and  I  would  keep  on  saying,   "My  poor  old  leg! 
My  poor  old  leg!  "    I  began  to  feel  sorry  for  it.     But 
I  didn't  think  it  was  part  of  me  at  the  time.     Maybe 
that  was  a  good  thing. 

Apart  from  these  phenomena,   no  other  effects  of  deprivation 
of  sensory  stimulation  were  reported.     It  is  noteworthy  that  starva- 
tion,  dehydration,   fatigue,   an  abnormal  percentage  of  methane  and 
carbon  dioxide,   apprehension,   and  anxiety,   along  with  deprivation 
of  visual  stimulation  for  up  to  five  days  did  not  produce  more  florid 
and  more  organized  hallucinations.     The  fact  that  the  men  were  not 
isolated  from  one  another  may  have  been  an  important  counterfactor 
It  is  noteworthy,  too,   that  the  men's  discussion  of  their  hallucina- 
tions while  they  were  experiencing  them  did  not  seem  to  produce  a 
common  form  of  hallucination. 


64 


Recent  experimental  studies  indicate  that  cognitive  functions 
are  impaired  after  as  little  as  24  hours  of  sensory  deprivation, 
with  some  evidence  that  the  effects  last  up  to  two  days  (Doane, 
Mahatoo,   Heron,   &  Scott,    1959;  Scott,   Bexton,  Heron,   &  Doane, 
1959).     Since  miners  were  not  tested  until  6  to  23  days  alter  their 
rescue,   it  is  unlikely  that  any  effects  of  perceptual  isolation  were 
reflected  in  their  cognitive  test  performance. 


65 


CHAPTER  5 

BEHAVIOR  OF  THE  TRAPPED  MINERS: 
A  QUANTITATIVE  ANALYSIS 


The  behavior  and  the  experiences  of  the  trapped  miners  dur- 
ing their  entrapment  have  been  discussed  in  general  terms  in  the 
preceding  chapter.     Now  the  same  phenomena  are  considered  from 
a  different  point  of  view.     This  chapter  systematically  describes 
one  quantifiable  aspect  of  the  miners'  behavior:  their  initiations. 

An  initiation,   as  defined  in  this  study,   is  an  act  that  originated 
an  extended  sequence  of  behavior. 

By  counting  initiations  through  content  analysis  of  the  inter- 
view material,   it  is  possible  to  consider  some  of  the  actions  of  the 
miners  in  a  specific  and  systematic  way  so  that  this  aspect  of  their 
behavior  can  be  compared.     With  such  a  measure,   it  is  possible  to 
find  out  how  equally  all  members  of  a  group  initiated  action  and  if 
the  frequency  of  a  miner's  initiating  was  constant  throughout  the 
entire  entrapment  or  varied  during  different  periods  of  this  ex- 
perience. 

One  expects  great  differences  in  the  accounts  of  such  a  pro- 
longed and  harrowing  experience.     The  spontaneous  story  obviously 
reflected  selective  recall,    conscious  and  unconscious  reconstruc- 
tion of  the  events,   and  deficiency  in  original  perception.     Although 
there  was  no  way  of  accurately  and  objectively  judging  the  relative 
validity  of  accounts,   there  was  no  reason  to  discount  the  validity  of 
any  account.     Each  point  of  view  and  description  of  events  was  re- 
garded as  adding  some  part  to  the  picture  of  the  total  experience. 
Therefore,   the  analysis  considered  the  number  of  initiations  each 
miner  attributed  to  himself,   the  number  he  attributed  to  others, 
and  the  number  others  attributed  to  him. 

The  individual  was  not  asked  to  rate  the  persons  in  the  group; 
rather,   his  spontaneous  story  was  analyzed  to  yield  a  score  for  him- 
self and  his  companions.     Each  speaker  in  telling  his  story  credited 
himself  with  the  initiation  of  certain  lines  of  action  or  with  making 


67 


suggestions  upon  which  the  group  acted:     "I  dug  him  out  and  he 
thanked  me."     "I  seen  we  had  to  have  help  so  I  said  to  B6,    'Go  out 
the  timber  road  and  get  help1.  .  .He  said,    'All  right.  '"    He  also 
credited  others  by  name  for  making  suggestions  or  initiating  ac- 
tions:    "D6  said  we  should  ration  the  water  out.  .  .and  he  did." 
Other  initiations  were  credited  to  specific  but  unnamed  persons: 
"Somebody  said--I  don't  remember  his  name—but  somebody  said, 
'Let's  pound  again.  '    So  two  of  us .  .  . "    Still  others  were  credited 
to  the  total  group  or  subgroup  as  "we"  and  "they":     "We  got  this 
saw  and  we  sawed  our  way  out  to  the  bull  wheel,"  and,   "When  they 
got  the  hole  through  and  the  air  was  coming  through,  they  hollered 
for  us  to  come  down."    A  point  was  scored  each  time  the  subject 
mentioned  an  initiation,   and  the  point  was  attributed  to  either  the 
speaker,   the  named  initator,   or  one  of  the  three  general  categories, 
"we,"  "they,"  or  "unspecified." 

Thus,   the  spontaneous  story  of  each  member  of  the  group  was 
translated  into  a  point- score  indicating  the  speaker's  view  of  the 
initiation  pattern.     The  following  kinds  of  initiation  scores  were 
used  in  the  analysis: 

(a)  Initiation  Perception:    the  total  number  of  times  the 
miner  mentioned  initiations  in  his  interview,   including 
the  initiations  the  miner  attributed  to  himself,  to  other 
members  of  the  group,   and  to  the  whole  group  or  sub- 
groups . 

(b)  "I"  Initiation:    the  number  of  times  a  miner  mentioned 
initiations  that  he  attributed  to  himself. 

(c)  Group  Evaluation:    the  total  number  of  times  all  other 
members  of  the  group  mentioned  initiations  attributed  to 
one  particular  individual,   exclusive  of  the  initiations 
with  which  the  individual  credited  himself.     (If  two  miners 
mentioned  the  same  initiation,  the  score  is  two.) 

Although  numerical  scores  are  included  in  the  tables  for  this 
chapter,   the  analysis  is  based  on  rank  orders.     The  rank  orders 
are  highly  reliable  and  less  affected  by  the  account  of  a  single  res- 
pondent than  are  numerical  scores.     All  of  eight  judges,   independent- 
ly scoring  the  interviews,   ranked  the  miners  in  the  same  order. 
Even  in  the  case  of  untaped  interviews,  though  they  may  be  incom- 
plete in  detail,   it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  interviewer  when 
dictating  the  untaped  interview  recounted  the  highlights  and  major 
activities  reported  in  the  respondent's  story.     Thus,  the  proportion 
of  initiations  that  the  respondent  attributed  to  other  miners  would 

68 


tend  to  be  preserved  in  the  interviewer's  dictated  account.     Conse- 
quently,  untaped  interviews  are  unlikely  to  affect  rank  orders  of 
Group  Evaluation.     It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  number  of  ini- 
tiations mentioned  in  each  interview  did  not  show  any  direct  rela- 
tionship with  the  length  of  the  interview.     Many  long  interviews 
contained  fewer  initiations  than  short  interviews.     Interview  probes 
rarely  increased  the  number  of  initiation  perceptions. 

As  an  additional  check  on  the  reliability  of  the  rank  order 
from  the  Group  Evaluation  score,  two  methods  were  developed. 
The  first  method  analyzed  the  initiations  mentioned  in  each  inter- 
view to  find  the  highest  initiator  as  recognized  by  that  respondent. 
A  point  was  credited  to  the  highest  initiator  derived  from  each  in- 
terview.    The  group  members  were  then  ranked  according  to  the 
number  of  credits  each  received.     This  rank  order  was  identical 
with  that  from  the  Group  Evaluation  score. 

The  second  method  analyzed  the  initiations  in  each  interview 
to  find  the  lowest  initiator  as  recognized  by  that  respondent.     A 
point  was  credited  to  the  lowest  initiator  as  derived  from  each  in- 
terview.    The  group  members  were  ranked  according  to  the  number 
of  credits  each/received.     This  rank  order  was  the  inverse  of  the 
high  initiator  r/ank  order  and  the  rank  order  from  the  Group  Evalua- 
tion score. 

Initiations 
The  Group  of  Six 

Table  5  lists  the  miners  of  the  group  of  six  in  rank  order  of 
Initiation  Perception,   "I"  Initiation,   and  Group  Evaluation  scores. 

There  was  a  wide  range  in  the  number  of  initiations  identified 
by  each  man--from  a  high  score  of  54  to  a  low  score  of  1 1 .     The 
story  of  A6,   who  is  ranked  lowest  on  initiation  perception,  was  not 
recorded  on  tape  due  to  difficulties  with  the  machine.     Instead,   it 
was  recorded  immediately  afterwards  by  the  interviewer  from  notes 
taken  during  the  interview.     The  interviewer  was  experienced,  and 
long  passages  of  direct  quotations  were  included  in  the  interview 
material  with  little  summarizing  or  condensation.     However,   it 
must  be  noted  that  this  particular  interview  is  atypical. 

Each  miner,   recounting  the  story  of  the  entrapment,  attributed 
more  initiations  to  himself  than  to  anyone  else.     As  the  story  was 
given  from  the  speaker's  point  of  view,   this  is  hardly  surprising. 
There  were  considerable  individual  differences  in  these  "I"  Initiation 


69 


TABLE  5 

Rank  Order  by  Initiation  Perception, 

"I"  Initiation,   and  Group  Evaluation  Scores: 

Group  of  Six 


Initiation 
perception 

MTH 

initiation 

Group 
evaluation 

Miner 

Score 

Miner 

Score 

Miner 

Score 

E6 

54 

E6 

28 

D6 

13 

C6 

29 

D6 

16 

E6 

12 

F6 

26 

F6 

12 

A6 

10 

D6 

19 

A6 

8a 

B6 

8 

B6 

12 

C6 

7 

C6 

2 

A6 

lla 

B6 

6 

F6 

2 

aBased  on  untaped  interview. 

scores:  one  member  recounted  28  actions  and  decisions  he  had  ini- 
tiated, while  another  only  attributed  6  to  himself.     The  range,  how- 
ever, was  not  as  great  as  that  of  the  Initiation  Perception. 

Scores  on  Initiation  Perception  and  "I"  Initiation  were  derived 
from  individual  interviews.     The  Group  Evaluation  scores,   on  the 
other  hand,  were  derived  for  each  person  in  the  group  from  the  in- 
terviews of  all  the  members  of  the  group  and  were,  therefore,  the 
most  important  in  the  assessment  of  group  structure.     As  can  be 
seen  in  Table  5,   2  of  the  6  miners  were  credited  with  a  mere  two 
initiations  in  the  accounts  of  their  companions,   considerably  fewer 
than  the  initiations  credited  to  the  other  4. 

The  Group  of  Twelve 

The  scores  from  the  initiation  analysis  of  the  interviews  of 
the  miners  in  the  group  of  twelve  are  listed  in  rank  order  in  Table 
6. 

Four  of  the  12  interviews  were  not  directly  tape  recorded. 
Machine  difficulties  required  the  interviewer  to  make  as  complete 
notes  as  possible  during  the  interviews  of  miners  G12,   O12,   P12, 
and  R12.     The  lack  of  detail  of  interviews  recorded  in  this  fashion 
undoubtedly  depressed  the  scores  of  G12,   O12,  P12,   and  R12  on 
Initiation  Perception  and  "I"  Initiation. 


70 


TABLE  6 

Rank  Order  by  Initiation  Perception, 
Initiation,   and  Group  Evaluation  Scores: 
Group  of  Twelve 


Initiation 
perception 

"I" 

initiation 

Group 
evaluation 

Miner 

Score 

Miner 

Score 

Miner 

Score 

Q12 

77 

K12 

30 

G12 

15 

K12 

56 

Q12 

19 

K12 

11 

N12 

30 

N12 

10 

M12 

11 

M12 

27 

M12 

7 

112 

9 

H12 

24 

O12 

6a 

Q12 

8 

112 

19 

G12 

5a 

L12 

7 

J12 

16 

H12 

5 

N12 

6 

L12 

15 

112 

4 

P12 

4 

012 

14a 

J12 

3 

H12 

2 

G12 

9a 

L12 

2 

J12 

0 

R12 

7a 

P12 

2a 

012 

0 

P12 

4a 

R12 

la 

R12 

0 

aBased  on  untaped  interview. 

Again,   as  in  the  group  of  six,  there  were  wide  ranges  in 
scores  on  Initiation  Perception,   "I"  Initiation,  and  Group  Evaluation. 
Some  miners  attributed  few  initiations  either  to  themselves  or  to 
their  companions.     Those  who  credited  themselves  with  many  initia- 
tions also  credited  many  to  others.     Miners  J12,   O12,   and  R12 
were  given  no  credit  by  their  companions  for  initiation;  one  man, 
G12,  was  given  a  prominently  high  score. 

Comparison  of  the  Two  Groups 

The  group  of  six  and  the  group  of  twelve  differed  in  a  number 
of  ways,   e.g.,   time  underground,   spatial  proximity,  and  size  of 
group.     Both  groups  lacked  formal  structure  and  leadership  when 
the  collapse  of  the  mine  isolated  them.     As  soon  as  the  first  initia- 
tions were  made,  an  informal  structure  began  to  emerge.     This 
informal  structure  showed  different  characteristics  for  the  two 
groups . 

Three  of  the  miners  in  the  group  of  twelve  were  credited  with 
no  initiations  by  their  companions  (Table  6);  no  member  of  the  group 
of  six  was  credited  with  fewer  than  two  initiations  (Table  5).     Thus, 

71 


in  the  larger  group  there  were  more  men  who  played  no  significant 
role  in  the  group's  activities. 

That  the  initiation  pattern  changes  with  the  size  of  the  group 
is  well  documented  in  the  experimental  literature  (Kelly,    1954). 
For  example,  Bales  (Bales,  Stradtbeck,  Mills,   &  Roseborough, 
1951),  using  a  "basic  initiation  rank,"  found  that  the  proportion  of 
very  infrequent  contributors  to  group  interaction  increases  as  the 
size  of  the  group  increases.     Both  Carter  (Carter,  Haythorn, 
Shriver,   &  Lanzetta,   1951)  and  Gibb  (1951)  suggest  that  in  larger 
groups  the  amount  of  freedom  is  not  sufficient  to  accommodate  all 
the  group  members. 

The  group  of  twelve  more  often  attributed  initiations  to  "we" 
or  to  "they,"  or  left  the  initiator  unspecified.     These  categories 
accounted  for  131  (43.9  per  cent)  of  the  298  initiations  reported  by 
the  group  of  twelve  and  27  (17.8  per  cent)  of  the  151  initiations  re- 
ported by  the  group  of  six.     The  difference  between  these  percen- 
tages is  highly  significant  statistically. 

Again,  this  is  probably  a  function  of  group  size.     With  an  in- 
crease in  the  size  of  the  group  there  is  greater  opportunity  for 
forming  subgroup  coalitions,  and  more  of  the  activities  of  the  group 
become  depersonalized. 

Initiations  in  Time  Sequence 

The  initiation  pattern  of  a  group  tends  to  change  with  time. 
Bales  (1950)  and  Gibb  (1954)  have  noted  general  tendencies  toward 
a  shift  in  emphasis  of  task  and  goal  within  ongoing  groups.     Riecken 
and  Romans  (1954)  have  discussed  phases  that  groups  go  through  in 
solving  a  problem  and  noted  that  as  a  group  becomes  more  accus- 
tomed to  working  together  less  interaction  is  spent  on  the  task  at 
hand  and  more  is  spent  on  affective  reactions . 

The  change  of  initiation  patterns  through  time  is  particularly 
pertinent  for  the  trapped  miners  because  their  period  of  entrapment 
seems  to  break  down  into  phases,   each  one  having  its  own  rather 
distinct  problems. 

The  Group  of  Six 

Two  periods  could  be  distinguished  in  the  accounts  of  the  six 
miners. 


72 


Escape  period.       Most  of  the  time  during  the  first  three  days 
of  entrapment  was  spent  in  trying  to  escape.     During  this  period 
there  was  a  great  deal  of  physical  activity  and  exploring  as  possi- 
bilities of  escape  were  probed. 

Survival  period.       After  about  three  days  of  fruitless  activity, 
the  miners  were  without  light  and  their  water  was  nearly  depleted. 
They  now  realized  that  they  were  unable  to  free  themselves  by  their 
own  efforts;  therefore,   most  of  the  remaining  five  days  before  res- 
cue were  devoted  to  survival,   and  a  different  set  of  decisions  and 
actions  was  brought  into  play. 

Pinned  miner  episode.        Part  of  the  first  five  days  was  spent 
dealing  with  a  crisis  quite  distinct  from  escape  or  survival.     It  con- 
cerned a  seventh  miner  caught  by  his  arm  in  one  of  the  wooden  packs 
that  held  up  the  roof  of  the  passageway.     He  was  in  pain,  and  the 
arm  could  not  be  released.     The  group  had  to  decide  what  to  do. 
The  alternatives  suggested  were  to  remove  the  arm,   risking  an 
amateur  operation  with  an  axe  and  the  possibility  of  the  man's  bleed- 
ing to  death  or  becoming  uncontrollably  violent  and  threatening  the 
existence  of  the  whole  group,   or  to  leave  the  man  pinned  as  he  was, 
against  the  wishes  of  the  man  himself.     Eventually,  their  decision 
was  to  leave  him  as  he  was,  and  the  miner  died  on  the  fifth  day  of 
entrapment. 

Although  the  escape  period  lasted  for  only  the  first  three  of 
the  8  1/2  days,   a  majority  of  the  initiations  were  reported  for  the 
escape  period.     Eighty- four  initiations  occurred  in  the  accounts  of 
the  escape  period,   48  in  the  accounts  of  the  ensuing  survival  period, 
and  19  in  the  accounts  of  the  pinned  miner  episode. 

The  few  initiations  reported  in  the  pinned  miner  episode  had 
no  relation  to  the  amount  of  time  spent  discussing  the  pinned  miner 
in  the  interviews.     All  discussed  him  at  length,  not  in  terms  of  ac- 
tion or  initiation,  but  rather  weighing  the  pros  and  cons  of  the  de- 
cision not  to  amputate  his  arm.     Almost  half  of  the  initiations  that 
were  referred  to  were  attributed  to  "we"  (a  much  larger  proportion 
than  in  either  the  escape  or  survival  periods).     Only  one  miner  at- 
tributed an  initiation  to  another  miner  in  his  account  of  this  episode. 

Table  7  lists  the  group  evaluation  of  each  miner's  initiations 
during  the  escape  period  and  the  survival  period.     It  is  clear  that 
in  the  reports  of  their  companions  none  of  the  men  were  consistent- 
ly high  initiators  during  the  entire  period  of  entrapment.     Instead, 
three  (E6,   A6,   and  B6)  were  reported  active  during  the  escape 
period,  and  another  (D6),  who  received  only  one  credit  for  an 

73 


initiation  during  the  escape  period,   received  almost  all  the  credits 
for  initiation  during  the  survival  period.     Initiations  were  spread 
more  evenly  among  the  six  miners  for  the  escape  period  than  for 
the  survival  period.     The  escape  and  survival  periods,   then,  were 
distinct,  not  only  in  the  kinds  and  amount  of  activities  carried  on, 
but  also  in  the  individuals  who  initiated  these  activities. 

TABLE  7 

Rank  Order  by  Group  Evaluation  Score 

in  the  Escape  Period,  the  Pinned  Miner  Episode, 

and  the  Survival  Period: 

Group  of  Six 


Escape 
period 

Pinned   miner                           Survival 
episode                                    period 

Miner 

Score 

Miner                Score           Miner 

Score 

E6 

11 

D6                    1                    D6 

11 

A6 

9 

B6 

2 

B6 

6 

A6 

1 

C6 

2 

E6 

1 

F6 

2 

C6 

0 

D6 

1 

F6 

0 

The  same  shift  was  less  clearly  reflected  in  the  "I"  Initiation 
score  for  the  escape  and  survival  periods  (Table  8).     E6  attributed 
almost  as  many  initiations  to  himself  during  the  escape  period  as 
the  other  five  miners  combined.     For  the  survival  period,   D6,   the 
high  man  in  Group  Evaluation  during  this  period,  barely  displaced 
E6  as  the  highest  in  "I"  Initiation.     On  the  whole,   "I"  Initiation,   or 
self- evaluation,  was  not  closely  related  to  Group  Evaluation. 

The  total  number  of  initiations  each  man  reported  remained 
quite  constant  for  the  escape  and  survival  periods  (Table  9)  and 
largely  independent  of  both  Group  Evaluation  and  "I"  Initiation. 

The  Group  of  Twelve 

There  was  no  major  situation  during  the  entrapment  of  the 
group  of  twelve,   similar  to  the  pinned  miner  episode  in  the  group 
of  six,  that  could  be  distinguished  from  initial  attempts  to  escape 
or  later  attempts  to  survive  until  rescued.     Therefore,  the  initiation 
scores  of  the  group  of  twelve  were  analyzed  separately  for  the  es- 
cape and  the  survival  periods. 

74 


TABLE  8 

Rank  Order  by  "I"  Initiation  Score 
in  the  Escape  Period,   the  Pinned  Miner  Episode, 
and  the  Survival  Period: 
Group  of  Six 


Escape 
period 

Pinned  miner 
episode 

Survival 
period 

Miner 

Score 

Miner 

Score 

Miner 

Score 

E6 

19 

A6 

& 

D6 

9 

B6 

5 

C6 

2 

E6 

8 

D6 

5 

D6 

2 

F6 

7 

A6 

4a 

F6 

2 

A6 

& 

C6 

4 

E6 

1 

B6 

I 

F6 

3 

B6 

0 

C6 

I 

aBased  on  untaped  interview. 


TABLE  9 

Rank  Order  by  Initiation  Perception  Score 

in  the  Escape  Period,  the  Pinned  Miner  Episode, 

and  the  Survival  Period: 

Group  of  Six 


Escape 
period 

Pinned  miner 
episode 

Survival 
period 

Miner 

Score 

Miner 

Score 

Miner 

Score 

E6 

34 

E6 

5 

E6 

15 

C6 

18 

F6 

5 

F6 

12 

B6 

9 

C6 

4 

D6 

9 

F6 

9 

D6 

3 

C6 

7 

A6 

7a 

A6 

2a 

B6 

3 

D6 

7 

B6 

0 

A6 

2a 

aBased  on  untaped  interview. 

As  in  the  group  of  six,   the  escape  period  lasted  for  about 
three  days.     Rescue  came  after  nearly  61/2  days  of  entrapment. 
Also  as  in  the  group  of  six,    most  initiations  were  reported  for  the 
escape  period.     The  accounts  for  the  first  three  days  yielded  212 


75 


initiations;  accounts  for  the  last  three,   86  initiations.     The  activity 
of  the  group,  then,   seems  to  have  changed  markedly  after  it  was 
realized  that  attempts  to  escape  were  futile. 

The  Group  Evaluation  of  each  man's  initiations  during  the  es- 
cape and  survival  periods  is  shown  in  Table  10.     The  Group  Evalua- 
tion scores  of  the  larger  group  of  miners  were  similar  to  those  of 
the  smaller  group  in  that  the  patterns  of  evaluations  for  escape  and 
survival  periods  differ.     G12  stood  out  during  the  escape  period 
with  13  initiations  attributed  to  him,   4  more  than  the  next  highest 
man;  he  received  credit  for  only  2  initiations  during  the  survival 
period.     K12  was  credited  with  only  one  initiation  during  the  escape 
period;  with  10  initiations  during  the  survival  period,  he  had  twice 
as  many  as  anyone  else  in  the  group.     As  in  the  group  of  six,   more 
men  shared  in  the  initiations  for  the  escape  period  than  for  the  sur- 
vival period. 

TABLE  10 

Rank  Order  by  Group  Evaluation  Score 

in  the  Escape  Period  and  the  Survival  Period: 

Group  of  Twelve 


Escape 

period 

Survival 

period 

Miner 

Score 

Miner 

Score 

G12 

13 

K12 

10 

112 

9 

N12 

5 

M12 

9 

Q12 

5 

L12 

7 

G12 

2 

P12 

3 

M12 

2 

Q12 

3 

P12 

1 

H12 

2 

H12 

0 

K12 

1 

112 

0 

N12 

1 

J12 

0 

J12 

0 

L12 

0 

012 

0 

012 

0 

R12 

0 

R12 

0 

Tables  11  and  12  give  the  "I"  Initiation  and  Initiation  Percep- 
tion scores  for  the  two  periods.     Unfortunately,  the  interview  with 
G12,  the  high  man  in  Group  Evaluation  for  the  escape  period,  was 
not  directly  tape  recorded.     This  undoubtedly  depressed  his  "I" 
Initiation  and  Initiation  Perception  scores.     For  the  survival  period, 
K12  led  as  markedly  in  "I"  Initiation  as  he  did  in  Group  Evaluation. 

76 


TABLE  11 

Rank  Order  by  "I"  Initiation  Score 

in  the  Escape  Period  and  the  Survival  Period: 

Group  of  Twelve 


Escape 

period 

Survival 

period 

Miner 

Score 

Miner 

Score 

K12 

17 

K12 

13 

Q12 

15 

N12 

4 

M12 

7 

Q12 

4 

N12 

6 

H12 

3 

G12 

4a 

012 

3a 

112 

3 

G12 

la 

J12 

3 

112 

1 

012 

3a 

L12 

1 

H12 

2 

J12 

0 

P12 

2a 

M12 

0 

L12 

1 

P12 

oa 

R12 

la 

R12 

oa 

aBased  on  untaped  interview. 


TABLE  12 

Rank  Order  by  Initiation  Perception  Score 

in  the  Escape  Period  and  the  Survival  Period: 

Group  of  Twelve 


Escape  period 

Survival 

period 

Miner 

Score 

Miner 

Score 

Q12 

64 

K12 

18 

K12 

38 

H12 

15 

M12 

24 

Q12 

13 

N12 

21 

N12 

9 

112 

13 

012 

7a 

J12 

12 

112 

6 

H12 

9 

L12 

6 

L12 

9 

J12 

4 

012 

7a 

G12 

3a 

G12 

6a 

M12 

3 

R12 

5a 

R12 

2a 

P12 

4a 

P12 

Oa 

aBased  on  untaped  interview. 

77 


As  in  the  group  of  six,   the  orders  of  Initiation  Perception 
and  "I"  Initiation  scores  varied  less  from  the  escape  to  survival 
periods  than  did  Group  Evaluation.     The  miners  in  both  groups 
tended  to  report  consistently  in  terms  of  action  or  nonaction,  and 
to  report  themselves  as  consistent  initiators,   either  high  or  low, 
but  they  distributed  their  credits  for  initiations  to  their  companions 
differently  for  the  escape  and  the  survival  periods. 

Discussion 
Leadership  and  Initiation 

The  defining  characteristics  of  leadership  have  been  variously 
identified,  but  presumably  one  basic  and  unique  function  of  the  lead- 
er is  initiation:    the  origination  and  facilitation  of,   or  resistance  to, 
new  ideas  and  practices  (Bales,    1953;  Halpin  &  Winer,    1952;  Hors- 
fall  &  Arensberg,    1949).     Halpin  and  Winer  (1952)  found  a  close  re- 
lationship between  leadership  ratings  and  amount  of  initiating.     The 
high  initiators  in  the  two  groups  of  trapped  miners,  therefore,   can 
be  identified  conventionally  as  leaders. 

A  number  of  different  techniques  for  the  rating  of  leadership 
are  found  in  the  experimental  literature:     rating  by  extra- group  ob- 
servers, by  the  participants  in  the  group  activity,  and  by  self- 
appraisal  of  group  members.     Generally  the  results  of  these  dif- 
ferent methods  have  been  found  not  to  be  highly  related  to  each  other 
In  this  study,  there  is  information  on  initiation  from  both  self- 
appraisal  ("I"  Initiation)  and  Group  Evaluation.     The  relationship 
between  the  two  is  slight.     It  has  also  been  noted  that  the  "I"  Initia- 
tion score  tended  to  remain  constant  although  the  Group  Evaluation 
changed  considerably  from  one  time  period  to  another.     The  two 
scores,  then,  tended  to  measure  different  things. 

An  "I"  Initiation  score  reflects  personality  characteristics 
that  may  not  be  related  to  leadership,  particularly  the  individual's 
habitual  style  of  narration.     The  narrative  style  of  some  interviews 
displayed  a  series  of  finely  distinguished  decisions,   orders,  and 
actions,  yielding  a  high  "I"  Initiation  score.     For  example,  the  fol- 
lowing is  a  characteristic  sequence  in  E6!s  narration: 

I  started  down  the  wall,   and  I  heard  someone  hollering 
"Help!  ";  so  I  went  down  and  there  was  Joe  in  the  pack 
and  just  below  I  heard  somebody  hollering  "Help!  "  so 
I  went  down  below  and  here  was  Jim.     He  was  buried 
about  round  the  waist.     I  dug  him  out,  and  he  thanked 
me,  and  I  said,   "Don't  mention  that,  boy."    And  we 

78 


came  back  up--we  came  up,   and  I  looked  at  Joe's  arm 
and  I  seen  we  had  to  have  help  so  I  yelled  to  Archie, 
"Go  out  the  timber  road  and  get  help";  and  I  said, 
"Bring  an  official  in  with  you;  its  going  to  be  gassy  in 
here." 

Other  miners  recounted  their  experiences  in  terms  of  thoughts 
rather  than  action,  thus  earning  low  "I"  Initiation  scores.     For 
example,   D6,  who  had  a  high  group  evaluation  score,  tended  to 
speak  in  a  frame  of  reference  of  "I  thought"  or  "we  figured": 

Well,   I  thought  about  getting  up,   I  thought  the  level  was 
our  best  bet.  .  .  Well,  the  way  I  figured,   we  didn't  have 
the  tools  then,  the  way  I  figured,  if  we  could  have  re- 
leased. .  . 

Such  idiosyncracies  in  the  individual  interviews  may  have 
little  to  do  with  leadership  characteristics,  but  greatly  influence 
an  individual's  "I"  Initiation  score.     For  this  reason  alone  the 
Group  Evaluation  is  to  be  preferred  as  a  measure  of  leadership. 

Group  Evaluation  is  also  preferable  on  theoretical  grounds. 
As  Gibb  (1954)  points  out,   man  emerges  as  a  leader  not  simply  be- 
cause of  particular  personality  traits  but  because  of  his  ability  to 
satisfy  group  needs.     The  Group  Evaluation  score  seems  to  be  a 
measure  of  the  individual's  standing,  which  depends  not  on  the  in- 
dividual's initiations  as  such  but  on  the  extent  to  which  his  com- 
panions perceive  him  as  having  made  these  initiations.     Gibb  (1954) 
adds  that  "his  standing  in  turn  is  dependent  not  upon  possession  of 
these  special  qualities  as  such,  but  upon  the  extent  to  which  his  fel- 
lows perceive  him  as  having  these  qualities." 

This  dimension  of  perception  of  leadership  is  largely  absent 
from  the  "I"  Initiation  scores.     The  "I"  Initiation  score  is  a  mea- 
sure of  the  number  of  initiations  the  individual  claims  to  have  made. 
Each  miner  may  well  have  initiated  as  many  times  as  he  said  he 
did--and  probably  at  a  fairly  constant  level  throughout  entrapment. 
However,   only  some  of  these  initiations  were  seen,  recognized,  and 
remembered  by  other  members  of  the  group,  who  would  perceive 
only  those  initiations  required  by  them  at  a  particular  time  to 
achieve  a  particular  goal  in  a  particular  situation.     If  this  is  so, 
the  Group  Evaluation  score  reflects  a  social  evaluation  relative  to 
other  members  and  relative  to  the  situation,  and  therefore  this 
evaluation  approaches  more  closely  the  conventional  definition  of 
leadership. 


79 


The  Shift  in  Leadership 

The  leadership  of  a  small,   traditionless  group  may  shift  fre- 
quently as  the  group  moves  from  one  phase  of  activity  to  another 
(Gibb,    1947).     At  any  one  time,  a  group  member  achieves  the  status 
of  a  group  leader  in  proportion  to  his  participation  in  the  group 
activity  and  his  demonstration  of  capacity  to  contribute  more  than 
others  to  the  achievement  of  the  common  goal.     As  the  activity 
changes,   the  roles  required  of  a  leader  change,  and,  because  of 
individual  differences  among  group  members,   the  likelihood  is  that 
different  members  will  be  perceived  as  filling  these  roles  best. 
Carter  (1953)  suggests  that 

there  are  probably  families  of  situations  for  which 
leadership  is  fairly  general  for  any  task  falling  in 
that  family,  but  there  will  be  other  families  in  which 
leadership  requirements  will  be  fairly  independent  of 
those  in  the  first  family  of  situations. 

Two  such  independent  families  of  situations  have  been  identified  by 
Bales  (1953):  task-oriented  (instrumental-adaptive)  and  emotion- 
oriented  (expressive-integrative),   each  with  its  peculiar  leadership 
requirements. 

Bale's  classification  of  situations  fits  the  entrapment  of  the 
miners.     The  miners'  interviews  all  indicate  a  change  in  the  major 
goal  of  both  groups  about  three  days  after  the  bump.     The  first 
phase  was  an  attempt  to  escape;  it  was  characterized  by  vigorous 
action  and  little  concern  with  keeping  up  morale.     While  most 
miners  made  initiations  during  this  period,   one  man  in  each  group, 
E6  in  the  group  of  six  and  G12  in  the  group  of  twelve,  was  promi- 
nently high  in  initiations  and  can  therefore  be  identified  as  the 
leader.     These  two  men  were  task  leaders  although  the  task  was 
widely  shared  among  their  companions . 

In  the  survival  period,  the  miners  concentrated  on  waiting  and 
surviving,  with  a  little  physical  action  maintained  in  pounding  on  the 
pipes  to  attract  the  attention  of  rescuers.     In  both  groups  during 
this  period  a  new  leader  emerged.     K12  in  the  group  of  twelve  was 
credited  with  almost  as  many  initiations  during  the  survival  period 
as  the  rest  of  his  group  combined,  while  D6  in  his  group  was  cred- 
ited with  almost  three  times  as  many  as  the  rest  of  his  group  com- 
bined.    They  were  the  emotion-oriented  leaders  of  their  groups  and 
their  role  was  not  widely  shared. 


80 


Presumably,   each  of  the  leaders—the  task-oriented  leaders 
and  the  emotion-oriented  leaders  —  emerged  in  their  role  because 
of  appropriate  qualities.     Certainly  a  number  of  the  trapped  men 
were  precluded  by  injury  from  leadership,  at  least  during  the  es- 
cape period  and  perhaps  during  the  survival  period  as  well.     C6 
and  F6  in  the  group  of  six  and  O12,  P12,  and  R12  in  the  group  of 
twelve  were  all  injured  in  some  degree  during  the  bump  and  were 
all  low  initiators  throughout. 

Apart  from  this,  the  few  actuarial  characteristics  that  were 
investigated  proved  to  be  unrelated  to  the  number  of  initiations: 
neither  age  nor  years  of  experience  in  mining  and  type  of  work  per 
formed  in  the  mine  differentiated  the  task-oriented  leaders  or 
emotion-oriented  leaders  from  their  companions.     The  problem  of 
leadership  characteristics  is  considered  more  fully  in  Chapter  8. 


81 


CHAPTER  6 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  DATA  ON  TRAPPED  AND 
NONTRAPPED  MINERS 

The   19  trapped  miners  were  all  given  a  brief  battery  of  psy- 
chological tests  within  5  to  23  days  after  being  rescued.     The  "con- 
trol" group  of  12  off-shift  miners  also  was  given  the  same  battery 
from  10  to  17  days  after  rescue  operations  were  completed.     The 
battery  included  subtests  from  the  Wechsler  Adult  Intelligence 
Scale  (WAIS)  (Wechsler,  1955),  two  counting  tests  (counting  back- 
wards from  20  to  1  and  counting  backwards  from  100  by  7's),   the 
Bender-Gestalt  Drawing  Test  (Bender,    1938),   Rorschach  cards  I, 
III,    VI,    VIII,   and  X  (Rorschach,    1942)  and  a  Sentence  Completion 
test  developed  for  this  study  (see  Appendix  C).     Three  WAIS  sub- 
tests  were  selected  as  measures  of  different  aspects  of  intellectual 
functioning:     Vocabulary  for  an  estimate  of  general  intelligence  (it 
was  not  given  to  2  of  the  trapped  and  9  of  the  nontrapped  miners  be- 
cause of  time  limitations);  Block  Design  for  its  performance  nature 
and  as  a  measure  of  the  ability  to  abstract,   analyze,   and  integrate 
the  components  of  a  problem;  and  Digit  Span  to  assess  immediate 
memory,   attention,   and  concentration.     The  two  counting  tests  were 
included  as  measures  of  concentration  without  involvement  of  im- 
mediate memory.     The  Bender-Gestalt  was  utilized  as  a  measure 
of  visual-motoi*  coordination,  which  is  sensitive  to  degree  of  emo- 
tional disturbance.     The  Rorschach  ink  blot  test  was  included  in  the 
battery  as  a  means  of  appraising  subjects'  modes  of  handling  un- 
structured stimulus  situations.     The  complete  test  of  ten  cards  was 
given  to  9  subjects;  time  limitations  and  subjects'  tendency  to  fatigue 
led  to  the  decision  to  use  only  five  cards  on  the  rest  of  the  subjects. 
A  31 -item  Sentence  Completion  test  was  made  up  to  elicit  information 
about  subjects'  feelings  and  attitudes  with  reference  to  events  and 
figures  involved  in  the  disaster. 

In  order  to  carry  out  a  comparative  analysis,   all  of  the  psy- 
chological data  were  treated  quantitatively.     Scores  on  tests  of  in- 
tellectual functions  were  derived  in  the  standard  manner.     To 
quantify  the  Bender-Gestalt,   a  simple  method  of  scoring  deviations 
from  the  original  stimulus  drawings  was  devised,   with  possible 
scores   ranging  from  0  to  12.     A  subject's  score  was  referred  to  as 
his  Bender-Gestalt  (B-G)  error  score.    The  scoring  method  showed 

83 


high  agreement  with  clinical  judgment  in  the  placing  of  the  31  draw- 
ings into  good  or  poor  groups;  the  two  methods  were  in  disagree- 
ment on  the  placement  of  only  2  out  of  the  31  drawings  .     Scoring 
was  reliable  between  independent  psychologists,   with  only  one  dis- 
agreement in  the  resulting  rank  order. 

The  Rorschach  protocols  were  independently  scored  by  a 
clinical  psychologist.     Klopfer's  method  (Klopfer,  Ainsworth, 
Klopfer,   &:  Holt,    1954)  was  used  with  the  following  modifications: 

(a)  Popular  (P)  was  given  for  those  "common"  responses 
used  by  Rapaport  (Rapaport,   Gill,    fe  Schafer,    1946): 
Card  I:  bat,   butterfly,   bird,  bug;  Card  III:  people, 
bird,   butterfly,   bow  tie,   hair  bow;  Card  VI:  animal 
skin;  Card  VIII:  animal;  Card  X:  octopuses,   crabs, 
rabbit  head,   wishbone,   two  bugs,   worms,   and 
caterpillar . 

(b)  Only  main  responses  and  main  determinants  were 
scored  and  used. 

(c)  Every  main  response  was  given  a  form-level  rating: 
good  form  (F+)  for  reasonably  accurate  percepts  of 
at  least  popular  form  level;  poor  form  (F-)  for  in- 
accurate or  vague  responses. 

(d)  Those  responses  that  involved  determinants  other 
than  F  were  assigned  determinant  scores  in  the 
usual  manner. 

(e)  All  whole  and  cut-off  whole  responses  (W)  were 
scored  as  either  good  Ws  (W+)  for  well-developed 
and  reasonably  accurate  wholes  or  poor  Ws  (W-) 
for  inaccurate,   disorganized,   or  vague  wholes. 

Each  subject's  Rorschach  scores  were  combined  into  four 
categories  defined  on  the  basis  of  clinical  experience  and  perusal 
of  the  literature.     The  first  category  was  labeled  "Rorschach  con- 
trol" and  was  derived  by  adding  the  subject's  score  for  F  +  ,   W+,   P, 
FC  ,   number  of  content  categories,   and  one  point  if  the  man's  re- 
cord had  one  mF  or  Fm.     The  second  category  was  labeled  "Ror- 
schach disorganization"  and  was  made  up  of  a  subject's  scores  for 
F-,   W-,   CF,   and  C,   and  a  point  for  .each  m  response  over  and 
above  the  one  counted  under  Rorschach  control.     The  ;third  category 
comprised  the  sum  of  a  subject's  c  and  H  responses.     Jt  was  larbeletf 
the  "empathy"  score.     The  empathy  scores  varied  little,    so  they 
were  not  used  in  group  comparisons.     The  fourth  category  was  the 
number  of  responses  each  miner  gave  to  the  five  Rorschaqh  ca.rds. 

84 


The  use  of  only  five  of  the  ten  ink  blots  is  not  in  keeping  with 
standard  Rorschach  practice.     This  expedient,  however,   would 
seem  justified  in  view  of  the  high  split-half  reliabilities  found  by 
Hertz  (1934)  and  the  conclusions  of  Baugham  (1954),   Dorken  (1950; 
1956),   and  Frank  (1939)  that  a  variety  of  ink  blots  evoke  relatively 
consistent  responses.     Moreover,   use  of  half  the  stimulus  cards  is 
legitimate  within  the  appropriate  experimental  design.     The  present 
study  was  a  comparative  one  with  an  experimental  and  a  control 
group,   and  at  a  later  date  both  groups  were  retested.     Finally,   only 
a  few  relatively  simple  determinant  scores  were  used  in  the  group 
comparisons. 

Nevertheless,   it  is  worth  noting  that  the  five  cards  produced 
responses  reasonably  representative  of  the  standard  ten  cards  in 
those  nine  miners  who  were  given  the  complete  series  of  blots. 
Rorschach  control  scores  for  the  two  halves  of  the  Rorschach  were 
significantly  related  (r  =  .87),   while  the  correlation  for  Rorschach 
disorganization  was  just  short  of  significance  at  the  5  per  cent 
level  (r  =  .64).     The  part-whole  reliability  coefficients  were  .97 
and  .94  for  the  two  Rorschach  measures  respectively.     These  find- 
ings indicate  that  the  five-card  Rorschach  produced  results  much 
like  a  ten-card  Rorschach,   at  least  in  terms  of  the  Rorschach  con- 
trol and  disorganization  scores  used  in  this  study. 

The  Sentence  Completion  responses  were  quantified  by  setting 
up  mutually  exclusive  and  exhaustive  categories  for  the  responses 
to  each  item.     The  selection  of  categories  was  guided  by  the  nature 
of  the  subjects1  responses.     Where  feasible,   like  categories  "were 
used  for  more  than  one  item.     For  example,   for  the  three  items, 
"My  ambition.  .  .  ,"    "I  would  like  to.  .  .  ,"  and  "What  I  need...  ," 
two  main  categories  were  used:     self- reference  and  economic  re- 
ference.    Each  category  was  defined  with  a  few  examples,  and  two 
psychologists  independently  coded  the  responses  of  20  subjects 
chosen  randomly  from  the  total  sample  of  31.     There  was  an  average 
of  just  over  three  categories  per  item.     The  judges  agreed  on  the 
categorization  of  84  per  cent  of  the  620  responses. 

A  prorated  IQ  was  calculated  for  each  subject  from  his  Digit 
Span  and  Block  Design  scale  scores.     Since  performance  on  both  of 
these  subtests  might  be  expected  to  be  impaired  under  stress,   it 
could  be  argued  that  the  Vocabulary  subtest  would  have  provided  a 
more  valid  estimate  of  intelligence.     However,  the  latter  was  not 
given  to  all  subjects.     Moreover,  for  the  20  subjects  who  did  do  the 
Vocabulary  subtest,  the  mean  scaled  score  was  7.6,  while  the  mean 
scaled  score  for  Block  Design  and  Digit  Span  combined  was  6.7. 
The  difference  between  these  two  means  was  not  significant  jt_  =  1.588) 

85 


Thus,  the  reported  IQ  is  presumably  not  appreciably  different  from 
one  that  might  have  been  based  on  the  Vocabulary  subtest.     The 
fact  that  the  miners'  average  prorated  IQ  was  considerably  below 
the  norm  of  100  used  by  Wechsler  (1955)  is  in  keeping  with  the 
achievement  nature  and  cultural  bias  of  measures  of  intelligence 
(Anastasi,    1958;  Burnett,  Beach,   fe  Sullivan,    1958).     Moreover, 
the  education  level  of  the  subjects  of  this  study  was  quite  low  (mean 
of  grade  6.7),  and  education  tends  to  correlate  with  intelligence  in 
the  general  population  (Anastasi,    1958).     Also,  the  stress  that  all, 
or  almost  all,   experienced  shortly  before  the  testing  may  have  de- 
pressed intelligence  scores. 

Wechslerfs  scaled  Digit  Span  score  is  based  on  a  raw  score 
computed  by  adding  the  number  of  digits  that  a  subject  remembers 
forward  to  the  number  he  remembers  backward.     In  order  to  give 
greater  weight  to  the  difference  between  the  number  remembered 
forward  and  the  number  remembered  backward,  a  difference  which 
may  be  increased  by  disturbances  like  depression  or  brain  damage, 
a  special  score  was  devised.     Hereafter  referred  to  as  the  Digit 
Efficiency  score,  it  was  derived  by  adding  a  subject's  digits  forward 
to  his  digits  backward,  and  subtracting  from  this  sum  the  difference 
between  his  digits  forward  and  digits  backward.     For  example,   if  a 
subject's  digits  forward  and  digits  backward  were  7  and  4  respec- 
tively, his  Digit  Efficiency  score  would  be:  (7  +  4)- (7  -  4)  =  8. 

The  final  measure  used  in  this  analysis  was  a  "psychiatric 
ego  strength"  score  based  on  the  interviews.     Eight  attributes  of 
behavior  were  rated  independently  by  two  psychiatrists  on  ten-point 
scales,  and  the  sum  of  these  ratings  for  a  given  miner  constituted 
his  psychiatric  ego  strength  score.     The  rated  attributes  were 
general  ability,   stability,  initiative,  persistence,  flexibility,  inte- 
gration, approach  to  problems  (from  open,  practical,   direct,  and 
decisive  to  panicky  or  withdrawn),  and  freedom  from  symptoms  and 
adjustment  problems.     The  psychiatrists'  ratings  were  in  fairly 
good  agreement,  with  a  rank  correlation  of  .67  for  the  31  trapped 
and  nontrapped  miners  (significant  at  the  1  per  cent  level).     The 
means  of  the  psychiatrists'  ratings  were  used  as  subjects'  ego 
strength  scores.     It  should  be  noted  that  these  scores  were  based 
on  the  subjects'  own  accounts  of  their  history  and  their  behavior  in 
the  disaster,  no  attempt  being  made  to  rate  these  two  parts  of  .the 
interview  separately. 

In  the  analysis  of  the  psychological  data  the  following  groups 
of  subjects  were  compared:     (a)  trapped  miners  vs .  nontrapped 
miners,   (b)  younger  trapped  miners  vs.   older  trapped  miners, 
(c)  younger  nontrapped  miners  vs  .   older  nontrapped  miners,   and 

86 


(d)  the  group  of  six  (trapped  8  1/2  days)  vs_.  the  group  of  twelve 
(trapped  61/2  days).     In  addition,   rank  order  correlations,   cor- 
rected for  ties  (Horn,    1942),   were  computed  between  all  tests.    All 
differences  and  relationships  significant  at  a  probability  level  of  5 
per  cent  or  less  are  discussed,  as  well  as  a  few  pattern  trends. 
The  coding  of  Sentence  Completion  responses  into  a  number  of  cate- 
gories resulted  in  frequencies  that  were  usually  too  small  for  tests 
of  significance.     The  results  were,  therefore,   treated  as  percen- 
tages of  members  of  a  group  that  gave  a  particular  kind  of  response. 
A  difference  between  groups  of  at  least  20  per  cent  was  arbitrarily 
selected  as  a  minimum  for  reporting  and  discussing  group  trends. 

While  the  use  of  statistical  tools  like  the  t-test,  Spearman's 
rank  order  correlation  coefficient,  and  a  probability  level  of  5  per 
cent  implies  that  the  relevant  assumptions  for  these  statistics  have 
been  met,   this  was  not  always  the  case  in  this  study.     The  groups 
were  small:   12  and  19.     Though  the  control  group  was  matched  with 
the  experimental  group  for  age,   education,   income,   religion,  and 
marital  status,   it  is  clear  this  list  does  not  include  all  the  variables 
one  would  wish  to  control.     Moreover,  the  experimental  group  of 
19  trapped  miners  was  not  selected  randomly,  and  the  parameters 
of  the  population  were  unknown.     Further,  this  was  a  field  study 
under  emergency  conditions,   and  the  primary  group  was  given  by 
the  accident  of  the  bump. 

Where  the  assumptions  for  a  particular  statistic  were  in  doubt, 
the  finding  was  checked  with  another  tool:    all  significant  t-test  find- 
ings were  confirmed  with  the  Mann- Whitney  U  test  (Siegel,    1956), 
which  does  not  require  normality  of  distributions  and  interval  scales. 
Treated  with  appropriate  caution,   a  statistical  analysis  can  be  ex- 
pected to  sort  out  the  data  more  reliably  and  with  less  bias  than  an 
impressionistic  and  intuitive  analysis.     The  statistical  findings  are 
presented  to  permit  the  reader  to  examine  critically  the  sources  of 
interpretative  statements  and  hypotheses.     The  objective  was  not  to 
establish  conclusions  or  generalizations,  and  the  statistical  data 
do  not  yield  them.     The  data  yield  hypotheses  which  must  be  treated 
only  as  hypotheses  for  research  rather  than  as  conclusions  for  prac- 
tical social  engineering  application. 

Comparison  of  Trapped  and  Nontrapped  Miners 

The  two  groups  of  trapped  and  nontrapped  miners  were  well 
matched  for  age  and  education  (Table  13).     The  groups  differed  sig- 
nificantly on  2  of  the  11  test  measures:    on  Block  Design  and  Bender- 
Gestalt  errors  (5  per  cent  level  with_tfs    corrected  for  inequality  of 
variances),  with  the  trapped  group  doing  better  on  both  tests. 

87 


Moreover,  the  trapped  group  did  somewhat  better  than  the  non- 
trapped  group  on  9  of  the  11  measures,  the  two  exceptions  being 
counting  backwards  from  20  to  1,   and  substracting  from  100  by  7's 
The  trapped  group  also  exhibited  more  variance  on  the  Block  De- 
sign subtest  (F  ratio  =  4.586,   significant  at  the  2  per  cent  level). 
These  findings  suggest  either  that  the  groups  were  different  in  the 
beginning  or  that  the  stress  the  trapped  miners  had  endured  was 
less  damaging  to  the  abilities  involved  in  the  tests. 


TABLE  13 

Comparison  of  Mean  Intelligence  and  Personality  Test 
Scores  for  Trapped  and  Nontrapped  Miners 


Trapped 
miners 

Nontrapped 
miners 

(N 

.=  19) 

(N 

=  12) 

Test 

N 

Mean 

N 

Mean 

t 

£ 

Age 

19 

38.9 

12 

40.2 

0.62 

ns 

Education 

19 

6.8 

12 

6.6 

0.19 

ns 

Vocabulary 

17 

7.7 

3 

7.0 

0.39 

ns 

Digit  efficiency 

19 

8.0 

12 

7.7 

0.28 

ns 

Block  design 

19 

7.1 

12 

5.1 

2.44a 

.05 

100  by  7's 

8 

90.4" 

6 

77.8" 

0.58 

ns 

20  to  1 

18 

19.4" 

12 

16.0" 

0.72 

ns 

IQ  (DS  &  BD) 

19 

87.5 

12 

78.9 

1.85 

ns 

Psychiatric  ego 

strength 

19 

53.4 

12 

48.5 

1.57 

ns 

Rorschach  control 

19 

15.4 

12 

15.1 

0.12 

ns 

Rorschach  number 

of  responses 

19 

7.8 

12 

7.2 

0.42 

ns 

Rorschach 

, 

disorganization 

19 

5.7 

12 

7.8 

1.88 

ns 

Bender  impairment 

19 

3.2 

12 

5.8 

2.53 

.05 

aCorrected  for  inequality  of  variance. 

The  hypothesis  that  the  trapped  and  nontrapped  groups  of 
miners  were  dissimilar  samples  is  supported  when  each  group  is 
subdivided  into  younger  and  older  men  (Table  14).     Mean  scores  of 
the  younger  trapped  miners  were  significantly  better  than  those  of 
the  older  trapped  miners  on  Block  Design  and  Bender-Gestalt  (both 
at  the  5  per  cent  level,   corrected  for  differences  in  variance),  and 
the  mean  prorated  IQ  of  the  younger  trapped  miners  was  13  points 


88 


TABLE  14 

Mean  Psychological  Test  Scores 

of  Younger  and  Older  Trapped  Miners, 

and  Younger  and  Older  Nontrapped  Miners 


Trapped 
miners 

Nontrapped 
miners 

Younger3- 

Olderb 

Younger0 

Olderd 

Test                           (N  =  8) 

(N  =  8) 

(N  =  6) 

(N  =  6) 

Education 

7.4 

6.5 

6.8 

6.3 

Vocabulary 

8.5 

7.3 

e 

---f 

Digit  efficiency 

9.2 

7.0 

7.0 

8.3 

Block  design 

9.1 

6.0* 

4.7 

5.5 

100  by  7's 

77.8" 

102.5" 

85" 

71" 

20  to  1 

11.7" 

24.3"* 

21.2" 

10.8" 

IQ  (DS  &  BD) 

96 

82.9 

76.7 

81.2 

Psychiatric  ego  strength 

54.5 

48.1 

43.2 

53.8* 

Rorschach  control 

17.2 

12.6 

13.5 

16.7 

Rorschach  number  of 

responses 

8.8 

7.1 

8.0 

8.2 

Rorschach  disorganization 

5.9 

6.4 

5.2 

4.3 

Bender  impairment 

1.75 

4.4* 

6.3 

5.2 

a22-35  years.         b42-58  years.        C29-41  years.     d42-50  years. 

eOnly  2  Ss.  fOnly  3  Ss. 

*Significantly  different  from  younger  group  at  the  .05  level  (t  tests) 


higher  than  that  of  the  older  trapped  miners  (not  significant).     More- 
over, the  older  trapped  miners'  mean  scores  were  poorer  than  those 
of  their  younger  mates  on  all  11  tests  and  there  was  a  tendency 
toward  greater  variability  among  the  older  men  /^significant  for 
Bender-Gesalt  (F  ratio  =  5.250,  p  between  10  per  cent  and  2  per 
centl/.     One  inference  from  these  results  is  that  the  older  subgroup 
was  deviant  for  some  reason;  indeed,  the  older  subgroup  did  include 
three  of  the  four  injured  miners  and  a  fourth  man  whose  test  results 
suggested  brain  damage.     However,  the  test  scores  of  these  injured 
men  did  not  differ  appreciably  from  the  other  older  miners  nor  were 
they  greatly  different  from  the  scores  of  the  older  and  younger  non- 
trapped  miners.     The  likeness  of  the  scores  of  the  older  trapped 
group  and  the  older  and  younger  nontrapped  groups,   in  contrast  to 
the  higher  scores  of  the  younger  trapped  miners,   suggests  that  the 
younger  trapped  miners  were  uniquely  proficient  on  the  tests.     The 
conclusion  is  that  the  proficiency  of  the  younger  members  of  the 

89 


trapped  group  contributed  to  the  finding  that  trapped  miners  as  a 
whole  did  better  than  nontrapped  miners.     Nevertheless,   it  is  notable 
that  a  period  of  entrapment  with  attendant  physiological  and  sensory 
deprivation  plus  extreme  psychological  threat  apparently  had  no 
more  effect  on  test  scores  than  the  experience  that  nontrapped  minerg 
had  endured. 

Age  (and  probably  years  of  experience)  may  have  had  differen-^ 
tial  effects  on  the  trapped  and  nontrapped  miners.     In  the  trapped 
group,  younger  miners'  mean  scores  were  better  than  their  older 
mates  on  all  11  tests;  in  the  nontrapped  group,   older  miners  did 
better  than  younger  men  on  all  11  tests.     The  probable  uniqueness 
of  the  sample  of  younger  trapped  miners,   mentioned  above,   may 
have  contributed  to  the  former  differences,  but  the  consistent  re- 
versal suggests  that  age  made  miners  more  susceptible  to  the  stress 
of  entrapment  while  it  made  for  resistance  to  the  stress  of  rescue 
work  and  living  above  ground  during  the  emergency. 

The  Sentence  Completion  responses  of  the  two  groups  of 
miners  revealed  differing  attitudes  and  thought  processes.     The 
trapped  miners1  responses  expressive  of  fear ,  anxiety,  and  needs 
were  focused  on  themselves  while  those  of  the  nontrapped  group 
were  more  concerned  with  external  factors  such  as  family  and  eco- 
nomic problems.     The  anxiety  of  the  trapped  subjects  did  have  one 
external  focus:     more  of  them  expressed  an  aversion  to  the  mine. 

The  trapped  men  were  more  open  in  expressing  hostility 
toward  bosses  while  the  nontrapped  were  more  positive  about  bosses 
and  superiors.     Responses  to.  other  items  indicated  that  the  mental 
and  emotional  condition  of  the  men  who  had  been  trapped  made  it 
difficult  for  them  to  think  clearly  and  make  up  their  minds  on 
various  issues.     Thus  more  of  them  were  evasive  and  noncommital 
to  items  about  leaders ,   relatives,   fears,  the  mine,  workmates, 
and  the  future;  and  more  expressed  anxious  anticipation  to  the  item 
about  leaving  Minetown.     By  contrast,   more  of  the  nontrapped 
miners  committed  themselves  on  such  problems,   giving  definitely 
positive  or  negative  statements;  more  of  them  gave  positive  evalua- 
tive responses  about  workmates  ,   relatives  ,  and  their  minds  and 
nerves.     The  nontrapped  miners1  positive  evaluation  of  their  minds 
and  nerves  suggests  that  their  self-esteem  was  more  intact  than 
that  of  the  trapped  miners.     More  of  the  nontrapped  miners  seemed 
to  be  facing  up  to  the  facts  on  all  sides.     They  were  both  more  pes- 
simistic about  the  future  and  less  willing  to  leave  Minetown:    they 
were  apparently  aware  of  the  unhappy  consequences  of  the  mine 
closing,  but  at  the  same  time  they  did  not  want  to  leave  their  es- 
tablished homes  and  start  all  over  again  in  a  new  setting. 

90 


Intertest  Correlations  Within  Groups 

As  a  means  of  throwing  further  light  on  the  differences  be- 
tween the  two  groups  of  miners,   rank  order  correlations  (corrected 
for  ties)  were  computed  between  all  test  scores  within  each  group 
(Tables   15  and  16).     Of  the  121  correlations,   32  were  significant 
at  the  5  per  cent  level  or  better,  whereas  only  6  might  be  expected 
by  chance.     The  significant  correlations  were,   therefore,  taken  as 
pointing  up  hypotheses. 

Education  was  positively  associated  with  intellectual  efficiency 
in  the  trapped  miners  (as  measured  by  the  prorated  IQ),   while  such 
a  relationship  did  not  hold  in  the  nontrapped  group.     Since  education 
is  normally  correlated  with  intelligence  (Anastasi,    1958),   it  maybe 
inferred  that  the  nontrapped  miners'  emotional  state  disrupted  the 
intellectual  abilities  measured  in  this  study  in  an  unsystematic 
fashion.     Accuracy  of  perception  and  visual- motor  coordination  as 
reflected  in  the  Bender-Gestalt  drawing  test  gave  a  different  picture: 
amount  of  education  was  associated  with  this  ability  (1  per  cent  level) 
in  the  nontrapped  group.     It  may  be  that  increased  formal  education 
made  for  specific  overlearning  in  this  area  and  hence  made  the  skill 
less  susceptible  to  impairment. 

Psychiatric  ratings  of  ego  strength  were  associated  with  con- 
trasting sets  of  measures  in  the  trapped  and  nontrapped  miners. 
In  the  trapped  group,  they  were  correlated  significantly  with  voca- 
bulary (5  per  cent  level)  and  with  Rorschach  control  (2  per  cent 
level),  while  they  tended  to  correlate  positively  with  Rorschach 
number  of  responses  and  negatively  with  Rorschach  disorganization. 
In  the  nontrapped  group,   psychiatric  ego  strength  was  not  correlated 
with  Rorschach  measures,   but  showed  a  general  tendency  to  be 
positively  related  to  intellectual  efficiency,   including  Block  Design, 
Digit  Efficiency  (5  per  cent  level),   IQ,  Bender-Gestalt  proficiency, 
and  education.     The  meaning  of  these  differing  relationships  is  not 
immediately  clear.     One  possibility  is  that  psychiatric  ego  strength 
ratings  were  based  on  two  different  qualities  in  the  two  groups:  on 
evidence  of  the  individual's  general  ability  as  exhibited  in  education 
and  performance  record  in  the  nontrapped  group  and  on  the  individ- 
ual's reaction  to  the  stress  of  entrapment  and  ability  to  communicate 
in  the  trapped  group.     Insofar  as  the  former  would  probably  depend 
to  a  considerable  extent  on  intelligence,  while  the  latter  was  more  a 
function  of  emotional  make-up,   psychiatric  judgment  was  apparent- 
ly a  valid  measuring  instrument  in  that  it  selected  and  was  associated 
with  the  variables  that  were  relevant  to  the  situation.     Further,   in 
line  with  other  test  results,  psychiatric  ratings  favored  the  younger 
and  less  experienced  men  in  the  trapped  group  and  the  older  and 
more  experienced  men  in  the  nontrapped  group. 

91 


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93 


There  was  a  general  tendency  for  age  and  years  of  experience 
in  mining  to  be  correlated  in  contrasting  ways  with  intelligence  and 
personality  measures  in  the  two  groups.     In  the  trapped  group,  years 
experience  and  age  had  negative  relationships  with  all  measures  of 
intelligence  and  personality  (8  of  the  20  were  significant).     Most  of 
the  correlations  were  higher  for  years  experience  than  for  age,  and 
partial  correlations  between  Rorschach  control,  years  experience, 
and  age,   revealed  that  years  experience  was  the  significant  variable 
(r     =  -.60,   significant  at  the  2  per  cent  level)  for  this  measure.     In 
the  nontrapped  group,   on  the  other  hand,   age  and  years  experience 
had  positive  relationships  with  all  but  two  of  the  measures  of  in- 
telligence and  personality.     This  reversal  of  trends  between  the 
trapped  and  nontrapped  miners  is  consistent  with  group  differences 
already  noted  in  Table  16.     It  supports  the  hypothesis  that  age  was 
a  liability  for  trapped  miners  and  an  asset  for  nontrapped  miners. 
In  the  trapped  group,  Vocabulary  and  Rorschach  number  of  responses 
were  negatively  correlated  with  years  experience  (2  per  cent  level), 
indicating  that  years  experience  together  with  being  trapped  had  led 
to  some  constriction  or  repression  of  thought  and  imagination.     This 
suggests  the  presence  of  a  depressive  element  in  the  reaction  of  the 
more  experienced  trapped  miners.     This  inference  is  supported  by 
the  Sentence  Completion  finding  that  older  trapped  miners  expressed 
more  self-depreciation  than  their  younger  mates.     Just  why  years 
of  living  and  working  with  danger  should  cause  this  type  of  reaction 
is  not  clear.     It  may  be  that  recurring  accidents  in  the  mines  to- 
gether with  their  own  and  their  wives'  reservations  about  the  occu- 
pation had  sometimes  made  them  feel  they  should  quit.     Under  these 
conditions,   despondency  and  sense  of  hopelessness  and  guilt  could 
well  be  their  reaction. 

Length  of  Entrapment  and  Test  Results 

The  test  results  of  the  trapped  group  of  twelve,   entrapped  for 
61/2  days  (six-day  group),  and  the  trapped  group  of  six  plus  the 
semi-isolated  miner,   entrapped  for  8  1/2  days  (eight-day  group), 
were  compared  (Table  17).     Their  mean  age  and  education  did  not 
differ.     The  eight- day  group  exhibited  more  variability  in  number 
of  responses  to  the  Rorschach  (F  ratio  =  4.326,   5  per  cent  level) 
and  showed  a  near- significant  tendency  to  give  more  responses 
(t_  was  2.  167,   slightly  lower  than  that  required  for  significance 
with  unequal  variances).     In  addition,   these  miners  got  higher  Ror- 
schach disorganization  scores  than  the  six-day  group.     One  interpre- 
tation of  these  findings  is  that  the  members  of  the  eight-day  group 
were  experiencing  a  post-crisis  excitement  or  euphoria  (Wallace, 
1956)  that  involved  an  exaggerated  press  to  talk  without  adequate 
care  for  what  was  said.     Why  it  should  be  particularly  evident  in 

94 


the  eight- day  group  is  another  question.       One  hypothesis  is  that, 
being  trapped  two  days  longer  and  being  less  certain  of  rescue, 
they  were  closer  to  hopeless  despair  and  rescue  produced  an  ex- 
citement reaction.     A  second  hypothesis  is  that  being  a  smaller 
group  they  were  subject  to  more  social  control  (as  indicated  by  the 
total  initiation  scores  of  the  small  group,   in  Chapter  5),  and  res- 
cue led  to  a  release  of  impulses  and  emotion.     The  findings  might 
also  be  interpreted  as  an  expression  of  exaggerated  dependency 
needs.     This  inference  is  supported  by  the  eight- day  group's  appar- 
ently stronger  dependency  needs  as  found  in  the  Sentence  Completion 
test.     More  of  them  made  positive  evaluative  statements  about  re- 
latives ,   superiors,  leaders,   religious  people,   God,   and  home,   in- 
dicating a  strong  need  to  respond  positively  to  others,   which  usually 
involves  a  tendency  to  please  others  by  responding  to  their  expec- 
tations.    This  may  have  led  them  to  keep  responding  to  the  Rorschach 
examiner.     Any  or  all  of  these  three  factors  may  have  contributed 
to  the  eight-day  group's  Rorschach  performance. 

TABLE  17 

Mean  Intelligence  and  Personality  Test  Scores 
of  Eight- Day  Group  and  Six- Day  Group 


Eight-  day 

Six-  day 

group 

(N  =  7)    group  (N  -  12) 

Test 

N 

Mean 

N 

Mean 

t 

_E 

Age 

7 

39.0 

12 

38.8 

0.32 

ns 

Education 

7 

6.6 

12 

6.9 

0.41 

ns 

Vocabulary 

6 

6.8 

11 

8.2' 

0.96 

ns 

Digit  efficiency 

7 

8.0 

12 

8.0 

-- 

ns 

Block  design 

7 

6.6 

12 

7.4 

0.43 

ns 

100  by  7's 

2 

71" 

6 

97" 

1.14 

ns 

20  to  1 

7 

19.4" 

12 

19.1" 

0.23 

ns 

IQ  <DS  &  BD) 

7 

88.9 

12 

88.8 

0.31 

ns 

Psychiatric  ego 

strength 

7 

55.8 

12 

52.9 

0.89 

ns 

Rorschach  control 

7 

18.7 

12 

13.8 

1.22 

ns 

Rorschach  number 

of  responses 

7 

10.3 

12 

6.4 

2.17a 

ns 

Rorschach  dis- 

organization 

7 

8.2 

12 

4.3 

2.83 

.02 

Bender  impairment 

7 

3.7 

12 

2.9 

1.33 

ns 

aCorrected  for  inequality  of  variance 


95 


The  Sentence  Completion  data  brought  out  other  differences 
between  the  eight- day  group  and  the  six- day  group.     The  eight- day 
group  was  more  self-oriented  in  their  expressed  needs  and  -worries 
while  more  of  the  six-day  group  focused  on  external  issues  such  as 
their  economic  problems.     This  tendency  of  the  eight-day  group  to 
emphasize  personal  and  subjective  concern  was  even  reflected  in 
their  responses  to  the  item,   "When  I  am  afraid.  .  ."    They  tended  to 
give  responses  descriptive  of  their  own  reactions  whereas  more  of 
the  six-day  group  said  they  would  seek  help  from  God  or  other  sources 
outside  themselves.     Apparently,   the  men  in  the  eight-day  group  were 
less  able  to  look  beyond  themselves. 

The  responses  of  the  eight-day  group  to  a  number  of  the  items 
indicated  that  they  were  concerned  to  cast  themselves  in  a  good 
light  and  to  deny  their  feelings.     Whereas  more  of  the  six-day  group 
gave  self- depreciation  responses  and  stated  that  their  greatest  weak- 
ness was  lack  of  emotional  control,   more  of  the  eight- day  group 
were  evasive  about  their  greatest  weakness,   said  their  "nerves" 
were  good,   and  attributed  socially  valued  characteristics  to  them- 
selves.    These  attitudes  of  the  eight-day  group  might  be  related  to 
the  hypothesized  excitement  they  experienced  after  rescue.     How- 
ever, another  explanation  is  perhaps  more  reasonable.     The  har- 
rowing experience  of  living  with  the  moaning  and  pleading  pinned 
miner  for  five  days  and  doing  virtually  nothing  to  save  him  may 
have  made  them  defensive  about  their  personal  adequacy. 

The  six-day  group  tended  to  be  evasive  about  the  future  and 
about  the  possibility  of  leaving  Minetown.     Apparently,  they  were 
in  a  state  of  conflict  and  of  uncertainty,  with  their  feelings  and 
reality  considerations  about  equally  balanced  on  these  matters.     By 
contrast,  nearly  one-half  of  the  eight-day  group  were  quite  positive 
and  optimistic  about  the  future,  again  reflecting  a  rather  unrealistic 
tendency  to  make  positive  statements  about  things.     On  the  other 
hand,   more  of  them  were  negative  about  leaving  Minetown.     It  is 
inferred  that  both  of  these  attitudes  reflect  their  strong  dependency 
needs  and  some  lack  of  consideration  for  the  facts  of  their  situation. 
Assuredly,   strongly  activated  dependency  needs  would  not  incline 
them  to  think  of  breaking  their  ties  with  their  homes,   friends,  and 
familiar  surroundings  in  Minetown.     Granting  these  inferences,  the 
expressed  attitudes  of  the  eight- day  group  seemed  to  be  more  de- 
termined by  subjective  feelings  than  by  external  facts. 

The  Effects  of  Entrapment 

Contrary  to  expectations,  the  trapped  miners  did  not  score 
lower  on  psychological  tests  than  did  the  nont rapped  miners.    Rather, 

96 


they  showed  some  tendency  to  do  better  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the 
trapped  group  included  several  injured.     The  probability  that  the 
younger  members  of  the  trapped  group  were  an  unique  sample  with 
more  ability  and  resources  did  not  adequately  account  for  the  lack 
of  effects  from  entrapment.     The  fact  that  testing  was  done  from 
5  to  23  days  after  rescue,  thus  giving  trapped   miners  time  to  re- 
cover,  may  have  contributed  to  the  results.     Again,  however,  this 
would  not  seem  to  be  a  complete  explanation,   for  the  interviewer 
noted  that  15  of  the   19  miners  were  tense  and  anxious  (Appendix 
B),   and  the  Sentence  Completion  test  indicated  anxiety. 

An  hypothesis  more  in  keeping  with  all  the  facts  is  that  the 
nontrapped  miners  did  not  constitute  a  control  group  that  was  free 
from  stress.     Rather,  the  two  groups  had  been  subject  to  stresses 
that  differed  in  kind,   degree,  and  the  manner  in  which  they  were 
handled.     All  the  nontrapped  miners,  although  they  were  above 
ground,  were  faced  with  a  number  of  anxiety-producing  situations 
and  prospects:     friends  and  relatives  had  been  lost,  the  whole  com- 
munity was  in  a  state  of  anxious  anticipation,  and  they  faced  the 
prospect  of  the  last  mine  in  Minetown  closing.     Moreover,  two- 
thirds  of  them  were  engaged  in  the  extremely  difficult,   dangerous, 
and  nauseating  rescue  work.     On  the  other  hand,  they  were  not  de- 
prived of  external  stimulation  and  were  relatively  free  to  make 
choices  and  decisions,  to  carry  out  goal-directed  activities,  and  to 
express  their  emotions  and  impulses.     By  contrast,  the  trapped 
miners  were  helpless  and  faced  the  threat  of  death.     For  much  of 
their  time  underground,  they  did  not  have  the  same  free  alternatives 
for  imagining,   anticipating,   choosing,   and  doing.     At  the  same  time, 
they  were  hungry,  thirsty,  bruised,   and  uncomfortable.     Their  con- 
dition and  situation  would  certainly  arouse  anxiety.     During  entrap- 
ment, however,  the  group  social  controls  tended  to  suppress  overt 
expressions  of  anxiety  in  the  trapped  groups.     Thus  overt  and  ex- 
pressive reactions  to  the  situation  were  controlled,  while  autonomic 
reactions  and  feeling  states  were  probably  accentuated.     The  com- 
bination of  autonomic  and  subjective  anxiety  on  the  one  hand  and 
control  of  expression  on  the  other  could  well  account  for  the  trapped 
miners1  greater  self-preoccupation  and  indecision  on  the  Sentence 
Completion  test  and  for  their  relatively  well-controlled  performance 
on  other  tests.     The  nontrapped  miners'  circumstances,  however, 
would  probably  orient  them  to  external  problems  and  facilitate  ex- 
pressed decisions,  as  reflected  in  their  Sentence  Completion  re- 
sponses,  and  make  for  less  overt  control  of  behavior,  as  reflected 
in  other  tests. 

The  anxiety  reaction  in  the  trapped  miners  had  several  de- 
pressive features:     self-preoccupation,   self-depreciation,  indecision, 

97 


and  constriction  of  thought  and  imagination.     Wolfenstein  (1957)  has 
noted  that  disaster  victims  may  have  depressive  reactions  and  tend 
to  focus  their  emotional  energies  on  themselves.     The  anxiety  re- 
action of  the  nontrapped  miners  was  more  overt  and  situational. 
The  suggestion  that  age  and  years  experience  made  for  poorer  test 
performance  in  the  trapped  group  suggests  that  the  depressive 
anxiety,  which  is  more  likely  in  older  people  (Mayer-Gross,   Slater, 
&:  Roth,    1955),  had  increased  to  the  point  where  it  affected  test  re- 
sults adversely  (Rapaport  et  al.  ,    1946).     Older  and  more  experienced 
members  of  the  nontrapped  group,   on  the  other  hand,   were  probably 
more  adapted  to  their  situation  and  hence  had  handled  it  better  than 
the  younger,   less  experienced  men. 

The  eight- day  group  exhibited  more  subjective  anxieties, 
stronger  dependency  needs,  and  a  tendency  for  members  to  cast 
themselves  in  a  good  light,  but  members  were  not  more  impaired 
on  intellectual  and  performance  tasks.     They  did  manifest  less  per- 
ceptual control  on  the  Rorschach  and  a  tendency  to  give  more  re- 
sponses.    This  may  have  been  due  to  their  longer  confinement. 
Other  conditions,  however,   may  also  have  contributed  to  these  ten- 
dencies, including  the  small  size  of  the  group  with  its  tighter  social 
controls  and  the  presence  of  the  pinned  miner.     Thus  length  of  en- 
trapment did  not  involve  simply  an  extension  of  time,  but  was  com- 
plicated by  a  number  of  social  and  situational  factors,   all  of  which 
presumably  affected  the  psychological  findings. 


98 


CHAPTER  7 

THE  RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  DATA 

AND  INITIATIONS 

In  this  chapter,   the  trapped  miners1  initiations  while  en- 
trapped are  related  to  their  psychological  test  scores.     An  initia- 
tion was  defined  as  an  act  that  originates  an  extended  sequence  of 
behavior.     Initiations  -were  used  as  the  basis  for  three  types  of 
scores:     Initiation  Perception,  the  number  of  initiations  a  subject 
reported  having  observed;  "I"  Initiation,  the  number  of  initiations 
the  subject  attributed  to  himself;  Group  Evaluation,    the  number  of 
initiations  that  all  the  other  members  of  the  group  attributed  to  the 
subject.     As  the  only  measure  of  behavior  while  entrapped,   they 
were  correlated  (rank  order)  with  test  scores,   as  well  as  with  edu- 
cation, psychiatric  ratings  of  ego  strength,   and  years  of  mining 
experience. 

Taking  the  5  per  cent  level  as  the  criterion  significance  level, 
12  of  the  99  correlation  coefficients  were  significant  (Table  18). 
Only  5  criterion  correlations  could  be  expected  by  chance;  the  re- 
ported relationships  and  interpretative  statements  should  be  taken 
as  hypotheses. 

Relations  among  Initiation  Measures 

Initiation  Perception  correlated  significantly  with  "I"  Initia- 
tion (Table  18).     In  other  words,  the  more  initiations  a  man  re- 
ported,  the  more  he  attributed  to  himself.     However,   examination 
of  the  correlations  for  the  separate  groups  by  periods  revealed 
that  the  relationship  was  largely  a  function  of  the  high  correlations 
for  the  six-day  group  (at  the  2  per  cent  level  in  each  period).     The 
correlations  were  in  the  same  direction  for  the  eight- day  group, 
but  were  not  significant.     Two  subjects,   C6  and  D6,   contributed 
the  greater  part  of  the  variance  from  the  regression  line  in  the 
eight- day  group.     C6  reported  a  large  number  of  initiation  percep- 
tions and  credited  himself  with  very  few.     This  man  was  49  years 
old,  had  been  a  miner  for  32  years,  and  had  suffered  two  major 
accidents  in  recent  years.     He  was  partially  deaf,   and  his  mates  said 
that  he  became  completely  deaf  during  entrapment.     This  cannot  be 
true  because  he  reported  events  that  he  could  have  perceived  only 

99 


by  auditory  means.     However,  this  miner  was  the  focus  of  consi- 
derable teasing  and  irritation  while  entrapped.     Assuming  that  he 
accepted  the  role  of  the  "butt,"  it  seems  possible  that  he  did  not 
take  himself  seriously  and  so  reported  few  "I"  initiations.     It  is 
also  possible  that  his  low  intellectual  capacity  (prorated  IQ  of  54) 
and  apparent  brain  damage  contributed  to  the  inconsistency  between 
his  "I"  Initiation  and  Initiation  Perception  scores. 

TABLE  18 

Rank  Order  Correlations  Between  Test  Scores 
and  the  Three  Measures  of  Initiation  for  Escape  and 
Survival  Periods  Separately  and  Combined  (N  =  18) 


Initiation 
perceptions 


initiations 


Group 
evaluation 


Es-     Sur-    Com-    Es-      Sur-  Com- 


Test          caj 

>e 

vival 

bined 

cape 

vival 

bined 

cape 

vival 

bined 

Years  experi- 

ence 

46 

-.33 

-.34 

-.35 

-.28 

-.31 

-.09 

-.29 

-.19 

Psychiatric  ego 

strength 

38 

.64 

.52 

.35 

.63 

.57 

-.34 

.50 

.07 

Rorschach  con- 

trol 

01 

.21 

.21 

.18 

.24 

.37 

-.02 

.43 

.31 

Rorschach  number 

of  responses        -. 

01 

.09 

-.04 

.18 

.22 

.25 

.24 

.24 

.18 

Rorschach  dis- 

organization 

37 

-.15 

-.39 

-.08 

.04 

-.12 

.21 

-.20 

.25 

B-G  errors 

36 

-.02 

-.23 

-.31 

-.08 

-.16 

-.23 

-.37 

-.40 

WAIS  IQ 

21 

-.18 

.08 

.41 

-.03 

.22 

.16 

.44 

.38 

Block  design 

41 

-.02 

.28 

.57 

.07 

.35 

.35 

.60 

.52 

Digit  efficiency 

24 

-.16 

.13 

.21 

-.05 

.16 

.15 

.24 

.10 

Vocabulary 

32 

.46 

.42 

.29 

.39 

.39 

-.46 

.37 

.05 

Initiation  per- 

ceptiona 

- 

- 

•    - 

.68 

.83 

.70 

.10 

.17 

.17 

"I"  initiation21 

— 

•— 

— 

mm 

mm 

""* 

.24 

.43 

.50 

Note:       Rho  of  .47  significant  at  5  per  cent  level  (two-tailed). 
aCorrelated  within  periods. 

The  other  miner  who  reduced  the  correlation  between  Initiation 
Perception  and  "I"  Initiation  was  D6.     He  reported  only  a  moderate 
number  of  initiation  perceptions  and  credited  himself  with  nearly  all 
of  them.     In  the  escape  period,  his  Initiation  Perception  score  was 
the  lowest  in  the  group,   and  this  was  in  keeping  with  his  relative 


100 


inactivity  in  this  period- -even  by  his  own  story.     It  seemed  that  he 
perceived  his  role  as  that  of  consultant  and  adviser,   directing  im- 
portant moves  from  the  central  location  from  which  the  others  went 
out  to  search  for  means  of  escape.     In  the  survival  period,  the  ten- 
dency to  see   himself  as  the  central  figure  became  more  noticeable 
as  he  reported  nine  initiation  perceptions  and  attributed  all  of  them 
to  himself.     In  this  instance,  however,  his  perception  of  his  role 
was  well  confirmed  by  the  reports  of  his  mates:     of  15  initiations 
attributed  to  various  members  of  the  group  by  all  the  rest,   D6  re- 
ceived credit  for  12,   meaning  that  his  mates  saw  him  as  responsible 
for  most  of  the  significant  initiations  in  the  survival  period.     It  was 
clear  that  this  miner  was  recognized  as  the  survival  leader  in  the 
eight- day  group.     However,  his  perception  and  recall  of  events  was 
very  atypical:     restricted  and  selective  in  a  way  to  give  himself 
maximum  credit.     Presumably  he  had  a  strong  need  to  be  ascendent 
and  to  be  recognized  by  the  group.     The  personal  characteristics, 
including  his  Negro  ancestry,  which  may  account  for  this  are  dis- 
cussed in  Chapter  8. 

For  the  escape  and  survival  periods  combined,  there  was  a 
positive  relationship  between  the  number  of  initiations  the  group 
attributed  to  a  man  and  the  number  he  credited  to  himself.     Again, 
the  six-day  group  was  mainly  responsible  for  this  correlation,  and 
primarily  in  the  survival  period.     However,   it  is  noteworthy  that 
when  the  three  men  are  omitted  whose  "I"  Initiation  and  Group 
Evaluation  were  most  discrepant,  the  rho  for  the  rest  of  the  total 
group  was  increased  from  .  50  to  .75.     Of  these  three,   F6  and  O12 
rated  themselves  high  on  initiations  and  received  virtually  no  credit 
from  the  group,  while  G12  rated  himself  low  (his  interview  was  not 
recorded)  but  was  credited  with  many  initiations  by  the  group.     G12 
had  been  treated  for  a  depressive  reaction  about  two  years  before 
the  disaster.     O12  was  injured  and  immobile  during  entombment, 
and  he  exhibited  paranoid  tendencies,  which  may  have  led  to  his 
apparent  need  to  give  himself  considerable  credit  in  the  situation. 
F6  was  apparently  the  most  unstable  man  in  the  group,  and  he 
"thought"  he  was  injured  by  the  bump  and  remained  virtually  im- 
mobile for  the  81/2  days. 

Psychological  Tests  and  Initiations 

Only  one  test,  the  Block  Design  subtest,   was  significantly  re- 
lated to  Group  Evaluation  for  the  escape  and  survival  periods  to- 
gether.    Apparently,  analytic  thinking  and  the  ability  underlying 
form  perception  were  important  qualities  for  general  leadership 
during  entrapment.     The  test  with  the  next  highest  correlation  with 
group  evaluation  was  the  Bender-Gestalt  drawing  test  (10  per  cent 

101 


level).     It  is  noteworthy  that  the  primary  source  of  the  correlations 
for  these  two  tests  was  in  the  survival  period.     Block  Design  was 
also  associated  with  "I"  Initiation  for  the  escape  period,   indicating 
that  ability  on  this  test  was  related  to  self- reports  of  participation 
in  escape  attempts. 

Some  individual  tests  were  not  significantly  correlated  with 
initiations,   apparently  because  of  the  atypical  scores  of  one  or  two 
men.     For  example,   the  rho  between  Rorschach  control  and  Group 
Evaluation  for  escape  and  survival  combined  was   .31;  without  miner 
G12,   it  was  .55.     G12  was  first  in  initiations  according  to  his  mates, 
but  he  had  the  poorest  Rorschach;  also,  he  had  previously  been 
treated  for  a  depressive  reaction.     Such  findings  indicate  that  tests 
may  be  related  to  most  men's  initiation  behavior  in  situations  like 
that  of  entrapment  underground,  but  that  the  relationship  may  break 
down  with  a  few  unusual  individuals. 

Fifteen  of  the   18  correlations  of  psychological  tests  with  "I" 
Initiations  for  the  escape  and  survival  period  separately  were  in 
the  positive  direction  (Table   18),   and  there  was  no  difference  in 
this  regard  between  periods.     Assuming  that  chance  would  result 
in  an  equal  number  of  positive  and  negative  correlations,  this  trend 
toward  positive  correlations  is  very  significant  (chi  square  =  6.722, 
p  =  1  per  cent).     This  indicates  that  there  was  a  general  tendency 
for  the  trapped  miners  with  the  "better"  test  results  to  attribute 
more  initiations  to  themselves.     In  view  of  the  previously  mentioned 
correlation  between  "I"  Initiation  and  Group  Evaluation,   it  is  sug- 
gested that  men  with  better  test  performance  did  initiate  more  ac- 
tion.    This  inference  is  supported  by  the  finding  of  a  similar  trend 
toward  positive  correlations  between  tests  and  Group  Evaluation- - 
14  of  the  18  rho's  were  positive  (chi  square  =  4.500,  p  =  5  per  cent). 
Taking  Group  Evaluation  as  a  measure  of  the  group's  perception  of 
an  individual's  contribution  to  its  current  goals,   there  was  a  trend 
relationship  between  proficiency  on  psychological  tests  and  leader- 
ship. 

Psychiatric  ratings  of  ego  strength  were  significantly  corre- 
lated with  "I"  Initiation  and  Initiation  Perception  for  the  escape  and 
survival  periods  combined.     Apparently  psychiatric  judgment  was 
influenced  by  the  individual's  tendency  to  give  a  detailed  account  of 
events  and  his  tendency  to  give  himself  credit  for  initiation  behavior. 
It  is  notable  that  the  main  source  of  these  correlations  was  in  the 
survival  period,   suggesting  that  the  traits  subsumed  under  the  term 
"ego  strength"  were  judged  to  be  characteristic  of  leaders  in  the 
survival  period  but  not  of  the  leaders  in  the  escape  period.     Indeed, 
a  negative  correlation  of  -.34  between  psychiatric  ego  strength  and 

102 


Group  Evaluation  in  escape,   in   contrast  to  a  positive  correlation 
of  .42  (10  per  cent  level)  in  survival,   indicates  that  ego  strength 
traits  as  judged  by  psychiatrists  may  be  associated  with  leadership 
as  measured  in  one  kind  of  situation,   but  may  contraindicate  leader- 
ship in  another  kind  of  situation.     That  this  selectivity  was  not  con- 
fined to  psychiatry  is  indicated  by  the  correlations  between  survival 
Group  Evaluation  and  tests  being  consistently  higher  than  those  be- 
tween escape  Group  Evaluation  and  tests.     This  suggests  that  the 
personal  qualities  associated  with  leadership  in  the  survival  period 
are  more  akin  to  the  qualities  that  meet  everyday  criteria  of  achieve- 
ment and  adjustment  in  our  society. 

The  essential  contrast  between  the  roles  required  in  the  es- 
cape and  the  survival  periods  is  reflected  in  the  lack  of  correlation 
between  Group  Evaluation  for  the  two  periods  (rho  =  .16),  whereas 
the  correlations  between  periods  were  .  50  for  Initiation  Perception 
(5  per  cent  level)  and  .53  for  "I"  Initiation  (5  per  cent  level).    Each 
miner  tended  to  see  himself  as  either  consistently  active  or  passive 
during  the  whole  period  of  entrapment,  but  he  did  not  find  his  col- 
leagues so  consistent.     Some  he  saw  as  leaders  during  the  escape 
period,   some  as  leaders  during  the  survival  period.     In  general, 
the  perceived  escape  leaders  were  not  the  same  men  as  the  per- 
ceived survival  leaders:    the  individuals  whom  they  perceived  as 
promoting  their  goals  differed  for  the  two  periods. 

One  trend  highlighted  the  contrasting  qualities  of  the  perceived 
leaders  for  the  escape  and  survival  periods.     Group  Evaluation  in 
survival  correlated  .37  with  .Vocabulary  and  .51  (5  per  cent  level) 
with  education.     For  the  escape  period,   Group  Evaluation  was  cor- 
related -.46  (10  per  cent  level)  with  Vocabulary  and  -.32  with  edu- 
cation.    Apparently,  training  and  proficiency  with  words  were  assets 
in  promoting  group  goals  in  survival,  while  these  skills  tended  to 
have  negative  value  when  the  goals  were  focused  on  escape  attempts. 
It  is  suggested  that  the  differing  circumstances  of  survival  and  es- 
cape periods  precipitated  the  emergence  of  intellectualizers  and 
task-oriented  individuals  as  leaders  in  their  respective  periods. 

To  check  some  of  the  relationships  between  leadership  and 
personal  qualities  more  closely,  the  test  scores  of  selected  miners 
were  examined.     One  apparent  relationship  was  that  between  per- 
formance tasks  and  Group  Evaluation  in  the  escape  period.     Of  the 
four  top  initiators  in  this  period  (G12,  A6,   M12,   E6),  all  obtained 
higher  scores  on  Block  Design  than  on  Vocabulary.     On  the  other 
hand,  three  of  the  four  highest  initiators  in  the  survival  period 
(K12,   N12,   D6),  tended  to  be  "intellectualizers,"  as  indicated  by 
their  high  Vocabulary  scores  and  the  expressive  quality  of  their 

103 


sentence  completions;    two  were  also  proficient  on  Digit  Span  and 
on  the  two  other  counting  tasks.     The  fourth  high  initiator  in  survi- 
val,  Q12,   was  an  exception  on  verbal  material.     Thus,   the  findings 
indicate  high  performance  abilities  apparently  characterized  initi- 
ators in  the  escape  period,   while  verbal-intellectual  abilities  were 
predominant  only  in  the  high  initiators  of  the  survival  period. 

Some  Rorschach  test  results  were  related  to  behavioral  cri- 
teria.    Most  of  the  outstanding  men  for  Group  Evaluation  in  the  sur- 
vival period  had  good  or  very  good  Rorschach  control  scores  (K12, 
D6,   Q12).     The  other  high  initiator  in  this  period,   N1Z,  had  a  rather 
constricted  record  but  showed  less  than  average  Rorschach  disor- 
ganization.    A  "Rorschach  composite"  score  was  computed  by  sub- 
tracting Rorschach  disorganization  from  Rorschach  control.     Of  the 
six  highest  and  four  lowest  initiators  (group  evaluation,  both  periods), 
all  of  them  uninjured  miners  ,   the  Rorschach  composite  score  cor- 
rectly differentiated  eight  of  the  ten.     This  contrasted  with  two  cor- 
rectly differentiated  among  the  ten  by  an  independent  clinical  ap- 
praisal of  the  Rorschach  protocols.     It  was  clear  that  quantified 
Rorschach  data  were  quite  efficient  in  identifying  leaders  and  those 
who  contributed  least,  although  it  did  not  discriminate  well  in  the 
middle  of  the  distribution.     The  quantified  Rorschach  was  also  much 
more  successful  than  a  clinical  appraisal  of  those  data. 

Examination  of  the  Block  Design  and  Bender-Gestalt  scores 
of  the  same  ten  high  and  low  initiators  revealed  that  each  of  these 
tests  differentiated  the  two  levels  of  leadership  with  but  one  error. 

The  three  subjects  (C6,   O12,  Q12)  who  attributed  an  unusually 
large  number  of  initiations  to  "they"  gave  no  Human  or  Texture  re- 
sponses to  the  ink  blots.     Only  G12,  the  subject  who  had  had  a  de- 
pressive breakdown  two  years  previously,   gave  a  similar  Rorschach 
in  this  respect.     The  sense  of  apartness  implied  in  "they"  initiations 
thus  may  be  associated  with  lack  of  dependency  needs  and  lack  of 
empathy  as  measured  by  the  Rorschach.     Taking  the  incidence  of 
Human  responses  alone,    six  subjects  gave  two  or  more  (J12,  K12, 
B6,   N12,   D6,   P12).     Of  this  group,   it  was  inferred  that  J 12  tended 
to  use  fantasy  as  an  escape  and  defense.     Of  the  others,   K12,   N12, 
and  D6  were  top  initiators  in  the  survival  period;  P12,  though 
seriously  injured  and  immobile,  was  credited  with  more  initiations 
than  nine  other  trapped  men  in  the  escape  period;  and  B6  was  sec- 
ond highest  initiator  in  his  group  in  the  survival  period  and  third 
highest  in  the  escape  period.     On  the  other  hand,   Q12,  the  second 
highest  initiator  in  the  survival  period  in  the  group  of  twelve,   gave 
no  Human  responses.     Nevertheless,  the  production  of  Human  re- 
sponses would  seem  to  be  associated  with  initiation  behavior. 

104 


The  influence  of  mining  experience  on  a  miner's  initiation 
behavior  turned  out  to  be  indeterminate.     Although  there  was  a  con- 
sistent tendency  for  years  experience  to  be  negatively  correlated 
with  measures  of  initiation  (Table   18),  this  trend  was  probably  the 
result  of  some  interviews  being  untaped  and  some  men  being  injured. 
Of  the  four  miners  with  untaped  interviews,  two  were  senior  in  min- 
ing experience  and  one  was  average.     Of  the  three  injured,   two  were 
senior  in  mining  experience  and  one  was  average.     Thus,   any  effects 
of  mining  experience  on  initiations  were  confounded  by  other  vari- 
ables and  therefore  indeterminable. 

The  Six- Day  and  Eight- Day  Groups 

The  group  of  twelve  and  the  group  of  six  were  trapped  separ- 
ately for  61/2  and  8  1/2  days  respectively.     Groups  of  this  size 
are  too  small  for  detailed  comparison  but  trends  may  be  suggestive. 
Of  the  20  correlations  between  Group  Evaluation  and  test  scores, 
13  were  positive  (in  terms  of  proficiency)  for  the  six-day  group  and 
15  were  positive  for  the  eight- day  group.     Of  the  20  rank  correla- 
tions between  tests  and  "I"  Initiation,    15  were  positive  for  the  six- 
day  group  and  18  for  the  eight- day  group.     However,   of  the  20  cor- 
relations between  Initiation  Perception  and  test  scores,  all  20  were 
positive  for  the  six-day  group  while  only  6  were  positive  for  the 
eight- day  group. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  eight- day  group  not  only  had  a 
longer  period  of  entrapment  but  also  more  rigid  group  social  con- 
trol, and  in  addition  it  had  the  harrowing  incident  of  the  pinned 
miner.     Presumably,   these  three  factors  affected  the  individuals 
differently:    those  with  better  test  performance  reported  fewer  ini- 
tiations and  those  who  reported  more  initiations  had  poorer  test  per- 
formances.    It  is  only  in  this  way  that  the  negative  correlations  of 
the  eight- day  group  can  be  explained.     Independent  data  were  insuf- 
ficient to  justify  an  interpretation  of  this  somewhat  negative  relation- 
ship between  test  proficiency  and  Initiation  Perception. 

Discussion 


The  findings  in  this  chapter  do  not  constitute  a  satisfactory 
basis  for  generalizations  or  predictions.     Sampling  problems  im- 
pose this  reservation.     Moreover,  all  of  the  tests  were  given  after 
the  disaster,   when  test  results  would  presumably  be  reflecting  some 
combination  of  individual  qualities  and  the  effects  of  stress.     To 
some  extent,   the  study  tells  more  about  the  tests  than  it  does  about 
reactions  to  stress.     Nevertheless,  the  findings  have  raised  a  num- 
ber of  interesting  issues. 

105 


The  general  tendency  for  test  proficiency  to  be  related  to 
initiation  behavior,   either  as  perceived  by  the  group  or  by  the  in- 
dividual himself,   is  not  surprising.     It  suggests  that  initiation  has 
some  relationship  with  the  criteria  for  test  performance.     Why  the 
relationship  was  rather  general  and  not  too  strong  is  an  important 
question.     The  answer  would  seem  to  involve  three  areas:    the  psy- 
chological tests,  the  individuals  examined,   and  measures  of  initia- 
tion. 

The  psychological  tests  used  in  the  study  were  probably  not 
the  most  appropriate.     The  Block  Design  subtest  was  perhaps  best 
in  terms  of  its  relationship  with  initiations  and  other  tests.     This 
is  consistent  with  its  record  in  intelligence  and  personality  studies 
(Rapaport  et  al.  ,    1946;  Wechsler,    1955).     The  Bender-Gestalt  draw- 
ing  test  was  fairly  discriminative.     Its  usefulness  might  well  be  aug- 
mented by  selected  changes  in  scoring  procedure.     Whether  its  dis- 
criminative power  would  be  evident  in  a  prestress  situation  is 
another  question.     The  Vocabulary  subtest  exhibited  selective  re- 
lationships.    This,   together  with  its  general  stability,  would  seem 
to  recommend  some  such  measure  for  similar  studies.     The  Digit 
Span  subtest  appeared  to  contribute  little  to  the  results. 

The  use  of  the  Rorschach  as  a  research  instrument  was  not 
vindicated  in  the  present  study.     Nevertheless,   a  simple  method  of 
quantifying  the  productions  would  seem  to  be  indicated  in  preference 
to  a  clinical  appraisal.     This  is  not  to  say  that  a  clinician  could  not 
do  as  well  if  he  knew  what  to  look  for.     The  point  is  that  what  he 
looks  for  is  determined  by  his  own  personality,   experience,  train- 
ing,  and  definition  of  the  situation.     To  use  clinical  appraisals  is  to 
introduce  variables  without  identifying  and  controlling  them.     The 
Rorschach  may  well  suffer  by  the  vagueness  of  the  stimuli  it  pre- 
sents.    Predictable  behavior  does  not  occur  in  a  vacuum  but  in  re- 
sponse to  relatively  specific  situations. 

While  the  Sentence  Completion  test  pointed  up  some  differen- 
tial attitudes  in  the  groups  of  miners,   it  was  an  inefficient  instru- 
ment:   not  only  may  something  be  lost  when  a  subject  can  pause  to 
write  answers,  but  undue  time  is  consumed  by  the  very  act  of  writ- 
ing.    Moreover,   much  of  the  information  cannot  be  used  when  the 
responses  of  small  groups  of  subjects  are  categorized.     A  multiple- 
choice  or  true-false  questionnaire  would  probably  have  produced 
more  data  that  are  pertinent  and  quantifiable.     In  general,  the  use 
of  empirically  well-established  psychological  tests  would  seem  to 
be  indicated.     Even  if  they  did  not  relate  to  measures  of  behavior, 
at  least  interpretation  of  standardized  tests  would  be  less  difficult. 


106 


The  instances  in  which  one  or  two  individuals  deviant  on  a 
particular  test  "spoiled"  a  probable  relationship  between  test  re- 
sults and  initiations  points  up  the  role  of  individual  differences. 
It  is  noteworthy  that  several  tests,   including  Block  Design,  Bender- 
Gestalt,  and  Rorschach  composite,  were  efficient  in  differentiating 
the  miners  at  either  end  of  the  initiation  scale.     The  same  tests 
were  less  successful  in  discriminating  the  rank  order  of  these  in- 
dividuals and  in  differentiating  miners  in  the  middle  of  the  initiation 
scale.     The  basic  problem  may  be  stated  as  an  ignorance  of  the  re- 
levant variables  or  a  failure  to  measure  and  relate  them. 

The  degree  of  relationship  between  test  performance  and  some 
overt  behavior  will  also  depend  on  the  nature  of  that  overt  behavior. 
The  initiations  of  the  miners  were  the  only  measure  of  their  be- 
havior  while  trapped.     Such  behavior  is  not  simple.     Operationally, 
it  was  a  respondent's  oral  report  of  a  remembered  verbal  or  phy- 
sical act  that  a  researcher  judged  as  leading  to  an  extended  se- 
quence of  behavior.     Reported  initiation  would  presumably  be  de- 
termined in  a  complex  way  by  perception,   memory,   emotional 
factors,   and  the  respondent's  perception  of  and  reaction  to  the  in- 
terviewer and  the  question.     In  the  light  of  these  influences,   it  is 
remarkable  that  a  separate  measure  of  behavior,  psychological 
tests,   should  be  related  to  initiations  at  all. 

It  would  have  been  preferable  to  have  had  more  than  one  in- 
terview with  every  miner.     This  would  have  permitted  determina- 
tion of  the  reliability  of  the  respondent's  account,  as  well  as  an 
analysis  beyond  initiations  in  terms  of  the  dynamics  of  interaction. 
Different  types  of  interaction  might  also  manifest  more  specific  re- 
lationships with  psychological  test  performance. 


107 


CHAPTER  8 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  AND  BEHAVIORAL  ANALYSIS  OF 
SELECTED  INDIVIDUALS 

Individual  appraisals  of  a  few  of  the  miners  who  played  dis- 
tinctive roles  during  entrapment  will  be  given  in  some  detail:     E6 
and  G12,   the  escape  leaders;  M12,   a  subleader  during  escape;  D6 
and  K12,   the  survival  leaders;  Q12,   a  willing  follower;  J12,   a 
passive-dependent  man;  F6,   a  disorganized  man;  and  X6,  the  iso- 
lated man. 

Miner  X6  is  discussed  because  of  the  unusual  array  of  condi- 
tions,   characteristics,   and  behavior  involved.     The  other  eight 
miners  were  selected  either  because  of  the  unusual  nature  of  their 
case  or  because  of  the  special  role  they  played  in  their  particular 
group.     It  seemed  useful  to  make  a  more  detailed  examination  of 
the  individual  as  a  person  in  contrast  with  the  examination  of  him 
as  an  impersonal  member  of  a  group.     The  other  miners  were  not 
less  interesting  but  their  histories  presented  little  different  ma- 
terial. 

E6:    An  Escape  Leader 

E6,   a  datal  miner  with  four  years  experience,   responded  di- 
rectly and  realistically  after  the  bump.     During  the  remainder  of 
the  escape  period  he  was  active  in  exploring  all  possible  ways  out, 
usually  with  his  younger  friend,   B6.     E6  had  the  highest  Group 
Evaluation  during  the  escape  period,   but  when  the  group  of  six 
gave  up  their  attempts  to  escape,   E6  became  relatively  inactive 
and  acknowledged  the  ascendancy  of  D6.     He  was  ranked  near  the 
bottom  in  group  evaluation  for  the  survival  period.     Although  it 
was  E6  who  suggested  that  they  drink  urine  and  eat  coal  and  who 
was  still  bent  on  escape  as  late  as  the  sixth  day,  he  was  apparent- 
ly not  the  kind  of  man  who  could  give  emotional  support  and  raise 
morale  during  the  long  wait.     He  was  the  only  man  who  said  he 
was  afraid  of  being  blamed  for  the  treatment  of  the  pinned  miner. 
E6's  account  of  the  entrapment  was  the  most  detailed  statement  ob- 
tained from  the  group  of  six:    he  reported  almost  twice  as  many 
initiations  as  any  of  his  companions. 


109 


This  escape  leader  was  35  years  old.     He  was  raised  on  a 
farm  and  had  to  do  regular  farm  work  at  a  very  early  age.     When 
12  years  old,  he  left  school  in  grade  5  to  help  his  ailing  father, 
who  died  two  years  later.     He  was  very  grieved  by  his  father's 
death.     He  worked  in  the  woods  and  on  the  railway  before  becoming 
a  miner.     Married  at  19,  he  had  four  children,  the  youngest  being 
microcephalic.     E6  shouldered  a  man's  responsibility  early  in  life 
and  handled  recurrent  stresses  in  a  reasonably  adaptive  manner. 

He  was  in  fairly  good  condition  when  rescued.     His  hospitali- 
zation  lasted  only  the  minimum  of  two  days.     The  major  complaints 
he  reported  were  headaches,   cramps,  weakness,   and  restlessness. 
However,   after  the  first  night  or  two  he  slept  well,  not  dreaming. 
When  interviewed  ten  days  after  rescue,  he  appeared  rather  tense 
and  smoked  heavily.     He  expressed  hostility  toward  the  company 
and  "all  those  damned  reports  (news  accounts  of  the  trapped  man's 
experience);  they  are  getting  everything  all  mixed  up."    He  was 
rather  depressed  and  cynical  about  the  future,  but  he  stated  that  he 
would  go  back  to  the  mines  rather  than  let  his  wife  and  children 
starve. 

When  tested  ten  days  after  rescue,   E6  obtained  a  prorated 
IQ  of  79.     His  wide  range  of  interests  and  above-average  productive 
energy  would  suggest  that  his  intellectual  potential  was  higher,  and 
probably  that  the  impairment  reflected  in  his  IQ  score  was  due  to 
the  emotional  strain  of  his  experience.     He  displayed  considerably 
better  than  average  Rorschach  control,   and  on  more  simple  per- 
formance tasks  he  was  better  than  average  for  the  trapped  miners, 
indicating  that  practical  judgment  and  planning  were  relatively  in- 
tact.    The  test  data  revealed  that  he  was  most  efficient  on  practical 
performance  tasks  rather  than  on  problems  requiring  intellectual 
skills.     Moreover,  his  reality  testing  and  organization  improved 
under  stress.     Emotional  responsiveness  was  not  covered  up  as 
much  as  in  some  of  the  miners,  but  it  was  hostility  that  was  ex- 
pressed.    This  trend  to  express  his  feelings  was  also  seen  in  a 
higher  than  average  anxious  concern  about  the  future  and  getting  a 
job. 

G12:    An  Escape  Leader 

In  the  group  of  twelve,   G12  was  the  primary  leader  during  the 
escape  period.     His  performance  was  especially  outstanding  in  help- 
ing his  eleven  fellow  survivors  in  the  immediate  post- impact  period 
when  most  were  dazed  and  partly  buried.     He  himself  received  no 
serious  injury  in  the  bump,   and  although  he  said  he  felt  "turned  up- 
side down,  both  inside  and  outside,"  he  was  immediately  able  to 

110 


help  his  companions  from  the  rubble.     An  uninjured  but  dazed  miner 
said,  "Of  course,  G12  went  by  me  to  help  the  other  boys  out." 

During  the  remainder  of  the  escape  period  G12  shared  leader- 
ship of  the  group  with  M12.     G12's  role  was  not  so  much  to  lead  es- 
cape attempts  as  to  act  as  the  chief  adviser  for  them.     His  com- 
panions seemed  to  regard  him  as  the  most  experienced  miner. 
They  attributed  the  highest  initiation  rank  to  him  during  this  period. 

G12,  however,   received  credit  as  the  third  lowest  initiator 
during  the  survival  period.     Like  E6,  he  was  the  recognized  leader 
of  his  group  as  long  as  the  group's  goals  were  to  find  their  way  out 
of  the  mine;  when  the  goals  were  shifted  to  handling  thirst,  keeping 
up  morale,  and  getting  a  message  to  the  rescuers,  G12  was  not 
perceived  as  promoting  these  ends.     He  gave  up  hope  of  being  res- 
cued during  the  last  two  days  of  the  entrapment: 

I  began  to  kind  of  think  what  way  would  I  be  if  I  died; 
whether  I  would  be  melancholy,   or  whether  my  breath- 
ing would  be  irregular,   or  whether  my  heart  would  stop. 
And  for  a  good  while  I  thought  about  this;  whether  death 
would  creep  on  me,   or  whether  I  would  have  any  pain. 

However,   he  kept  his  pessimism  to  himself:    "At  times  tears  came 
into  my  eyes,  welled  up  in  my  eyes,   but  I  never  broke  down,  I  never 
cried."    He  described  several  anxiety  attacks:     "My  heart  began  to 
pound,   my  breathing  was  difficult,   my  skin  began  to  feel  like  a 
corpse."    He  felt  that  this  was  "due  to  nerves." 

G12  was  47  years  old  and  had  spent  27  years  in  the  mines. 
He  was  a  contract  miner  until  one  year  before  the  bump,  when  he 
changed  to  datal  work  because  he  felt  he  was  not  physically  able  to 
handle  contract  work.     G12  reached  grade  6  in  school,  after  failing 
several  grades.     He  reported  exceptional  shyness  with  girls  and 
people  in  general  during  his  early  life.     He  was  married  at  the  age 
of  27  and  had  a  16-year-old  daughter.     He  did  not  take  part  in  com- 
munity affairs  nor  did  he  visit  with  neighbors.     He  liked  hunting, 
watching  television,  and  raising  chickens.     G12  had  a  "nervous  spell" 
at  the  age  of  19,  when  he  would  not  go  out  and  refused  to  go  to  work. 
He  went  away  and  worked  on  a  farm  for  a  year,  then  returned  to  the 
mines.     In  1954,  he  was  given  electroconvulsive  therapy  for  a  "de- 
pressive reaction."    He  was  discharged  from  the  hospital  as  "well" 
after  two  months  of  treatment.     After  being  rescued  he  said,   "I 
never  broke.     This  is  not  so  bad  for  a  man  that  was  two  months  in 
the  (mental)  hospital." 


Ill 


When  interviewed  five  days  after  rescue,   G12  had  a  tired, 
somewhat  apathetic  expression.     He  was  cooperative,   friendly,  and 
helpful,  but  he  tried  to  avoid  talking  about  his  experiences  during 
entrapment.     After  his  period  of  hospitalization,   he  reported  that 
he  felt  tired,   restless,  and  tense  most  of  the  time.     He  did  not  like 
being  alone. 

When  tested  six  days  after  rescue,  GIZ's  prorated  IQ  was  77. 
Concentration  was  especially  poor,  but  he  showed  considerable 
ability  to  persist  (he  managed  to  do  the  100  backwards  by  7's,  though 
he  took  some  time  and  had  3  errors)  and  to  improve  under  added 
stress  (the  quality  of  his  responses  on  the  Rorschach  improved  on 
the  inquiry).     Range  of  ideas  and  interests  was  very  restricted. 
His  Rorschach  productions  were  the  poorest  of  the  trapped  miners, 
with  perseveration,   disorganization,   inaccuracy  of  perception,   and 
inappropriate  emotional  responsiveness.     He  was  preoccupied  with 
shattered  bodies  and  unable  to  see  the  obvious.     There  was  evidence 
of  much  latent  tension.     On  the  other  hand,  he  was  one  of  the  two 
to  give  controlled  color  responses,   indicating  an  area  of  emotional 
control. 

Although  G12!s  practical  performance  abilities  were  poorer 
than  average,  they  were  not  as  poor  as  those  of  some  of  the  trapped 
miners.     He  expressed  more  fear  of  the  mine  than  others  and  volun- 
teered the  information  that  he  would  like  to  move  away.     On  the 
whole,   G12's  test  results  indicated  extreme  and  disintegrating 
anxiety.     Nevertheless,  his  practical  performance  abilities  were 
not  the  worst,  and  he  showed  capacity  to  control  emotion  and  to  im- 
prove his  performance  when  added  demands  were  made  on  him. 

In  the  light  of  this  man's  history  and  the  postdisaster  psy- 
chological picture  it  would  hardly  have  been  inferred  that  he  was  a 
leader  during  entrapment.     However,   G12's  anxieties  may  well  have 
had  little  outlet,   for  the  circumstance  was  such  that  expression  of 
uncontrolled  emotion  served  no  function  and  indeed  was  subject  to 
group  suppression.     Moreover,  this  group  apparently  placed  con- 
siderable value  on  experience,  and  two  of  the  other  high  initiators, 
K12  and  M12,  appealed  to  G12fs  experienced  opinion  several  times. 
Thus  the  group  may  have  been  instrumental  in  defining  a  leader's 
role  for  him.     It  is  notable  that  he  was  perceived  as  leader  in  the 
escape  period,  when  the  dominant  preoccupation  was  to  explore  all 
passages  for  possible  escape.     G12's  experience  would  have  been 
functional  in  terms  of  such  goals.     Moreover,  his  anxiety  may  have 
served  as  a  drive  to  action.     When  activity  was  no  longer  empha- 
sized,  in  the  survival  period,  he  had  no  outlet  for  this  drive  and 
tended  to  give  up  hope.     He  did  not  have  the  resources  that  could 

112 


contribute  to  group  morale  when  it  was  a  matter  of  waiting,  hoping, 
and  getting  a  message  to  the  rescuers. 

M1Z:     A  Subleader  in  Escape 

In  the  group  of  twelve,  there  was  at  least  one  subleader  dur- 
ing the  escape  period.     M1Z,   a  46-year-old  contract  miner  with 
nearly  28  years  of  mining  experience,   promoted  escape  activities 
with  fierce  persistance: 

So  this  chap,   M12,  he  had  tired  himself  out  com- 
pletely and  he'd  drive  us  after  he  was  down  on  his 
back.     He'd  get  us  up  to  try  to  do  some  job  to  try 
to  get  out. 

However,   his  escape  activity  appeared  to  be  realistic  and  construc- 
tive, as  is  suggested  by  the  strategy  he  outlined: 

(When  we  worked  in  the  mine)  we  timbered  (built 
packs  to  support  the  roof)  it  good  enough  that  we 
were  satisfied  ourselves  for  our  own  safety.     Why 
can't  we  go  down  and  timber  the  waste?     Then,   if 
we  get  down  and  don't  get  any  further,  we  can  have 
a  way  of  coming  back.  .  .Well,  we  decided  that  was 
a  good  idea,   so  we  go,  we  timbered  it  all  up  as  good 
as  what  we  could,   what  we  figured  was  safe,  and  so 
got  through  that  part  of  the  waste  (safely). 

M12's  Initiation  Perception,   "I"  Initiation,   and  Group  Evalua- 
tion scores  were  high  for  the  escape  period.     All  were  low  for  the 
survival  period.     When  escape  proved  impossible,   MIZ's  morale 
collapsed: 

I  thought,   it's  all  over  and  we  done  everything  we 
could.  .  .While  I  was  setting  there  I  thought  about  that, 
and  it  is  not  going  to  be  too  long  before  I  am  going  to 
find  out.  .  .for  myself.     I  really  gave  up.  .  .That  thought 
went  through  my  mind  more  than  often  enough.     I  would 
try  to  brush  it  off. 

He  hoped  he  would  be  gassed  rather  than  suffocate.     The  visual  hal- 
lucinations that  M12  reported  were  bizarre. 

M12  had  several  nervous  traits  as  a  boy  and  was  extremely 
self-conscious:  "I  couldn't  go  into  a  restaurant  to  eat  if  I  thought 
anybody  was  looking  at  me."  Before  becoming  a  miner,  he  worked 

113 


^t  various  jobs,   including  theatre  projectionist  and  construction 
laborer.     At  24,  he  married  the  only  girl  he  had  ever  gone  out  with: 
"I  never  considered  marriage.     No,  that  was  the  last  thing  in  my 
life  I  ever  wanted  to  do."    M12  had  been  a  heavy  drinker  during  a 
large  part  of  his  life,   and  he  was  a  heavy  smoker.     He  was  im- 
patient,  irritable,  and  short-tempered;  he  said  he  felt  like  break- 
ing things  when  angry,   once  smashed  three  radios  in  three  months. 
He  had  an  unusually  strong  interest  in  hunting:     "I  like  going  to  the 
woods,  hunting.     I  like  being  alone  in  the  woods  away  from  people. 
When  I'm  in  the  woods,  the  world  is  mine."    His  other  interest  was 
to  drink  with  a  young  miner  with  whom  he  felt  close. 

When  rescued,  M12  was  in  about  average  physical  condition. 
When  interviewed  eight  days  after  rescue,   he  fidgited,   chain- 
smoked, and  stood  up  and  sat  down  several  times.     He  said  that 
after  leaving  the  hospital  and  returning  home,  his  sleep  was  dis- 
turbed by  nightmares  about  the  bump:     "I'm  as  tired  in  the  morning 
as  when  I  go  to  bed.  .  .1  am  always  tired."    He  had  sudden  severe 
headaches  and  had  difficulty  in  concentrating.     His  hostility  got  out 
of  control:     "I  was  so  cross  with  my  children  that  they  had  to  be 
placed  with  neighbors."     When  the  children  made  a  noise,  he  would 
scream  at  them  and  send  them  outside.     When  his  three-year-old 
son  was  showing  him  a  picture  book,  he  became  extremely  agitated 
and  threw  it  into  the  stove.     He  said  that  he  felt  quite  guilty  about 
this.     At  the  same  time,  he  did  not  like  to  be  alone.     He  was  drink- 
ing heavily  and  was  openly  hostile  toward  his  wife;  however,  he 
said, 

When  my  young  pal  comes  to  the  house  it  seems  like 
things  are  different.     It  seems  to  change  everything, 
because  he  has  a  way  with  me  that  seems  to  offset  every- 
thing. 

When  tested  nine  days  after  rescue,  M12  obtained  a  prorated 
IQ  of  100.     The  primarily  intellectual  tests  and  the  Bender-Gestalt 
drawing  test  were  performed  with  very  little  evidence  of  impaired 
proficiency.     His  Rorschach  productions  indicated  good  average 
control  with  virtually  no  inaccuracies  or  evidence  of  disorganization. 
Signs  of  tension,   emotional  responsiveness,   and  awareness  of  de- 
pendency needs  were  completely  absent  on  this  test.     In  view  of  the 
stress  through  which  this  man  had  gone,  his  test  results  appeared 
to  be  too  good  and  too  free  from  anxiety  effects.     However,  his 
sentence  completions  were  rather  deviant:    he  blocked  on  five  items, 
and  his  responses  to  others  indicated  evasiveness,   an  authoritarian 
outlook,   and  rather  odd  thoughts.     To  "When  I  am  afraid.  .  .  ,"  he 
wrote,   "I  am  curious."    His  "greatest  ambition"  was  "to  be  in  the 

114 


woods."    His  "greatest  fear"  and  "what  bothers  him  most"  was 
"noise."     The  results  on  this  test  suggested  that  M12  had  a  thought 
disorder,   which,   in  view  of  his  very  well-controlled  performance 
on  other  tests,  was  probably  paranoid  in  nature. 

This  man's  suspected  paranoid  personality  resulted  in  a  rather 
unique  reaction  to  entrapment:    activeness  and  constructiveness 
during  the  period  when  there  was  hope  and  when  specific  goal- 
directed  activity  was  in  order;  despair,   irritability,  and  impaired 
perception  or  recall  of  events  during  the  long  wait;  rather  bizarre 
hallucinations;  and  virtually  no  impairment  on  most  psychological 
tests  nine  days  after  rescue. 

A  number  of  tentative  generalizations  can  be  made  about  the 
characteristics  common  to  the  escape  leaders  (E6,   G12,  and  M12): 

(a)  They  characteristically  made  direct,   driving  attacks  on 
problems . 

(b)  They  perceived  problems  as  involving  physical  barriers 
rather  than  interpersonal  issues. 

(c)  They  associated  with  one  or  two  friends:    the  whole  group 
was  not  their  frame  of  reference. 

(d)  They  were  rather  individualistic  in  their  expressed 
opinions  and  actions  ,   outspoken,   and  aggressive. 

(e)  They  were  not  particularly  concerned  with  having  the 
good  opinion  of  most  of  the  others. 

(f)  They  lacked  empathy  and  emotional  control. 

(g)  Their  performance  abilities  were  better  than  their  ver- 
bal abilities . 

D6:    A  Survival  Leader 

D6  was  not  active  in  escape  attempts.     However,  after  digging 
his  way  out  of  the  rubble  (he  was  buried  to  the  waist  by  the  bump) 
he  did  go  with  some  of  the  other  men  on  the  first  attempt  to  escape. 
He  said  to  the  others  at  that  time  that  he  thought  the  bump  had  hit 
all  three  walls  and  would  have  sealed  up  the  area.     This  accurate 
appraisal  of  the  situation  may  account  for,   or  be  only  a  rationaliza- 
tion for,  his  lack  of  activity  in  subsequent  escape  attempts.     He 
was  credited  by  his  companions  as  being  the  lowest  initiator  in  the 
group  for  the  escape  period. 

115 


During  the  first  few  days,  he  apparently  paid  much  attention 
to  the  pinned  man;  he  attempted  to  comfort  him  and  gave  him  the 
aspirins  he  happened  to  have  with  him.     On  about  the  second  day, 
D6  suggested  that  the  remaining  water  be  rationed  and  he  kept  the 
supply,   pouring  out  each  man's  portion. 

When  the  others  gave  up  their  attempts  to  escape,  D6  de- 
finitely became  their  leader.     For  the  survival  period,  he  was 
credited  as  being  the  highest  initiator  as  well  as  having  a  large 
proportion  of  the  total  initiations  reported.     All  the  initiations  he 
reported  for  the  survival  period,  he  attributed  to  himself.     He  sug- 
gested that  they  should  make  a  noise  so  that  the  rescuers  would 
know  that  they  were  alive.     He  organized  shifts  to  beat  on  the  pans 
and  pipes  and  apparently  filled  in  for  weaker  companions.     The 
single  luminous -dial  watch  available  to  the  group  was  turned  over 
to  him. 

The  others  said  of  D6: 

He  was  the  man  down  there.  .  .He  kept  the  morale 
up,   that  fellow. 

D6,  he  talked  and  joked.  .  .and  then  he  was  always 
singing.  .  .Kind  of  kept  your  mind. 

We  had  a  sing-song.  .  .  D6  was  the  leader--he  was 
always  pretty  good  at  singing. 

That  dark  fellow  (D6)  who  was  with  us,  you  know-- 
as soon  as  I  heard  (the  rescuers)  coming,   I  reached 
over  and  kissed  him. 

D6  described  the  attempts  to  keep  up  morale  in  this  way: 

All  the  boys.  .  .seemed  to  be  quite  cooperative, 
as  time  wears  on  you  get  a  little  on  the  edgy  side. 
Once  in  a  while,  they  were  kind  of  disgusted.     I  heard 
different  things,  but  I  figured  the  boys  seemed  to  be 
OK.  .  .One  chap  there  seemed  to  be  always  right  shaky 
--you  know  what  I  mean? --and  I  was  amazed  at  the  way 
he  went  along.     You  know,  before  the  rest  of  the  time 
he  was  really  good.     I  was  amazed,   really  and  truly, 
boy.     This  fellow  done  wonderful.     I  was  surprised. 
Always  laughing,   I  would  say,    "You  will  last  for 
another  day".  .  .The  boys  would  get  to  sleeping  and  I 
didn't  know  what  it  would  be  like  to  wake  them.     I 


116 


slept  fairly  good  myself.     I  usually  stayed  awake  until 
I  heard  the  boys  talking  and  I  would  be  doing  a  little 
singing  to  myself,   one  thing  and  another,  and  I  did  a 
terrible  amount  of  praying.  .  .The  boys  were  pretty 
gallant.  .  .Everybody  was  really  cooperative. 

D6  was  46  years  old.     His  ancestry  was  partially  Negro;  how- 
ever, this  was  not  obvious  from  his  appearance.     He  had  been  a 
contract  miner  for  17  years  and  his  father  was  a  miner  before  him. 
He  did  not  start  to  school  until  10  years  old,   apparently  because 
his  mother  thought  he  was  delicate.     He  won  a  prize  in  grade  5  or 
6  for  high  marks,   failed  grade  10  once,   failed 'grade  11  the  first 
time,   was  expelled  the  second  year,   and  did  not  take  the  exams  the 
third  year . 

At  28,  he  married  a  woman  some  13  years  younger  than  him- 
self and  they  have  had  12  children.     D6  read  religious  literature  and 
modern  novels,   played  the  ukelele  and  several  other  instruments, 
wrote  popular  songs,   and  had  a  tape  recorder  for  use  with  his  musi- 
cal activities.     Despite  being  delicate  as  a  child,   D6  displayed 
better  than  average  drive,  persistence,   achievement,  and  generally 
adaptive  behavior  in  his  predisaster  life,  with  an  emphasis  on  re- 
ligious and  musical  activities.     His  main  associations  remained 
within  the  Negro  community. 

D6's  physical  condition  upon  rescue  was  better  than  that  of 
most  of  the  others.     Apart  from  the  usual  dehydration  and  starva- 
tion, his  main  complaints  after  rescue  were  restlessness  and  some 
proneness  to  fatigue.     When  interviewed  nine  days  after  rescue,  D6 
was  friendly  and  cooperative.     He  appeared  alert  and  intelligent  al- 
though his  mind  sometimes  wandered  off  the  subject.     After  dis- 
charge from  the  hospital,  he  visited  the  injured  men  and  sent  sym- 
pathy cards  to  the  widows.     D6  said  that  he  had  been  taking  five 
minutes  of  exercises  daily  for  about  a  year,  to  keep  his  weight  down 
and  to  take  a  little  off  the  hips  and  put  more  around  the  chest  and 
shoulder,   "so  to  make  me  equal."    He  said  he  would  "count  the 
nights  from  the  twenty-third  (when  trapped)  and.  .  .take  ten  minutes 
and  would  catch  up"  on  his  exercise. 

D6  obtained  a  prorated  IQ  of  93  when  tested  ten  days  after 
rescue.     There  were  signs  to  suggest  that  this  score  was  lowered 
considerably  by  anxiety.     He  also  showed  some  deficiency  in  plan- 
ning and  judgment.     His  control  score  on  the  Rorschach  was  the 
highest  of  any  miner  tested.     Energy  level  was  high,  tempered  with 
reasonably  good  accuracy  and  organization.     His  Rorschach  disor- 
ganization score  was  average  for  the  group,   indicating  that  the 

117 


stress  of  entrapment  affected  him  as  much  as  it  affected  others. 
He  showed  a  good  capacity  for  empathy  and  expressed  a  positive 
evaluation  of  others,  but  dependency  needs  were  not  in  evidence. 
A  major  trait  was  his  tendency  to  intellectualize  rather  than  act. 
This,  along  with  his  keen  awareness  of  his  inferior  status  as  a 
member  of  the  minority  Negro  community  in  Minetown,  his  accu- 
rate assessment  of  the  extent  of  the  bump,  and  his  faith  in  being 
rescued,   may  account  for  his  inactivity  in  escape  attempts. 

D6  had  the  endurance  and  the  intellectual  and  spiritual  re- 
sources that  were  primary  requirements  during  the  survival  period. 
He  apparently  had  a  strong  need  for  attention  and  recognition,   even 
to  the  point  of  being  vain.     His  care  for  his  companions,   all  of  whom 
were  white,   may  have  satisfied  a  desire  to  have  white  men  dependent 
on  him.     The  emergent  situation  probably  gratified  these  needs,  giv- 
ing him  added  strength.     His  activities  after  rescue,   caring  for 
others  and  raising  money  for  the  disaster  fund,   may  reflect  an 
attempt  to  perpetuate  the  status  and  role  he  developed  while  trapped. 

K12:    A  Survival  Leader 


After  the  bump  struck,   K12  heard  a  half-buried  miner  shout- 
ing: 

He  was  hollering.     I  don't  know  whether  he  was 
hollering  at  anything,  but  he  was  hollering.     I  said  to 
him--I  was  in  the  dark--I  said  to  him,   "Just  keep 
quiet;  just  stay  right  where  you  are;  don't  try  to  get 
out  or  anything;  just  wait  till  I  get  hold  of  my  lamp  and 
I  can  see."    I  reached  around  and  got  hold  of  the  cord 
and  tore  the  light  out  from  under  the  stones.     I  shone 
it  down  on  him  and  I  said,   "Now,  be  careful,"  you 
know.     I  thought  he  might  have  a  leg  caught  and  break 
it  trying  to  get  away. 

Before  K12  could  act,   G12  uncovered  the  man: 

I  just  stayed  right  where  I  was  until--!  wasn't 
sure  whether  anything  was  wrong--!  stayed  there  for, 
I  don't  know,   maybe  two  or  three  minutes.     One  of 
my  first  ideas  was  to  get  my  head  down  because  I 
knew  I  was  tight  to  the  roof  and  the  air  was  quite 
heavy.     I  imagine  there  might  have  been  a  percen- 
tage of  gas  or  something,   so  that  was  my  first  idea. 
And,   of  course,   G12  went  by  me  to  help  the  other 
boys  out.     But  then,   I  don't  know  just  exactly  what 
I  done. 

118 


Later  K12  joined  the  rest  in  their  escape  attempts,  but  pro- 
vided little  if  any  leadership.     Although  he  attributed  a  greater 
number  of  "I"  initiations  to  himself  for  the  escape  period  than  did 
any  of  his  companions,   the  group  credited  him  with  the  second 
lowest  rank. 

When  the  group  of  twelve  found  their  way  blocked  in  a  danger- 
ous passage  on  the  third  day,   with  no  water,  little  energy,  and  very 
little  light,   K12  suggested  that  they  get  out  of  that  spot  and  return 
to  the  relative  safety  of  the  cavity  in  the  13,000  foot  level  wall.    The 
men  agreed,   and  they  moved  back  in  relays.     This  was  apparently 
the  turning  point  in  K12's  role  in  the  group.     For  the  survival  period, 
his  Group  Evaluation  score  was  twice  as  high  as  that  of  any  other 
man. 

After  K12,  along  with  N12  and  Q12,   found  a  can  of  water,   he 
took  charge  of  rationing  it  and  sent  the  men  with  rations  for  the  two 
injured  men  (O12  and  P12)  who  were  about  50  feet  away.     He  was  at 
the  broken  air  pipe  when  he  heard  the  rescuers  working  and  he 
stayed  by  it  from  then  on,    shouting  through  the  pipe,  with  others 
spelling  him  off.     When  the  rescuers  finally  heard  them,   K12  de- 
manded that  the  rescuers  send  water  in  to  them  through  the  pipe. 
He  received  and  distributed  the  water.     A  companion  said, 

K12,  he  kept  us  all  from  more  or  less  cracking  up 
.  .  .He  would  say,   "Now  listen,  boys,  now  listen,"  and 
he  would  explain  it  out  to  us.     "We  can't  make  our  way 
out  and  (the  rescuers)  are  coming  in  to  us;  now  we  will 
just  take  it  calm  and  cool.     It's  pretty  hard  but  we  will 
have  to  do  our  best."    I  don't  know  yet  how  he  done  it, 
but  he  really  done  wonders  .     He  kept  us  pretty  well 
huddled  together. 

In  addition  to  being  instrumental  in  satisfying  two  important 
needs  of  the  group,   the  needs  for  water  and  for  hope,   K12  handled 
individual  problems  in  a  way  to  avoid  dissension  in  the  group.     He 
felt  guilty  when  the  two  injured  men  accused  him  of  drinking  water 
while  they  slept,  and  he  made  sure  they  got  their  share  thereafter. 
He  forced  the  weak  member,   J12,  to  take  water  to  the  two  injured 
men  when  his  turn  came  because  "I  knew  that  if  I  didn't  keep  at  him 
to  move  or  something  that  the  other  fellows  would  growl."    His  own 
morale  was  generally  good.     He  had  a  "rough  time"  for  a  day  or  so, 
but  he  said,   "I  figured  that  we  were  going  to  get  out  because  I  was 
determined  that  I  heard  the  pounding  and  that  they  would  be  coming." 


119 


K12  was  37  years  old  and  had  had  17  years  in  the  mines.     He 
stopped  school  at  grade  8  when  he  was  13.     He  worked  at  various 
jobs  until  his  marriage  when  he  went  to  work  in  the  mines.     He 
tried  contract  mining  but  "figured  it  was  too  heavy  work  for  a  man 
of  my  build  (5  feet  9  inches  and  'slim)  so  I  decided  I  had  better.  .  . 
get  the  next  best  thing  to  it."    Thus  he  became  a  "shiftman,"  a  man 
with  minor  foreman  status.     K12  was  in  the  1956  explosion  but  was 
rescued  after  six  hours;  he  was  slightly  gassed  when  brought  up. 
His  wife  had  more  formal  education  than  he  and  was  working  as  a 
typist.     Discussing  his  in-law  problems  and  sexual  difficulties,  he 
said,   "We  kind  of  got  our  difference  ironed  out.  .  .It's  a  lot  better 
now."    He  seemed  to  feel  somewhat  inferior  to  his  wife  and  a  little 
dependent  on  her.     K12  confined  his  associations  to  his  family  and 
a  small  circle  of  close,  long-standing  friends.     He  apparently  did 
considerable  cooking  and  enjoyed  it,  and  he  built  his  own  summer 
cottage.     He  appeared  to  work  things  out  in  an  open  and  practical 
manner,  avoiding  conflict  and  dissension  as  much  as  possible. 

K12's  condition  on  rescue  was  fairly  good.     When  interviewed 
seven  days  after  rescue,  he  gave  the  impression  of  a  rather  quiet 
person,   slow  and  deliberate  in  speech.    On  psychological  tests  eight 
days  after  rescue,  K12  obtained  a  prorated  IQ  of  77.     This  was  ten 
points  below  the  group  average,  and  in  view  of  his  high  Vocabulary 
score,   ten,   it  was  inferred  that  his  intellectual  abilities  were  quite 
seriously  impaired.     On  the  other  hand,  practical  judgment,   plan- 
ning,  and  organization  were  good.     His  underlying  personality  was 
well  integrated  with  considerable  resources  in  the  way  of  control 
and  realistic  flexibility.     Moreover,  his  reality  testing  improved 
under  pressure.     Some  tension  was  in  evidence,   and  although  emo- 
tional expression  was  being  tightly  controlled,  he  did  show  signs  of 
empathy  and  awareness  of  dependency  needs.     His  sentence  com- 
pletions were  quite  unusual  for  their  candor,   considered  awareness, 
and  expressive  qualities.     He  was  a  person  who  had  considerable 
self-awareness,  acknowledging  and  facing  up  to  problems.     In  his 
interview,   K12  reported  more  initiations  than  any  other  man  for 
both  the  escape  and  survival  periods.     He  apparently  was  very  aware 
of  events  and  felt  free  to  recount  them.     Like  D6,  he  attributed  a 
high  proportion  of  initiations  to  himself. 

The  two  survival  leaders,   D6  and  K12,   shared  a  number  of 
characteristics: 

(a)  They  were  sensitive  to  the  moods,   feelings,   and  needs  of 
others,   rationalizing  and  sympathizing  with  them  when 
appropriate. 

(b)  They  sought  to  avoid  conflict  and  dissension. 

120 


(c)  They  were  intellectualizers ,   using  communication  rather 
than  action  to  satisfy  the  group  needs  ,  their  verbal  abili- 
ties being  better  than  their  performance  abilities. 

(d)  Their  role  in  the  survival  period  was  to  a  considerable 
degree  a  function  of  their  need  to  have  the  general  good 
opinion  and  recognition  of  the  whole  group,   rather  than 
the  specific  good  opinion  of  a  special  friend  or  partner. 

(e)  They  perceived  themselves  as  making  an  important  con- 
tribution to  the  group. 

Q12:     A  Willing  Follower 

Q12,   a  26-year-old  miner  with  seven  years  in  the  mines, 
gave  the  most  clear,   orderly,   and  detailed  account  of  the  entrap- 
ment.    His  role  was  that  of  an  active,   willing  worker  in  all  proceed- 
ings;  an  active  participant  in  escape  and  particularly  in  survival 
operations,   he  appeared  to  follow  very  largely  the  suggestions  of 
the  others,   especially  K12,  the  survival  leader. 

There  was  a  hole  there,  you  could  crawl  up  top.  .  . 
They  could  smell  gas,    so  they  came  back.  .  .We  stayed 
there  a  while.     We  wasn't  satisfied.     Try  it  again.     So 
away  we  went  up  the  wall.     This  time  they  decided  for 
me  to  go  first.     I  got  about  15  feet  away  from  them, 
and  I  just  blacked  out. 

When  they  found  the  last  possible  escape  passage  blocked, 
Q12  supported  K12's  suggestion  that  they  return  to  the  top  of  the 
wall  where  it  was  safer  and  rescuers  were  more  likely  to  come 
through  first.     Q12  accompanied  K12  and  N12  in  a  successful  ex- 
ploration for  water.     During  the  survival  period,   he  remained  with 
K12  by  the  broken  air  pipe  through  which  they  heard  the  rescuers 
and  finally  made  a  contact  with  them. 

When  interviewed  18  days  after  rescue,  Q12  was  neat,  well- 
groomed,   and  appeared  healthy  and  fit.     He  showed  no  signs  of 
fatigue,   tension,   or  anxiety,   and  appeared  to  have  few  aftereffects, 
perhaps  fewer  than  any  of  the  other  trapped  men. 

Q12's  schooling  did  not  continue  beyond  grade  7,  which  he 
reached  at  the  age  of  14.     His  mother  died  when  he  was   11,  after 
which  he  was  raised  by  his  grandmother.     His  work  record  was 
more  orderly  than  many  of  his  fellows:     two  years  in  a  truck  as  a 
driver  with  his  father,  two  years  driving  a  taxi,   and  two  years  in 


121 


a  garage.     He  sought  work  in  the  mine  to  earn  more  money.     He 
was  invited  to  move  up  from  datal  to  contract  work  after  three  years 
in  the  mine.     After  marrying  at  the  age  of  23,  he  built  his  own  house, 
He  did  not  drink  and  smoked  moderately.     The  psychiatrist  con- 
cluded that  this  man  exhibited  considerable  initiative,  persistence, 
and  stability  within  the  framework  of  his  community  culture. 

Q12  was  given  psychological  tests   18  days  after  rescue.     He 
obtained  a  prorated  IQ  of  100,   showing  no  obvious  impairment  of 
primarily  intellectual  functions.     His  performance  abilities  and 
practical  judgment  appear  to  be  his  forte,   and  they  were  apparently 
untouched  by  anxiety.     His  handling  of  unstructured  material  indi- 
cated basic  stability  and  better  than  average  resistance  to  disor- 
ganization.    Moreover,   his  reality  testing  improved  as  demands  on 
him  were  increased.     No  tension  was  observed;  emotional  respon- 
siveness tended  to  be  impulsive  and  spontaneous  rather  than  modu- 
lated.    He  exhibited  no  signs  of  empathy  or  awareness  of  dependency 
needs.     The  Sentence  Completion  test  indicated  that  Q12  was  evasive 
of  emotional  involvement  and  self-criticism,   had  rather  egocentric 
interests,   and  had  little  capacity  for  independent  and  imaginative 
thought.     It  was  inferred  that  he  would  rely  on  others  in  making  im- 
portant decisions.     On  the  whole,   this  man  appeared  to  be  a  "per- 
formance type"  who  relied  on  intuition  and  practical  abilities;  he 
showed  signs  of  repression  or  lack  of  feeling;  and  his  interests  were 
focused  on  his  own  wishes  and  welfare. 

This  young  man's  predisaster  history  reflected  better  than 
average  achievement  drive,   persistence,   realism,   and  stability. 
His  behavior  during  entrapment  was  in  keeping  with  this  picture, 
and  he  was  in  remarkably  good  condition  when  interviewed  and 
tested.     The  interval  between  rescue  and  examination  was  longer 
for  him  than  for  most  others,  but  this  alone  would  hardly  account 
for  his  apparent  freedom  from  aftereffects,   as  examplified  by  his 
traveling  over  one  thousand  miles  to  see  about  a  job  just  five  days 
after  rescue.     A  more  likely  inference  is  that  Q12's  ability  to  re- 
main emotionally  uninvolved  and  his  lack  of  imagination  enabled 
him  to  shrug  off  and  forget  much  of  the  emotional  impact  of  entrap- 
ment.    Moreover,   the  situation  offered  considerable  opportunity  for 
the  exercise  of  his  intuitive,  practical  approach  to  problems.     And 
finally,   in  the  survival  period  he  took  the  role  of  lieutenant  to  his 
older  colleague,   K12,   from  whom  he  may  have  drawn  support.     His 
recognized  contribution  to  group  support  in  the  survival  period  in- 
dicates that  his  own  mood  and  morale  was  relatively  positive  and 
steady.     It  is  probable  that  his  association  with  the  recognized 
leader  in  that  period,  as  the  latter  rationed  the  last  can  of  water 
and  heard  rescuers  through  the  air  pipe,   also  induced  the  group  to 
perceive  Q12  as  contributing  to  its  needs. 

122 


J12:    A  Passive- dependent  Man 

J1Z,   a  22-year-old  datal  worker  with  three  years  in  the  mines, 
was  dazed  and  confused  by  the  bump.     He  reported,   "I  was  a  little 
shaky  and  nervous.  .  .and  didn't  quite  know  where  I  was  .  "    He  made 
escape  attempts  with  the  others  for  a  time,   "Then  I  don't  know--it 
just  seemed  as  if  we  were  dozing.     Some  of  the  boys  went  up  the 
wall  and  dug  around  for  water  cans." 

J12!s  story  was  vague  and  evasive.     Others  said  that  he  was 
at  times  emotional  and  helpless: 

J12,  he  wouldn't  move  at  all,   and  I  would  threaten 
him  with  "Well,   I'll  give  you  no  water."    He  would  cry 
for  a  little.     I  really  shouldn't  have  done  it,  but  I  knew 
that  if  I  didn't  keep  at  him  to  move  or  something,  that 
the  other  fellows  would  growl. 

His  companions  gave  him  no  credit  for  initiations.     He  himself  re- 
called a  higher  than  average  number  of  initiations,  as  if  well  aware 
of  events  during  entrapment;  however,  the  reliability  of  some  of 
his  statements  is  in  doubt. 

On  rescue,  J12  appeared  to  be  less  exhausted  than  the  other 
trapped  miners,   and  he  wanted  to  go  home.     He  did  not  want  to  be 
alone.     When  interviewed  seven  days  after  rescue,  he  was  some- 
what tense  and  evaded  emotional  material.     He  seemed  to  enjoy 
lying  on  a  couch,  being  waited  on  by  his  wife,   receiving  attention, 
and  being  something  of  a  hero.     He  said  that  he  was  sleeping  well, 
had  no  dreams,   and  had  no  complaints  other  than  a  sore  back.     He 
had  made  little  effort  to  go  out  since  being  rescued  and  displayed 
no  urge  to  see  how  the  other  men  were  getting  along.     It  appeared 
that  he  was  giving  his  strong  dependency  needs  full  reign.     During 
the  month  following  rescue,  he  had  several  attacks  of  "trembling 
and  crying." 

An  only  child  of  parents  who  separated  when  he  was  14,  he 
said  that  he  got  on  well  with  his  mother  but  his  father  was  "contrary. 
He  reached  grade  8  when  17,  after  failing  two  grades.     His  wife 
appeared  mentally  retarded.     They  had  two  children,   one  of  which 
died  in  childbirth.     While  mixing  well  with  a  large  number  of  people, 
he  was  not  a  member  of  any  community  organization.     He  liked 
tinkering  with  cars  and  playing  country  music  on  a  violin. 

J12  was  tested  seven  days  after  rescue.     His  prorated  IQ  was 
87,  his  range  of  ideas  was  greater  than  average,  and  he  exhibited 

123 


high  productive  energy.     His  abilities  were  relatively  even  at  the 
average  level,  with  no  evidence  areas  of  impairment.     Judgment 
and  practical  performance  were  virtually  intact  and  apparently  un- 
affected by  anxiety.     Rorschach  control  was  very  good,  with  less 
than  average  disorganization.     There  was  some  evidence  of  tension, 
but  emotional  responsiveness  was  covered  up.     This  man  exhibited 
a  considerable  wealth  of  resources  and  gave  the  general  appearance 
of  being  well  integrated  and  stable.     However,  his  resources  were 
not  utilized  for  constructive  purposes  but  tended  to  be  diverted  into 
fantasy.     Moreover,  when  situational  demands  were  increased,  his 
reality  testing  tended  to  deteriorate  somewhat.     An  independent 
clinical  appraisal  of  this  man's  Rorschach  was  very  positive. 

Psychological  test  findings  were  at  variance  with  the  be- 
havioral picture,   indicating  a  self-contained  and  well- integrated 
personality  with  little  impairment  of  intellectual  and  performance 
abilities.     The  only  obvious  explanation  for  this  man's  behavior 
under  stress  is  that  regression  to  complete  dependency  was  his 
habitual  means  of  handling  stress,  although  this  "was  not  brought 
out  by  the  tests.     It  is  notable  that  this  defense  apparently  protected 
J12  both  physically  and  psychologically. 

F6:    A  Disorganized  Man 

F6,  a  37-year-old  contract  miner  with  17  years  in  the  mines, 
was  buried  to  the  waist  by  the  bump.  E6,  the  escape  leader,  came 
to  his  aid  when  he  called  for  help. 

This  here  hip  I  thought  was  broke.     I  couldn't  put 
no  weight  on  it.     We  got  to  the  top  of  the  wall  and  tried 
to  get  out  but  we  couldn't  get  out;  so  I  had  to  lay  there 
mostly  for  about  two  days.  .  .1  didn't  get  out,   I  didn't 
crawl  out.     The  boys  told  me  it  was  only  about  a  foot 
high.     Well,   I  couldn't  crawl  out  myself  because  my 
hips  were  too  sore.  .  .They  left  me,  the  other  five 
went  out  of  the  top  of  the  timber  way.     They  took  an 
axe  and  a  saw  and  were  going  to  try  to  get  through 
and  they  left  me  with  the  pinned  man.     He  was  caught 
there,   and  him  and  I  talked. 

He  denied  having  any  psychophysiological  symptoms  or  hal- 
lucinations; he  also  denied  being  scared  or  "bothered  one  bit." 
However,   there  were  considerable  evasion  and  vagueness  in  his 
story,  and  a  number  of  inconsistencies.     He  was  obsessed  by  the 
thought  of  drinking  pop  and  talked  about  this  often,   much  to  the 
annoyance  of  the  other  miners: 

124 


I  thought  about  that  pop  and  ice  cream.     It  near 
drove  me  crazy,   I'm  telling  you.     That  was  on  my 
mind.  .  .most  of  the  time.     It  was  getting  on  the  boys' 
nerves  so  I  didn't  say  too  much  about  it. 

He  said  he  had  no  hope  and  expected  to  die  there: 

I  thought  we  were  there  to  stay.  .  .1  started  to  give 
up  hope,   in  fact  I  did  give  up.     I  was  prepared  to  go, 
and  I  wasn't  one  bit  scared.     I  made  up  my  mind.     I 
said,    "Boys,   we've  had  it  now.  .  .We'll  all  go  together!" 

He  was  bothered  by  the  raving  of  the  pinned  man  and  had  to  be  re- 
strained when  he  impulsively  decided  to  chop  off  the  man's  arm. 
Several  of  the  others  said  that  F6's  behavior  was  poor  and  that  he 
came  nearest  to  breaking. 

On  rescue,  this  man  walked  most  of  the  way  to  the  ambulance, 
despite  his  sore  hips.     He  required  an  extra  day  in  the  hospital. 
When  interviewed  six  days  after  rescue,  he  was  untidy  and  unshaven. 
He  was  restless  and  tense  at  times.     He  said  that  he  was  sleeping 
well  and  "never  thinks  of  it  (the  experience)  now." 

After  several  failures,   F6  quit  school  in  grade  4,  at  14  years 
of  age.     He  married  when  he  was  20  and  has  a  son  aged  16.     He  had 
had  bronchitis  or  asthma  for  several  years  and  was  given  psychiatric 
treatment  for  acute  alcoholism  about  two  years  before  the  disaster. 
About  the  1956  explosion  he  said,   "I  couldn't  force  myself  to  go 
down  and  do  rescue  work." 

On  psychological  tests  ten  days  after  rescue,   F6  obtained  a 
prorated  IQ  of  66.     Although  there  was  some  evidence  of  impairment 
of  concentration,  there  was  little  to  suggest  that  this  man  had  had 
average  intelligence.     He  seemed  a  rigid  person  with  little  potential 
for  adaptive  behavior,   confining  himself  nearly  always  to  popular 
stereotypes.     On  the  Rorschach,  his  elaborations  tended  to  spoil 
his  percepts,   suggesting  that  his  reality  testing  deteriorated  under 
stress.     His  Bender-Gestalt  productions  were  extremely  poor,   and 
although  he  did  them  in  a  hurry,   it  was  inferred  that  his  judgment 
and  practical  performance  abilities  were  deficient.     Dependency 
needs  were  expressed.     Signs  of  empathy  were  absent,  but  these 
may  have  been  repressed.     On  the  other  hand,  he  was  preoccupied 
with  fears  of  the  mine  and  did  not  show  concern  about  work  and  the 
future  as  many  of  his  fellows  did.     It  is  notable  that  the  Rorschach 
did  not  reveal  impulsivity  or  tension.     It  would  seem  that  his  self- 
esteem  and  mechanisms  of  denial  and  repression  had  been  working 
overtime  to  present  a  good  front  in  the  ten  days  after  his  rescue. 

125 


X6:    The  Semi-isolated  Man 

X6  was  a  42-year-old  datal  worker  and  the  son  of  a  miner. 
He  was  trapped  in  virtual  isolation  for  81/2  days.     He  was  found 
by  members  of  the  group  of  six  on  the  second  day,  but  was  thought 
by  them  to  be  "pretty  near  gone."    On  about  the  fourth  day,  how- 
ever, two  miners  searching  for  an  escape  passage  came  upon  him 
and  were  surprised  to  find  he  had  changed  position.     X6  spoke  a 
few  words  to  them.     Two  or  three  days  later,  the  two  miners  found 
he  had  moved  again. 

The  enclosure  to  which  he  had  moved  was  very  small,   about 
five  feet  high  and  four  feet  square.     There  was  a  hole,  however, 
that  went  up  through  the  ceiling  quite  a  distance,  providing  some 
air  circulation,  though  carbon  dioxid.e  may  have  been  trapped  in 
the  pocket.     If  carbon  dioxide  were  present,  his  prone  position 
would  have  increased  his  chance  of  inhaling  a  maximum  amount  of 
the  gas. 

The  group  of  six  said  they  did  not  bring  him  to  their  cavity 
because  the  way  was  very  narrow  and  dangerous  and  they  were  weak, 
Thus,   X6  was  virtually  alone  until  he  was  rescued. 

X6  was  seen  daily  in  the  hospital.     He  lay  all  day  immobile  in 
bed  with  the  sheets  tucked  under  his  chin  as  the  nurse  had  left  them. 
He  smiled  with  a  warm,   rather  sickly,   childish  grin.     He  replied  to 
simple  questions  but  talked  mainly  about'his  head,  which  was  hurt- 
ing him  rather  badly,   and  about  the  fact  that  he  was  not  sleeping 
well.     He  seemed  to  tire  after  two  or  three  questions  and  would  say 
nothing  more.     On  the  fifth  day,  he  volunteered  one  remark:    "It  is 
a  nice  day  out  today."     This  was  the  first  spontaneous  remark  he 
made  to  anyone.     The  nurse  who  was  looking  after  him  felt  that  for 
the  first  few  days  after  his  rescue  "he  wasn't  quite  with  us."    This 
was  also  the  impression  of  the  interviewer. 

X6  was  interviewed  on  the  twelfth  day  after  rescue,  when  he 
was  showing  considerable  improvement.     He  was  seen  for  one  hour, 
as  he  sat  on  the  edge  of  the  bed.     He  seemed  dazed  and  somewhat 
withdrawn;  it  took  several  seconds  before  he  made  contact  and 
started  to  respond.     He  looked  rather  sad  but  smiled  warmly  on 
occasion.     The  reason  for  the  interview  was  explained,  but  he 
showed  no  emotional  reaction  apart  from  a  smile.     His  memory 
for  remote  events  appeared  to  be  quite  good,   though  his  memory 
for  the  entrapment  was  very  limited  and  vague:     "It  seems  as  if  it 
was  a--a  dream."    However,  he  did  remember  "drinking  a  bit  and 
eating  a  sandwich."    He  also  recalled  wandering  around  and  trying 

126 


to  get  out,   "another  man  hollering  at  me.  .  .standing  and  falling  down 
again,"  and  he  remembered  being  carried  out.     As  for  his  thoughts 
and  feelings: 

I  thought  I  was  gone.  .  .1  felt  pretty  bad;  I  felt 
half  weak;  the  air  was  bad  and  the  gas  bothered  me 
when  I  lay  down.  .  .1  thought  about  my  wife  and  I 
was  worrying  about  her  and  what  was  happening. 

When  contacted  by  the  other  trapped  men,   X6  apparently  was  dis- 
oriented, for  he  did  not  ask  where  they  came  from  or  where  they 
were  going;  he  only  asked  for  a  drink  of  water.     He  did  not  drink 
urine  nor,   in  fact,   did  he  remember  urinating  at  all.     He  did  not 
remember  praying.     He  did  not  think  he  had  had  a  headache,  and 
he  recalled  no  unusual  sensory  experiences.     He  remembered  what 
he  was  doing  when  the  bump  struck,  but  was  vague  about  the  three 
or  four  days  prior  to  the  bump  and  the  first  two  days  in  hospital. 

X6  did  not  seem  anxious  or  tense,  nor  did  he  tire  as  much  as 
expected.     His  major  symptoms  were  memory  loss,   impaired  atten- 
tion,  and  confusion.     He  had  difficulty  in  differentiating  time  and 
place,   so  that  at  times  it  was  difficult  to  tell  whether  he  was  talk- 
ing about  his  time  in  hospital  or  in  the  mine. 

X6  described  his  childhood  as  being  very  unhappy.     His  father 
drank  a  lot  and  "was  always  fighting"  with  his  mother.     He  got  along 
well  with  his  mother  but  not  with  his  father.     He  appears  to  have 
had  many  nervous  traits  in  childhood. 

As  for  family  history,  three  brothers  were  in  a  home  for  the 
mentally  ill;  one  was  apparently  epileptic.     X6  described  one  aunt 
as  "manic."     The  remaining  members  of  the  family  were  better  ad- 
justed mentally.     His  mother  had  diabetes  and  had  been  blind  for 
some  years.     He  started  school  at  6  and  failed  grades  1  and  2: 
"Things  were  bad  at  home  and  I  used  to  be  mad  at  my  father."   How- 
ever, he  went  on  to  finish  grade  7  at  the  age  of  15.     He  left  school: 
"I  wanted  to  make  some  money  as  my  father  was  drinking  it  all." 
For  ten  years  after  leaving  school,  X6  worked  on  a  delivery  wagon 
and  after  that  he  entered  the  mines  where  he  has  worked  for  the 
last  18  years  as  a  laborer.     He  married  when  25,  his  wife  being 
the  only  girlfriend  he  had  ever  gone  out  with.     Their  marriage 
appeared  to  be  very  successful.     They  had  one  teen-age  son  who 
looked  healthy  and  bright.     X6's  wife  was  a  large,   fat,   motherly 
woman. 


127 


His  work  record  at  the  mine  was  good.     Apart  from  an  acci- 
dent 4  or  5  years  earlier,  he  had  not  missed  any  time.     At  that  time, 
a  fall  of  stone  resulted  in  a  minor  head  injury,  which  kept  him  from 
work  for  a  few  weeks.     He  described  his  attitude  towards  work  as 
"I  keep  very  much  to  myself."     When  he  drove  his  car  to  work  in 
the  mornings,  he  parked  it  away  from  the  others  "in  case  they 
would  scrape  the  fender  or  sides  of  my  car."    On  the  whole,   X6 
gave  the  impression  of  being  shy  and  retiring,   a  rather  schizoid 
and  compulsive  person. 

X6's  outside  interests  appeared  to  be  few,   apart  from  trying 
to  make  some  extra  money  doing  odd  jobs  around  the  town.     He 
spent  most  of  his  spare  time  cutting  grass  or  hedges  in  summer  or 
doing  rough  carpentry  for  people:     "I  put  up  160  storm  windows  this 
fall  before  the  bump."    He  was  paid  for  all  this  activity,  was  very 
proud  of  the  fact  that  he  did  not  owe  any  bills  and  that  he  owned  his 
own  home  and  car.     He  bought  nothing  on  credit.     He  stayed  home 
most  of  the  time.     He  visited  and  played  cards  rarely.     He  took  no 
part  in  community  activities  and  had  not  gone  to  church  since  his 
marriage. 

X6  was  given  psychological  tests  13  days  after  rescue,  while 
sitting  on  the  edge  of  the  bed.     He  appeared  quite  alert,  was  very 
anxious  to  please,   and  was  almost  too  cooperative  and  responsive. 
At  times,  when  he  found  problems  difficult,  he  would  make  dis- 
paraging remarks  about  his  abilities. 

This  man  achieved  a  prorated  IQ  of  112  and  his  test  perfor- 
mance in  general  indicated  virtually  no  impairment  due  to  anxiety. 
While  his  planning  and  judgment  were  very  good  he  did  not  appear 
to  use  his  intellectual  potential  to  its  fullest  extent,   for  he  made 
little  effort  to  think  originally.     The  quality  of  his  Rorschach  re- 
sponses indicated  feelings  of  inadequacy  while  sentence  completion 
responses  suggested  one  who  had  a  strong  achievement  drive,  was 
proud,   and  was  rather  lacking  in  self-criticism.     There  were  no 
signs  of  tension  and  he  expressed  no  fear  of  the  mine.     There  was 
some  evidence  of  unmodulated  responsiveness  to  emotional  impact, 
and  he  was  quite  dependent,   especially  on  his  family.     On  the  whole, 
X6  showed  minimum  signs  of  disturbance  and  better  than  average 
resources  of  intellect  and  personality. 

A  subsequent  neurological  examination  (EEC)  diagnosed  him 
as  having  a  "low-grade  epileptogenic  lesion"  in  the  frontotemporal 
area. 


128 


The  data  on  X6  did  not  provide  any  clear  hypotheses  to  account 
for  his  reactions  to  isolation  in  the  mine.     His  extremely  spotty 
memory  for  the  81/2  days  suggests  that  he  was  in  a  semicoma 
and  not  too  conscious  of  events.     This  is  supported  by  his  apparent 
inability  to  do  more  than  flounder  aimlessly  about  and  by  his  evident 
lack  of  contact  with  reality  while  trapped.     His  near  faultless  per- 
formance on  psychological  tests   13  days  after  rescue  also  suggested 
that  he  had  been  protected  from  anxiety  in  some  way.     X6  thought 
he  had  probably  been  struck  on  the  head  by  a  stone,  but  there  was 
no  evidence  of  this  except  his  reported  headaches.     One  possibility 
is  that  he  suffered  a  prolonged  epileptic  seizure  produced  by  sub- 
dural  pressure  from  a  head  blow  or  precipitated  by  carbon  dioxide 
(Meduna,    1950).     Such  a  seizure  would  account  for  his  amnesia, 
his  freedom  from  anxiety,  and  his  efficient  test  performance  when 
he  recovered.     Inspiration  of  carbon  dioxide  would  also  probably 
contribute  to  reducing  anxiety  (cf.  ,  Wolpe,    1958)  and  may  have 
helped  to  induce  a  hibernation- like  state  (cf.  ,  Seevers  ,   1944). 


129 


CHAPTER  9 
EVALUATION  AND  SUMMARY 

There  are  a  number  of  methodological  problems  peculiar  to 
disaster  research.     That  there  is  seldom  a  trained  observer  on 
the  scene  at  the  time  of  impact  raises  one  set  of  problems.     The 
research  worker  has  to  rely  on  informants  who  were  in  or  near  the 
disaster,   and  he  must  be  seriously  concerned  with  the  reliability 
of  information  reported  in  retrospect.     The  information  that  infor- 
mants give  is  subject  to  all  the  errors  of  perception  and  recall. 

There  is  a  further  problem  of  actual  information:     Does  the 
respondent  actually  know  ?      Was  he  in  a  position  to  have  the  know- 
ledge to  be  able  subsequently  to  answer  the  question  accurately? 
It  is  well  known  that  a  person  will  often  answer  a  question  regard- 
less of  whether  he  has  direct  knowledge  of  the  phenomenon  in  ques- 
tion. 

Within  this  study  a  number  of  people  were  asked  if  there  were 
sufficient  men  available  for  rescue  work.     The  answers  to  this 
question  varied  considerably.     Without  doubt,   the  individuals  an- 
swered honestly.     Whether  or  not  they  were  in  a  position  to  know 
the  answer  is  beside  the  point;  what  is  more  appropriate  is  to  ask 
what  the  respondent  perceived  in  the  question.     It  would  seem  that 
to  some  the  question  meant,   "Did  your  community  respond  well  to 
the  disaster?     Did  everyone  do  as  well  as  he  could?"    Within  this 
context,  they  could  honestly  answer  "Yes,"  saying,   in  effect,   "There 
were  plenty  of  volunteer  rescuers.     We  did  our  part."     The  question 
might  mean  to  another  respondent,   "Why  did  you  not  perform  rescue 
work?"     Within  this  context,  the  answer  again  was  "Yes"  and  meant 
"There  were  more  than  enough  volunteers,   so  I  did  not  have  to  go." 
On  the  other  hand,  the  question  seemed  to  mean  to  some,   "Were 
there  enough  men  working  on  your  shift,   so  you  could  have  some 
respite  and  be  relieved  at  the  proper  time?"    With  this  meaning 
imputed  to  the  question,  the  answer  was  "No."     The  respondent  was 
replying,   "On  the  days  that  I  was  working,  there  were  barely  enough 
men  to  perform  the  rescue  work,   and  I  resented  it." 

This  poses  the  very  difficult  question  of  the  use  of  the  nodal 
informant.     Great  variations  will  appear  in  the  information, 

131 


depending  on  which  nodal  informant  is  interviewed.     The  question 
probably  elicits  more  information  about  the  respondent  than  it  does 
about  the  problem  at  hand.     This  phenomenon  is  common  and  wide- 
ly recognized,  but  is  particularly  pertinent  in  disaster  research 
when  the  trained  observer  is  not  present  at  the  time  of  the  disaster. 
All  answers  are  "correct"  within  the  appropriate  context.     What 
the  context  is,  is  another  problem.    A  major  task  is  to  identify  and 
categorize  the  contexts. 

The  analysis  of  initiation  points  to  another  range  of  problems. 
It  is  quite  clear  that  it  makes  a  difference  whether  the  disaster 
events  are  reported  by  an  individual  or  by  all  the  members  of  the 
group.     The  number  of  initiations  with  which  the  individual  credits 
himself  may  have  no  relation  to  the  number  of  initiations  with  which 
the  group  credits  that  same  individual.     As  in  the  case  of  the  nodal 
informant,  both  analyses  are  appropriate,  but  they  are  reported 
from  different  frames  of  reference  and  presumably  have  different 
implications.     Quantification  of  initiations  does  have  the  merit  of 
cutting  through  the  cover  story  of  the  miner. 

The  limitations  of  any  psychological  appraisal  are  very  real, 
as  there  may  be  no  way  of  ascertaining  many  of  the  predisaster 
characteristics  of  the  individual  in  any  reliable  way.     Much  can  be 
inferred  from  the  interview  and  tests,  but  there  is  no  way  in  which 
the  amount  of  disaster  contamination  can  be  estimated.     Although  a 
carefully  matched  control  group  is  of  some  help,   it  is  only  of  rel- 
ative assistance,  partly  because  of  incomplete  matching  and  partly 
because  all  individuals  are  involved  in  some  degree  or  manner  in 
the  disaster.     A  follow-up  study  may,  to  some  extent,  yield  infor- 
mation that  would  provide  a  check  on  inferences  that  have  been 
made. 

To  study  adequately  the  complex  effects  of  disaster  requires 
the  use  of  techniques  from  several  disciplines.     Yet,  there  are  a 
number  of  problems  in  interdisciplinary  research  resulting  from 
the  techniques  and  assumptions  not  held  in  common  by  the  disci- 
plines.    The  clearest  sign  of  interdisciplinary  difficulty  in  this 
study  was  the  disappointing  attempt  to  collect  many  types  of  data 
in  a  single  interview.     Few  interviewers  are  able  to  probe  to  any 
depth  in  areas  and  disciplines  in  which  they  have  little  training  or 
competence.     The  very  thing  that  interdisciplinary  research  sets 
out  to  achieve--integration--may  limit  the  quality  of  the  research. 

From  the  data  made  available  through  these  procedures, 
initiations  were  the  only  measure  of  miners1  behavior  while  trapped, 
The  number  of  initiations  credited  to  a  miner  by  all  the  other 

132 


members  of  the  group  was  taken  as  a  measure  of  the  extent  to  which 
that  man  was  perceived  as  promoting  current  group  activities. 
Whether  individuals  with  high  Group  Evaluation  scores  should  be 
called  leaders  is  a  matter  of  definition.     According  to  the  inter- 
actional view  (Gibb,    1954),  high  initiators  would  be  called  leaders. 

Although  quantitative  group  evaluation  of  initiation  based  on 
the  interviews  indicated  different  leaders  for  the  escape  and  sur- 
vival periods,   the  miners'  interviews  on  a  qualitative  level  general- 
ly pointed  to  the  survival  leaders.     Several  men  spoke  in  glowing 
terms  of  the  survival  initiators,   expressing  an  emotional  and  de- 
pendent attitude  toward  them.     Such  expressions  did  not  occur  with 
respect  to  escape  initiators,   although  these  miners  were  promoting 
the  group's  goals  at  that  time.     It  appeared  that  survival  initiators 
were  appreciated  by  the  others  for  their  emotional  support,   while 
escape  initiators  did  not  engender  that  kind  of  response. 

From  another  point  of  view,  psychological  tests  and  psychia- 
tric ratings  of  ego  strength  favored  survival  leaders.     Indeed  psy- 
chiatric measures,   Vocabulary,   and  education  had  negative  re- 
lationships with  escape  leadership.     They  were  at  variance  with 
the  frame  of  reference  of  the  trapped  miners  in  the  escape  situation. 
It  is  quite  obvious  that  leadership  could  be  cast  in  a  variety  of  terms, 

The  fact  that  the  analysis  has  used  initiations  as  a  measure 
of  behavior  should  in  no  way  imply  a  judgment  that  either  a  high 
initiation  score  or  a  low  one  is  desirable.     Rather  than  evaluate 
behavior,   initiations  simply  measure  and  describe  it.     It  remains 
that  an  evaluation  of  the  direct  or  indirect  usefulness  of  initiations 
is  not  possible  without  making  a  number  of  assumptions  as  to  what 
in  each  circumstance  could  be  considered  functional  behavior. 
Many  complex  factors  are  involved,   and  any  evaluation  of  the  utility 
of  behavior  for  either  the  individual  or  the  group  would  have  to  in- 
clude an  ex  post  facto   knowledge  of  what  actually  did  happen  after 
the  bump.     A  few  of  the  considerations  necessary  for  any  analysis 
of  the  usefulness  of  particular  behavior  can  be  briefly  mentioned. 

Immediately  after  the  bump,  the  miners  had  two  clear  alter- 
natives:   they  could  sit,   rest,   and  await  rescue,   or  they  could 
attempt  to  find  a  way  out  of  the  mine.     Attempting  to  escape  had  a 
widely  accepted  precedent:    the  majority  of  the  survivors  in  both 
the  1956  explosion  and  the   1958  bump  had  walked  out  of  the  mine. 
This  was  a  sensible  pattern,  particularly  for  miners  skilled  in  the 
mechanics  of  mine  activities,   for  it  allowed  rescuers  to  concentrate 
on  those  miners  who  were  unable  to  make  their  own  way  out. 


133 


On  a  slightly  more  subtle  level,   escape  attempts  provided 
the  trapped  miners  with  activity.     Rather  than  sitting  passively  to 
await  rescue  or  death,  the  miners  occupied  themselves  with  ac- 
tivity that  in  the  situation  was  not  random  but  was  organized  and 
appropriate.     It  would  also  have  been  useful  if,   indeed,  they  had 
managed  to  work  their  way  out  through  the  blocked  passages.    Such 
meaningful  physical  activity  would  seem  very  important  in  light  of 
the  fear  of  insanity  or  loss  of  self-control  expressed  by  the  miners. 
Also,  attempts  to  escape,  which  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  escape 
was  impossible,   may  well  have  been  an  important  precondition  to 
the  absence  of  recrimination  and  conflict  during  the  survival  period. 

Two  of  the  three  high  escape  initiators  exhibited  good  psy- 
chological test  results.     On  the  other  hand,  test  results  indicate 
that  some  miners  who  contributed  few  initiations  showed  minimum 
psychological  effects.     It  could  be  argued  that  a  miner  who  sits  still 
to  conserve  his  energy  while  his  companions  are  trying  to  escape 
is  doing  the  wisest  thing  for  himself.     It  could  be  suggested  that 
this  miner  saves  not  only  his  own  resources  but  also  contributes  to 
the  group,  not  in  terms  of  initiations,  but  by  presenting  a  focus  of 
concern  for  the  group.     The  inactive  man  can  equally  well  contri- 
bute to  the  group  in  terms  of  stability,   reassurance,  and  calm. 
From  the  latter  frame  of  reference,  the  most  inactive  man  can  well 
be  the  "leader"  if  he  fulfills  other  criteria. 

If  it  had  turned  out  that  the  bump  was  not  as  severe  as  it  was 
and  the  escape  attempts  had  been  successful,   leadership  might  well 
have  been  attributed  to  the  most  active  initiator  of  the  escape  period. 
Under  these  conditions,   a  so-called  maladjusted  person  could  act 
in  a  way  that  was  useful  to  the  group  by  carrying  out  his  own  parti- 
cular adaptation  to  the  situation.     It  would  be  easy  for  the  investi- 
gator to  overlook  the  possibility  that  an  unstable  personality  may  be 
most  functional  for  a  group  under  certain  conditions. 

On  a  physical  level,  however,  the  unsuccessful  escape  attempts 
posed  a  definite  threat.     The  physical  stress,  the  fatigue,  the  added 
danger,  and  the  rapid  use  of  water  resources  during  escape  attempts 
shortened  the  period  for  which  the  group  could  survive.     Even  with 
a  post  hoc  recognition  of  this  threat  on  the  physical  level,  it  is  very 
difficult  to  estimate  how  useful  prolonged  escape  attempts  were  to 
the  group.     The  majority  of  the  miners  seem  to  have  acted  on  the 
assumption  that  they  should  attempt  to  find  a  way  out  until  their 
lights  fail. 

A  full  assessment  of  the  behavior  of  the  miners  would  involve 
a  study  of  the  motivations,   specific  consequences  that  they  anticipated, 

134 


and  specific  consequences  they  did  not  anticipate.    The  effects  of 
this  behavior  on  each  individual,   as  well  as  on  the  group  as  a  whole, 
would  have  to  be  established;  but  more  important,   any  appraisal 
would  have  to  be  made  within  a  situational  context.     Though  it  is 
possible  to  make  evaluations  of  types  of  behavior,   it  would  not  be 
valid  or  useful  to  do  so  with  only  hindsight  as  to  what  the  situation 
was.     Any  evaluation  of  the  behavior  of  the  trapped  miners  would 
require  the  adoption  of  a  frame  of  reference,   and  any -frame  of  ref- 
erence would  imply  a  value  judgment. 

Summary 

The  Minetown  mine  disaster  was  relatively  unusual  when  con- 
trasted with  most  other  disasters   reported  in  the  literature.     First, 
19  miners  in  two  groups  were  trapped  in  a  coal  mine  for  6   1/2  to 
81/2  days  and  were  later  available  for  examination  and  assessment. 
The  population  to  which  the  trapped  men  belonged  was  stable,   mak- 
ing it  possible  to  examine  other  groups  in  a  systematic  fashion,   in- 
cluding a  "control"  group  of  nontrapped  miners,   the  wives  of  both 
groups  of  miners,   and  selected  personal  service  personnel  and  their 
wives.     The  situation  thus  had  some  of  the  features  of  an  experiment 
in  which  small  samples  are  treated  on  a  comparative  basis.    Seventy- 
six  people  were  interviewed,   including  31  trapped  and  nontrapped 
miners  who  were  given  psychological  tests. 

The  second  special  feature  of  this  disaster  was  the  long  his- 
tory of  previous  individual  accidents  and  disasters  in  this  particular 
mining  community,   the  most  recent  being  a  coal  dust  explosion  in 
1956.     Repeated  disasters  had  provided  material  for  the  folklore  and 
expectations  of  the  people  in  the  community.     It  might  be  anticipated, 
then,   that  individual  and  group  preparedness  would  play  a  discernable 
part  in  the  reaction  and  behavior  consequent  to  the  disaster.     It  was 
possible  to  make  a  number  of  observations  relevant  to  this  proposi- 
tion. 

When  the  bump  occurred,   the  shock  was  felt  and  heard  by  many 
people  in  the  community.    Whereas  most  studies  report  that  only  a 
few  people  interpret  disasters  accurately  at  first,   it  was  quite  dif- 
ferent in  Minetown.     Eighty-seven  per  cent  of  the  23  subjects  having 
a  direct  personal  involvement,   that  is,  the  men  having  relatives  and 
the  women  having  husbands  in  the  mine  at  the  time,   correctly  rec- 
ognized the  tremor  as  a  bump.     Of  the  24  subjects  not  having  such 
involvement,   only  43  per  cent  immediately  identified  it  as  a  bump. 

The  off- shift  miners  exhibited  the  convergence  behavior 
noticed  in  other  disasters,   all  but  one  of  them  going  to  the  mine 


135 


within  minutes  of  the  bump.     In  this  case,   convergence  was  due  to 
two  general  motives:     (a)  the  desire  for  information  about  the  bump 
and  the  welfare  of  friends  and  relatives  and  (b)  compliance  with  the 
informal  miners'  code  that  miners  participate  in  rescue  work.     It 
is  notable  that  the  code  in  Minetown  was  apparently  approved  by 
all  individuals,   including  wives  as  well  as  miners,   for  there  was 
no  evidence  of  the  conflicting  loyalties  between  family  and  job  duties, 
which  is  reported  in  other  disaster  studies.     While  it  is  true  that 
some  of  the  miners  had  relatives  in  the  mine  and  others  themselves 
had  been  saved  in  previous  disasters,  nevertheless,  the  readiness 
of  the  miners  to  put  rescue  work  before  danger  and  before  possible 
distress  to  their  family  was  apparently  related  to  the  history  and 
folklore  of  the  community.     The  fact  that  wives  likewise  manifested 
no  reservations  about  their  husbands  being  rescuers  indicates  that 
families  were  also  loyal  to  the  code. 

The  role  of  preparedness ,   specifically  the  experience  gained 
under  similar  conditions  after  the  1956  mine  explosion,  was  well 
illustrated  in  the  behavior  of  the  community  during  rescue  opera- 
tions.    Few  of  the  trapped  miners'  wives  went  to  the  mine;  they  had 
been  instructed  by  their  husbands  to  stay  away  from  the  pit  head 
because  of  the  crowding  that  occurred  in  the  1956  disaster.     On  the 
other  hand,   a  great  majority  of  the  less  involved  wives  did  go  to 
the  mine;     Rescue  operations  were  organized  within  minutes.     This 
was  largely  due  to  the  company's  competent  disaster  organization. 
Contrary  to  the  findings  in  other  studies  (Gordon  &:  Raymond,    1952), 
no  direction  from  outside  the  community  was  required  and  the  en- 
tire rescue  operation  was  locally  organized  and  carried  out.     At 
the  same  time,   a  large  number  of  special  services  converged  upon 
Minetown  from  a  radius  of  150  miles,   including  Army  and  Civil  De- 
fense units,   first  aid  stations,   mobile  kitchen,  an  oxygen  unit,  and 
psychiatric  unit.     It  was  notable  that  these  special  services  and 
personnel  integrated  rapidly  and  with  very  little  difficulty.     This 
was  presumably  because  many  of  them  attended  the   1956  disaster. 

All  of  the  wives  with  husbands  in  the  mine  joined  groups  of 
relatives  or  friends,  while  only  a  small  proportion  of  the  less  in- 
volved did  so.     It  was  clear  that  the  supportive  role  of  the  extended 
family  played  an  important  part  in  the  long  waiting  period  in  Mine- 
town.     This  agrees  with  the  findings  of  Fritz  and  Rayner  (1958). 
Presumably  the  presence  of  danger  and  disaster  helped  to  maintain 
the  cohesiveness  of  extended  family  units. 

There  was  adequate  "official"  information  throughout  the 
waiting  period  from  radio,  television,  and  press  located  at  the  pit 
head.     Nevertheless,  there  was  a  tendency  to  rely  on  private  sources 

136 


of  news,   such  as  the  doctor  or  a  relative  engaged  in  rescue  work. 
More  than  half  of  the  waiting  wives  rejected  the  official  announce- 
ment given  on  the  fifth  day  that  there  was  little  hope  for  the  buried 
men. 

On  the  whole,   individual  and  group  behavior  above  ground  dur- 
ing rescue  operations  and  the  long  waiting  period  contrasts  with 
several  of  the  findings  in  other  disaster  studies.     Minetown's  his- 
tory of  accident  and  disaster  had  led  to  the  development  of  a  stable 
social  structure  designed  to  handle  such  events,  and  the  disaster 
two  years  previously  constituted  a  rehearsal  that  made  for  more 
functional  behavior,   especially  of  the  numerous  special  services 
that  converged  on  the  site. 

A  content  analysis  technique  was  used  to  identify  and  count 
initiations  in  the  miners'  recorded  interviews.     An  initiation  was 
defined  as  an  act  that  originates  an  extended  sequence  of  behavior. 
Three  types  of  initiation  scores  were  discussed:    Initiation  Per- 
ception (the  number  of  initiations  that  a  miner  reported),   "I"  Ini- 
tiation (the  number  of  initiations  that  he  attributed  to  himself),  and 
Group  Evaluation  (the  number  of  initiations  attributed  to  him  by  all 
the  other  members  of  the  group).     Group  Evaluation  was  taken  as 
a  measure  of  the  extent  to  which  each  miner  was  perceived  by  his 
companions  as  promoting  current  group  activities  and  goals. 

An  examination  of  the  initiation  data  revealed  that  in  both 
groups  of  trapped  miners  the  interval  of  entrapment  involved  two 
relatively  distinct  phases:    an  escape  period  during  which  the  miners 
actively  sought  to  find  or  dig  their  way  out  and  a  survival  period 
during  which  the  miners  waited  for  rescue. 

The  initiation  pattern  of  the  group  changed  with  time  and  type 
of  problem.     The  majority  of  the  initiations  were  reported  for  the 
escape  period,  when  the  emphasis  was  on  task-oriented  activity. 
Fewer  initiations  were  reported  for  the  longer  survival  period, 
when  the  focus  was  on  affective  and  interpersonal  problems.     The 
miners  in  the  smaller  group  (group  of  six)  had  to  contend  with  the 
problem  of  a  miner  whose  arm  was  pinned  near  the  shoulder.     The 
alternatives  were  to  risk  an  amateur  and  probably  fatal  amputation 
with  an  axe  or  to  leave  him  and  hope  for  rescue.     They  decided  on 
the  latter.     The  miner  died  on  the  fifth  day  of  entrapment.     Almost 
all  initiations  with  reference  to  this  problem  were  depersonalized, 
indicating  the  difficulty  of  decision  on  the  matter  and  the  strong 
affect  involved. 


137 


The  two  groups  differed  in  their  patterns  of  initiations. 
There  were  more  miners  in  the  larger  group  (group  of  twelve) 
who  played  no  significant  role  in  the  group's  activities,  as  mea- 
sured by  Group  Evaluation,  thus  reflecting  an  influence  of  group 
size  on  member  participation.     The  group  of  twelve  also  men- 
tioned more  initiations  with  indefinite  referents,  indicating  that 
the  activities  of  larger  groups  are  more  depersonalized  and  a  func- 
tion of  subgroup  coalitions. 

The  circumstances  and  goals  of  the  miners  were  different  in 
the  two  periods.     In  the  escape  period,  they  had  water  and  light  and 
their  behavior  was  actively  directed  against  physical  barriers.     In 
the  survival  period,  the  miners  were  without  water  and  light  and 
their  efforts  were  concentrated  on  maintaining  emotional  control 
and  morale,   on  satisfying  their  thirst,   and  on  attracting  the  atten- 
tion of  rescuers.     When  initiation  scores  for  the  two  periods  were 
compared,   it  was  found  that  the  miners'  rank  order  for  "I"  Initia- 
tion and  Initiation  Perception  scores  was  relatively  constant.     In 
contrast,  the  miners1  rank  order  for  Group  Evaluation  was  quite 
different  for  the  two  periods.     In  other  words,  the  trapped  men 
perceived  different  members  as  leaders  during  the  escape  and  sur- 
vival periods . 

The  escape  and  survival  periods  were  closely  analogous  to 
the  two  types  of  situations  that  Bales  (1953)  has  identified:    the  task- 
oriented  situation  calling  for  instrumental- adaptive  leadership  be- 
havior and  the  emotion-oriented  circumstance  calling  for  expressive- 
integrative  behavior  (cf.  ,   Tyhurst,    1957b).     An  analysis  of  the  in- 
terview and  postrescue  psychological  data  indicated  that  the  per- 
ceived leaders  for  both  groups  in  the  escape  and  the  survival  periods 
had  contrasting  personal  qualities  that  enabled  them  to  play  the  re- 
quired roles.     Escape  leaders  were  characterized  by  the  following 
qualities: 

(a)  They  made  direct  driving  attacks  on  problems. 

(b)  They  perceived  problems  as  involving  physical  barriers 
rather  than  interpersonal  issues. 

(c)  They  associated  with  one  or  two  friends:    the  whole  group 
was  not  their  frame  of  reference. 

(d)  They  were  rather  individualistic  in  their  expressed 
opinions  and  actions ,   outspoken,   and  aggressive. 

(e)  They  were  not  particularly  concerned  with  having  the  good 
opinion  of  most  others. 

138 


(f)  They  lacked  empathy  and  emotional  control. 

(g)  Their  performance  abilities  were  better  than  their  ver- 
bal abilities. 

The  two  perceived  leaders  in  the  survival  period  shared  the 
following  characteristics: 

(a)  They  were  sensitive  to  the  moods,   feelings,   and  needs 

of  others,    rationalizing  and  sympathizing  with  them  when 
appropriate. 

(b)  They  sought  to  avoid  conflict  and  dissension. 

(c)  They  were  intellectualizers  ,  using  communication  rather 
than  action  to  satisfy  the  group  needs,  their  verbal  abili- 
ties being  better  than  their  performance  abilities. 

(d)  Their  role  in  the  survival  period  was  to  a  considerable 
degree  a  function  of  their  need  to  have  the  general  good 
opinion  and  recognition  of  the  whole  group,   rather  than 
the  specific  good  opinion  of  a  special  friend  or  partner. 

(e)  They  perceived  themselves  as  making  an  important  con- 
tribution to  the  group. 

The  following  psychological  tests  were  given  to  the  trapped 
miners:     the  Vocabulary,   Digit  Span,   and  Block  Design  subtests  of 
the  Wechsler  Adult  Intelligence  Scale;  the  Bender-Gestalt  drawing 
test;  the  Rorschach  ink  blot  test;  and  a  senteVice  completion  test. 
Psychiatrists  rated  each  miner's  interview  on  a  number  of  qualities 
indicating  ego  strength.     There  was  a  general  tendency  for  test  per- 
formance to  be  positively  related  to  initiation  behavior  as  credited 
to  the  man  by  himself  or  by  his  mates;  however,   only  the  Block  De- 
sign subtest  had  significant  relationships.    Of  the  other  psychologi- 
cal tests,   the  Bender-Gestalt  showed  somewhat  more  consistent 
relationships  with  initiations.     These  two  tests,  as  well  as  a  quan- 
titative Rorschach  measure,  were  efficient  in  differentiating  high 
and  low  initiators  but  did  not  discriminate  their  rank  order  or  the 
middle  of  the  distribution  so  well.     A  clinical  appraisal  of  the 
Rorschach  protocols  was  unsuccessful  in  distinguishing  high  and 
low  initiators. 

All  tests  and  measures  gave  better  scores  to  survival  leaders 
than  to  escape  leaders.     Some,   including  education,  Vocabulary, 
and  psychiatric  ratings  of  ego  strength  tended  to  be  negatively 

139 


related  to  escape  leadership.     It  was  suggested  that  the  frame  of 
reference  of  psychological  tests  and  clinical  judgment  is  selective 
and  may  overlook  social  qualities  that  the  group  recognizes  in  par- 
ticular situations.     Psychiatric  ratings  of  ego  strength  seemed  to 
be  influenced  by  the  miner's  cover  story  (Dollard,  Auld,   &:  White, 
1953),   giving  higher  scores  to  the  man  who  reported  more  detail 
and  who  gave  himself  most  credit. 

Psychological  tests  indicated  that  being  trapped  for  6  1/2  to 
81/2  days  with  little  food  and  water  and  with  the  threat  of  death 
affected  the  miners  less  than  expected.     Indeed,  their  test  scores 
seemed  to  be  affected  no  more  than  those  of  the  group  of  nontrapped 
miners.     On  the  other  hand,  the  Sentence  Completion  test  indicated 
that  trapped  miners  were  experiencing  more  subjective  anxiety  with 
self-preoccupation,  uncertainty,   and  questioning  of  personal  ade- 
quacy.    It  was  suggested  that  the  nontrapped  miners  did  not  consti- 
tute a  real  control  group,   but  that  both  groups  had  experienced 
stresses  that  differed  in  kind,   degree,  and  the  means  available  to 
handle  them. 

There  was  some  evidence  that  age  and  years  experience  in 
mining  were  factors  in  resistance  to  the  stresses  involved  in  the 
Minetown  disaster.     Younger  trapped  miners  did  better  on  tests 
than  did  older  trapped  miners  ,  while  older  nontrapped  miners  did 
better  than  younger  nontrapped  miners.     In  the  trapped  group,   age 
and  mining  experience  were  associated  with  constriction  of  thought 
and  imagination.     It  was  suggested  that  this  represented  an  exaggera- 
tion of  their  subjective  anxiety  to  the  point  of  depression. 

The  group  of  six  miners  were  trapped  for  81/2  days,  two  days 
longer  than  the  group  of  twelve.     The  former  group  exhibited  several 
unusual  trends  when  contrasted  with  the  latter  group:  less  perceptual 
control  and  a  tendency  to  overproduce  on  the  Rorschach,   more  sub- 
jective concerns,   stronger  dependency  needs,  a  tendency  to  present 
themselves  in  a  good  light,  and  atypical  correlations  between  tests 
and  initiation  measures.     It  was  suggested  that  a  number  of  factors 
may  have  contributed  to  these  results,   including  length  of  entrap- 
ment,  the  presence  of  a  pinned  miner  who  died  in  their  presence, 
and  the  tighter  social  controls  exhibited  in  the  small  group. 

The  findings  summarized  in  this  chapter  should  not  be  over- 
generalized.     They  were  derived  within  a  situation  whose  essential 
features  may  be  relatively  unique  and  they  are  based  on  data  from 
rather  small  incidental  samples.     However,  they  concern  human 
behavior  amenable  to  further  investigation  within  social  science 
research  as  well  as  within  the  special  field  of  disaster  research. 
It  is  hoped  that  some  of  the  results  of  this  study  will  be  clarified 
by  the  follow-up  study  of  Minetown  now  in  progress. 

140 
j 


APPENDIX  A 
THE  DISASTER  SERVICES  IN  MINETOWN 

Within  hours  after  the  occurrence  of  the  bump  in  Minctown  a 
large  number  of  special  service  units  went  into  action  (see  Table 
19).     Some,   like  the  Red  Cross  and  the  militia,  were  mobilized  in 
Minetown.     Others,   like  one  of  the  army  units  and  the  psychiatric 
team,   came  from  as  far  as  150  miles.     All  of  these  services  came 
to  render  relief  and  assistance  to  rescuers,  wives,  and  the  com- 
munity as  a  whole.     They  did  not  come  to  help  in  rescue  work. 
Most  of  them,   including  many  of  the  same  personnel,  had  served 
in  Minetown  during  the  1956  disaster.     In  general,  they  functioned 
as  they  had  in  1956,  using  the  same  lines  of  communication.     The 
following  section  is  a  brief  summary  of  the  handling  of  selected 
community  disaster  problems. 

Traffic  Control 


During  the  night  of  the  bump,  the  traffic  to  the  mine  was  very 
heavy.     Within  an  hour,   the  local  police,   assisted  by  local  militia, 
and  police  from  the  surrounding  region  were  stationed  at  important 
intersections  to  give  the  rescuers  and  equipment  the  right  of  way 
and  to  direct  them  to  the  large  parking  space  in  the  pit  yard.     All 
other  vehicles  were  kept  moving  to  the  side  streets  for  parking. 
The  road  to  the  hospital  was  cleared  and  kept  open  so  that  ambu- 
lances had  a  clear  right  of  way  from  the  pit  head  to  the  hospital. 
At  the  sound  of  an  ambulance  siren  all  traffic  moving  along  this 
right  of  way  was  stopped  by  "pointmen"  of  the  three  policing  agen- 
cies . 

Rescue  equipment,   such  as  oxygen  tanks,   stretchers,  and 
tents,  were  moved  into  the  pit  yard,   some  by  helicopter,  but  most 
of  it  by  truck.     Mobile  radio  and  television  equipment  were  also 
moved  into  the  area. 

Organization  of  Hospital 

In  the  hours  after  the  bump,  when  the  rescued  men  began  to 
come  to  the  surface  in  groups  of  two  or  three,  the  entrances  to  the 
hospital  were  not  congested  and  there  was  ample  parking  space 
available  at  the  hospital. 

141 


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The  three  doctors  of  Minetown  were  on  duty  and  the  49-bed 
hospital  was  prepared  for  the  emergency.    The  doctors  estimated 
that  it  would  be  three  hours  before  the  hospital  was  needed  and 
that  15  to  20  beds  might  be  required.     Accordingly,  they  had  15  to 
20  patients  moved  and  preparations  completed  to  receive  the  in- 
jured.    As  the  81  men  emerged  from  the  pit,  the  company  doctor 
gave  them  a  cursory  check.     About  20  cases  were  admitted  to  the 
hospital  on  the  first  night  and  30  more  cases  were  registered  as 
outpatients.     The  patients  were  suffering  from  broken  bones,   cuts, 
bruises,   and  methane  intoxication.     For  the  majority,  the  length 
of  stay  was  two  to  three  days.     When  word  was  received  that  12 
trapped  miners  were  alive,   a  field  hospital  and  an  emergency 
operating  room  were  set  up  in  the  armories. 

Administration  of  Victims 

The  first  dead  bodies  were  brought  up  at  noon  on  October  24. 
All  deaths  except  one  were  instantaneous  and  were  caused  by  mul- 
tiple contusions  and  crushing.     The  bodies  were  brought  to  the  sur- 
face at  the  end  of  each  eight-hour  shift.     As  rescue  work  was  dif- 
ficult and  slow,   the  number  of  bodies  recovered  on  each  shift  was 
limited  to  two  or  three. 

The  bodies  were  unofficially  identified  in  the  mine  by  the 
friends  who  dug  them  out,  by  the  location  of  the  bodies  in  the  mine, 
and  by  the  check  number  on  their  lamps.     On  arrival  at  the  surface 
before  they  were  taken  from  the  trolley,  they  were  seen  by  a  doc- 
tor,  an  official  of  the  Union,  and  a  representative  of  the  company. 
All  identification  was  done  by  this  team.     If  any  of  these  three  men 
was  in  doubt,  next  of  kin  were  brought  to  view  the  body.     Because 
of  mutilation  and  odor  the  family  was  not  asked  to  identify  the  re- 
mains in  most  cases.     Both  the  identity  and  the  means  of  identifi- 
cation were  marked  on  a  card  attached  to  the  body  and  signed  by 
all  three  officials.     The  duplicate  of  the  card  was  then  taken  by 
special  messenger  to  the  mine  manager's  office.     From  there,  the 
miner's  own  minister  was  notified,  and  he  was  given  half  an  hour 
to  notify  the  family  that  the  body  had  been  recovered  and  identified. 
If  the  miner's  own  minister  was  not  available,   a  second  minister 
was  called.     In  all  cases,  the  half  hour  was  strictly  adhered  to; 
after  this,   the  name  was  given  to  the  press. 

In  the  mine,   a  body  was  wrapped  in  a  blanket  and  plastic  and 
brought  to  the  surface  on  a  stretcher.     After  the  body  had  been 
identified,  it  was  taken  by  ambulance  or  station  wagon  to  the  tem- 
porary morgue,  which  began  to  operate  at  about  3  a.m.   on  October 
24.     It  operated  for  two  weeks,   first  in  the  armories  and  later  in  a 

145 


tent.     At  the  morgue,  the  body  was  placed  in  a  metal,  airtight 
coffin  liner  and  sealed.     The  blanket  and  plastic  wrapping  were 
not  removed.     The  identification  card  was  removed  from  the  body 
and  wired  to  the  coffin  liner,  and  this  information  was  also  entered 
in  the  morgue  book.     The  body  was  then  sent  to  the  town's  single 
funeral  parlor  where  it  was  placed  in  a  regular  coffin  and  taken  to 
the  family  home.     Due  to  the  condition  of  the  bodies,  nearly  all  of 
the  coffins  were  sealed.     Five  to  seven  funerals  took  place  each 
day,  usually  from  the  home  of  the  deceased,  and  the  local  ministers 
took  their  regular  part  in  each  service. 

Distribution  of  Information 

As  the  rescued  miners  came  to  the  surface,  before  the  mine 
office  officially  checked  them  in,   most  of  their  families  informally 
learned  of  their  safety  through  either  a  member  of  the  family  who 
was  waiting  at  the  pit  head  or  friends  who  passed  on  word.     By  the 
time  the   miner  had  turned  in  his  lamp  and  washed,  his  family  knew 
he  was  safe.     The  more  formal  procedure  of  notifying  the  bereaved 
was  noted  earlier. 

As  the  mine  office  and  the  manager's  residence  are  only  a 
few  hundred  yards  from  the  pit  head,  contact  and  communication 
with  officials  was  relatively  simple.     Immediately  after  the  bump 
and  for  the  first  nine  hours  afterwards,  the  company  doctor  was 
the  only  company  official  at  the  pit  head.     All  other  officials  were 
in  the  mine.     Twelve  hours  after  the  bump,  the  public  relations 
officer  and  his  assistant  set  up  a  press  release  headquarters  in  the 
mine  office  building,  where  all  information  was  centralized  for  the 
137  newspaper,,  television,  and  radio  reporters.     No  official  news 
could  be  obtained  from  the  pit  head,  although  much  unofficial  and 
sensational  news  was  obtained  there.     The  local  radio  station  re- 
ceived permission  to  stay  on  the  air  24  hours  each  day  to  report 
the  recovery  of  the  dead  and  the  rescued.     All  commercial  programs 
were  cancelled  and  the  entire  broadcast  time  devoted  to  announce- 
ments and  news  concerning  the  rescue  operation,  the  release  of 
victims'  names—with  recorded  music  for  continuity.     On-the-spot 
television  coverage  was  extensive,  and  national  and  regional  net- 
works extended  their  broadcasting  day  when  appropriate.     As  a 
consequence,   most  people  in  Minetown  remained  at  home  to  listen 
to  the  radio.     The  extensive  information  service  was  probably  in- 
strumental in  controlling  crowds  and  reducing  the  level  of  anxiety 
among  the  population  (cf.  ,  Conference.  .  .  ,     1953).     This  together 
with  the  fact  that  there  was  little  to  see- -no  wholesale  destruction 
--resulted  in  relatively  small  crowds  at  the  pit  head  and  the  morgue. 


146 


Psychiatric  Service 

In  the  1956  Minetown  disaster,  a  psychiatric  team  consisting 
of  a  social  worker,  a  psychiatrist,  and  a  nurse  joined  the  other 
disaster  services  present  in  Minetown  (Dunsworth,   1958;  Weil  k 
Dunsworth,    1958).     They  offered  psychiatric  service  to  all  survi- 
vors and  relatives  of  victims  who  requested  such  service  and  were 
available  for  referrals  from   other  medical  authorities,   clergy,   re- 
lief organizations,   etc.     This  group  was  expanded  to  four  teams 
which  relieved  each  other  in  rotation  in  order  to  give  continuous 
service.     Patients  were  mostly  townspeople.     The  fact  that  few  of 
the  rescued  miners  were  seen  during  the  disaster  period  was  re- 
gretted since  during  the  succeeding  twelve  months  14  of  the  88  sur- 
vivors were  referred  for  psychiatric  assessment. 

In  1958,   one  or  two  psychiatrists  together  with  a  psychiatric 
nurse  were  continuously  maintained  in  Minetown  from  October  24 
to  November  3.     Teams  released  from  regular  duties  were  changed 
on  a  rotation  basis,   each  team  serving  one  or  two  days  at  a  time. 
Service  was  available  through  referral  or  on  a  request  basis. 
Only  one  of  the  81  miners  rescued  within  the  first  24  hours  was 
referred  to  the  psychiatrist.     None  of  the   19  trapped  miners  were 
referred  to  psychiatry  for  appraisal  or  treatment.     Word  was 
spread  through  the  town  by  the  local  Mental  Health  Association  and 
by  relief  agencies  that  psychiatric  services  were  available,   and 
from  October  24  to  November  2,    121  individuals,    mostly  relatives 
of  victims,   were  sean  and  treated.     Virtually  all  cases  were 
examined  in  their  homes. 

Grief  reaction,   exhaustion  with  nervous  tension,   and  acute 
anxiety  reactions  were  the  most  common  diagnoses.     Grief  reactions 
were  usually  of  the  hysterical  or  muted  depressive  type.     Forms  of 
treatment  for  grief  reaction  included  emotional  support  and  the  pre- 
scription of  tranquillizers  and  sedatives.     Besides  serving  in  their 
specialty,   the  psychiatrists  functioned  in  a  more  purely  medical 
role.     The  psychiatric  nurse  played  a  supportive  role  with  patients 
and  families  and  accompanied  many  wives  and  relatives  of  victims 
to  the  morgue. 

Institution  of  Recommendations 

As  a  result  of  the  experience  at  Minetown,  a  Provincial  Dis- 
aster Committee  has  been  established  to  provide  guidance  and 
assistance  in  local  disasters,  thereby  putting  into  effect  most  of 
the  above  recommendations.     The  Committee  includes  representa- 
tives from  Civil  Defense,   Red  Cross,   St.   John  Ambulance,  Salvation 

147 


Army,  and  Canadian  Legion.     Each  of  these  agencies  has  accepted 
responsibility  for  specific  services  in  the  event  of  disaster.     In 
addition,  the  National  Police  and  the  Regular  Army  supply  liaison 
officers  to  the  Committee.     The  terms  of  reference  and  operating 
procedures  of  the  Committee  have  been  communicated  to  all  senior 
municipal  officials  throughout  the  Province. 


148 


APPENDIX  B 

MEDICAL  FINDINGS  ON  THE  CONDITION  OF  THE 
TRAPPED  MINERS 

Medical  reports  of  local  physicians  on  the  condition  of  the 
trapped  miners  after  rescue,   together  with  information  from  the 
psychiatric  interview  obtained  from  6  to  23  days  later,  provided 
factual  material  that  could  be  tabulated.     The  information  was 
coded  according  to  the  categories  and  definitions  presented  in 
Tables  20  and  21. 

At  the  time  of  rescue  all  the  miners  were  dehydrated,  had 
lost  weight,   and  were  weak.     During  the  mine  upheaval,   only  4 
miners  escaped  with  minor  simple  injuries,    12  acquired  multiple 
bruises,   cuts,   and  abrasions,   and  3  were  severely  injured  (frac- 
tures and  severe  tissue  injuries). 

When  rescued,   6  men  had  minor  psychological  symptoms 
(minimal  signs  of  anxiety  and  depression),  and  11  were  moderate- 
ly tense--the  tension  expressed  predominately  in  speech  and  rest- 
lessness.    One  had  marked  anxiety  symptoms:    he  cried,  trembled, 
and  had  weak  spells  lasting  beyond  the  immediate  treatment  period. 
The  remaining  man  was  confused. 

Upon  arrival  in  the  hospital  in  Minetown,  all  of  the  19  res- 
cued miners  received  homeostatic  restorative  procedures  in  the 
form  of  intravenous  infusions  to  counteract  their  dehydration, 
vitamins  by  injection,   and  antibiotic  drugs  which  were  adminis- 
tered for  the  treatment  of  existing  infections  and  as  a  preventive 
measure.     Three  injured  men  needed  blood  transfusions.     Two 
men  required  immediate  major  surgical  interventions  and  5  re- 
quired immediate  minor  surgical  treatment.     Six  miners  who  dis- 
played emotional  symptoms  were  given  sedatives  and  tranquilizing 
drugs. 

Most  rescued  men  recovered  after  immediate  treatment  and 
10  were  well  enough  to  be  discharged  after  two  days  of  hospitaliza- 
tion.     Nine  were  retained  in  hospital  for  more  than  two  days.     Of 
these  9,   3  remained  in  the  local  hospital  for  a  considerable  period 
of  time,   2  for  major  surgical  conditions,  and  one  for  rest  and 

149 


TABLE  20 

Distribution  by  Category  of  Physical  and  Emotional 
Condition  and  Treatment  of  the  Trapped  Miners 

Number 

Codea         Category  of  condition  or  treatment  of  cases 

General  condition  on  rescue 

g  Fairly  good:  dehydrated,  but  otherwise  good  2 

f                  Fair:  dehydrated,  weak  10 
p                  Poor:  dehydrated,   "sick,"  "shocked,"  "weak"        7 
Injuries  when  rescued 

1  Minor  simple  4 

2  Minor  multiple  12 

3  Severe  3 
Emotional  state  when  rescued 

1  Minimal  emotional  symptoms  6 

2  Anxiety:  tension  symptoms  moderate  11 

3  Anxiety:  tension  symptoms  marked  1 

4  Confusion  1 
Immediate  treatment  in  hospital 

N                No  treatment  0 

H                Homeostatic  restorative  procedures  19 

M                Medical  0 

P                 Psychiatric  (sedatives  or  tranquillizers)  6 

s                  Minor  surgical  5 

5  Major  surgical  2 
Condition  after  immediate  treatment 

g                 Good  10 

f                  Fair  7 

p                 Poor  2 

Duration  of  hospitalization  in  Minetown 

2                  Two  days  or  less  10 

2+               More  than  two  days  9 

Disposal  locally  after  immediate  treatment  in 

Minetown 

N                 No  treatment  15 

I                  Investigation  only  0 

M                Medical  treatment  1 

P                Psychiatric  treatment  1 

S                  Surgical  treatment  2 

Treatment  at  other  centers 

N                No  treatment  16 

I                  Investigation  only  1 

M                Medical  1 

P                 Psychiatric  0 

S                  Surgical  1 

150 


TABLE  20  (Continued) 


Number 
Codea  Category  of  condition  or  treatment  of  cases 

Emotional  condition  when  interviewed 

N  No  symptoms  1 

1  Tense  7 

2  Anxious,   fidgity,   restless,  tired  easily  8 

3  Depressed  1 

4  Paranoid  trends  1 

5  Confused  1 
Physical  condition  when  interviewed 

N  No  symptoms  12 

T-  Symptoms  but  no  treatment  required  3 

T  Symptoms  requiring  treatment  4 

aFor  application  of  code,   see  Table  21. 

psychiatric  treatment.     Of  those  discharged  after  two  days,  one 
was  readmitted  with  jaundice  and  treated  medically,  and  one  who 
was  retained  in  hospital  for  four  days  was  subsequently  given  psy- 
chiatric outpatient  treatment. 

Three  patients  were  transferred  to  other  centers,  one  for 
amputation  of  a  limb  following  traumatic  thrombosis  of  the  femoral 
artery,   one  for  medical  treatment  of  silicosis  and  pulmonary  tuber- 
culosis,  and  one  for  psychiatric  investigation  not  followed  by  treat- 
ment. 

All  19  trapped  miners  were  interviewed  by  a  psychiatrist  be- 
tween the  sixth  and  twenty- third  day  following  rescue.     Only  one  of 
those  interviewed  did  not  show  any  signs  of  anxiety.     Seven  were 
described  as  tense,   8  were  anxious,   fidgity,   restless,  and  very 
easily  tired.     One  of  the  miners  had  definite  signs  of  depression, 
one  man  expressed  paranoid  ideas  bordering  on  delusions,  and  one 
was  confused. 

At  the  time  of  the  interview,    12  miners  had  no  observable 
physical  symptoms  nor  did  they  complain  about  such,   3  mentioned 
physical  symptoms  but  did  not  seem  to  need  special  medical  atten- 
tion, and  4  still  required  and  were  receiving  medical,   surgical, 
or  psychiatric  care. 


151 


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APPENDIX  C 
THE  SENTENCE  COMPLETION  TEST 

The  incomplete  sentences  in  this  test  were  made  up  to  sample 
in  a  systematic  manner  the  miners'  verbalized  fears,  needs,  feel- 
ings, attitudes,  hopes,  and  expectations  with  reference  to  their  dis- 
aster experience  and  to  their  current  situation.     The  instrument 
was  not  pretested.     While  the  items  were  designed  for  this  particu- 
lar investigation,   most  of  them  are  sufficiently  general  to  be  appli- 
cable in  other  situations,  disaster  or  otherwise.     The  efficiency  of 
the  instrument  is  discussed  briefly  in  Chapter  7. 


153 


Sentence  Completion  Test 


Instructions;     Below  are  31  partly  completed  sentences.     Read 
each  one  and  finish  it  by  writing  down  the  first  thought  that  comes 
to  your  mind.     Do  not  bother  about  whether  it  makes  sense  to  you 
or  not.     If  sevetal  thoughts  come  to  mind  at  once,  write  down  the 
first  one,  and  the  next  ones  also.     Do  not  bother  about  how  well 
you  can  write;  we  are  interested  in  your  first  thoughts  about  each 
sentence.     Work  fast  by  just  writing  down  whatever  thoughts  come 
to  your  mind  as  you  read  each  sentence. 


1.  Home  is , 

2.  A  leader  is , 

3.  I  would  never , 

4.  The  people  I  work  with  are 

5.  My  ambition 

6.  Religious  people , 

7 .  I  would  like  to     . , 

8.  A  friend  will , 

9.  A  man's  wife  should    .... 

10.  The  future  is 

11.  What  bothers  me , 

12.  The  thing  I  like  about  myself 

13.  .What  I  like  about  church    .    . 

14.  The  trouble  with  boses   .    .    . 

15.  What  I  need 

16.  Relatives  are 

17.  My  greatest  fear 

18.  What  I  like  about  my  job    .    . 

19.  God  is  .    . 

20.  The  people  over  me 

21.  To  move  to  another  place.    . 

22.  When  I  am  afraid 

23.  My  greatest  worry 

24.  A  good  education 

25.  I  failed 

26.  What  I  want  for  my  children 

27.  My  mind 

28.  My  greatest  weakness     .    .    . 

29.  When  I  am  old 

30.  My  nerves 

31.  In  times  of  trouble  we  need 


154 


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HILL 

REFERENCE 


160 


NATIONAL  ACADEMY  OF  SCIENCES—NATIONAL  RESEARCH   COUNCIL 

The  National  Academy  of  Sciences — National  Research  Council  is 
a  private,  nonprofit  organization  of  scientists,  dedicated  to  the  fur- 
therance of  science  and  to  its  use  for  the  general  welfare. 

The  Academy  itself  was  established  in  1863  under  a  Congressional 
charter  signed  by  President  Lincoln.  Empowered  to  provide  for  all 
activities  appropriate  to  academies  of  science,  it  was  also  required  by 
its  charter  to  act  as  an  adviser  to  the  Federal  Government  in  scientific 
matters.  This  provision  accounts  for  the  close  ties  that  have  always 
existed  between  the  Academy  and  the  Government,  although  the 
Academy  is  not  a  governmental  agency. 

The  National  Research  Council  was  established  by  the  Academy  in 
1916,  at  the  request  of  President  Wilson,  to  enable  scientists  generally 
to  associate  their  efforts  with  those  of  the  limited  membership  of  the 
Academy  in  service  to  the  nation,  to  society,  and  to  science  at  home 
and  abroad.  Members  of  the  National  Research  Council  receive  their 
appointments  from  the  President  of  the  Academy.  They  include  rep- 
resentatives nominated  by  the  major  scientific  and  technical  societies, 
representatives  of  the  Federal  Government,  and  a  number  of  mem- 
ber s-at-large.  In  addition,  several  thousand  scientists  and  engineers 
take  part  in  the  activities  of  the  Research  Council  through  member- 
ship on  its  various  boards  and  committees. 

Receiving  funds  from  both  public  and  private  sources,  by  contribu- 
tions, grant,  or  contract,  the  Academy  and  its  Research  Council  thus 
work  to  stimulate  research  and  its  applications,  to  survey  the  broad 
possibilities  of  science,  to  promote  effective  utilization  of  the  scientific 
and  technical  resources  of  the  country,  to  serve  the  Government,  and 
to  further  the  general  interests  of  science.